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Ownership is one of the most fundamental concepts in tax law, yet it
remains remarkably confused. The uncertainty inhibits tax planning, leads to
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the issue, but most of the commentary has been either exceedingly narrow or
focused on far-reaching reforms. As a result, the law of tax ownership lacks
conceptual foundation. This article attempts to remedy the deficiency by
proposing a comprehensive approach to tax ownership and demonstrating that
the doctrine may (and should) be significantly clarified without a dramatic
overhaul of the existing substantive law. The approach rests on dividing all
ownership questions into four categories depending on the context in which the
questions arose. Using this analytical framework, the article allocates various
tax ownership authorities to appropriate categories and develops the
underlying principles guiding the analysis for each group. Because these
principles differ among the categories, the article suggests that the existence of
numerous seemingly inconsistent tax ownership decisions should be
understood not as a sign of a confused doctrine, but as an appropriate result
reflecting the underlying conceptual differences. By rationalizing and
organizing the law of tax ownership, the article provides a framework for
resolving future tax ownership controversies.
INTRODUCTION
If one wanted to make a point that there is no such thing as a simple tax
concept, ownership would be a perfect example. One of the central concepts
of tax law, it is as complex as it is confused. Ownership has generated
controversy virtually from the inception of federal income tax, given rise to
countless disputes between the government and the taxpayers throughout the
years, and remains as contentious today as it has ever been. As one could
expect from this ongoing battle, no clear winner has emerged. More
importantly, no comprehensive doctrine has developed. Competing views of
tax ownership have been expressed and tested in a multitude of fairly narrow
unrelated factual settings. Particular types of transactions raised tax ownership
questions at different times. Years, and sometimes decades, separated the
judges considering novel tax ownership questions from the decisions that could
have provided a useful insight. More often than not, remoteness and factual
dissimilarity prevented consideration of the relevant authorities. As a result,
the law of tax ownership today is a patchwork of rules that appear to lack a
unifying principle (or set of principles).
Absent a conceptual foundation, novel ownership issues continue to create
considerable uncertainty at the planning stage, lead to confused and sometimes
self-contradicting responses from the government, and produce highly
unpredictable outcomes in the courts. Tax commentators have long identified
the problem, but have not succeeded in remedying it. While the scholars agree
that the current ownership doctrine is unsatisfactory,' their work, for the most
'See, e.g., Charles I. Kingson, The Confusion Over Tax Ownership, 93 TAx NOTES 409,
409 (2001) (referring to the "continuing confusion over the criteria to determine [tax]
ownership"); Steven M. Surdell, Analyzing Equity-Linked Debt Instruments After Reform
Proposals, 71 TAx NOTES 1525, 1532 (1996) ("Determinations of tax ownership and
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part, has been either relatively narrow and restricted to the analysis of
particular transactions,2 or extremely broad and focused on questions of
fundamental reform.3 This article attempts to fill in the gap by suggesting a
comprehensive approach to tax ownership and demonstrating that the doctrine
may (and should) be significantly clarified without a dramatic overhaul of the
existing substantive law. By rationalizing and organizing the law of tax
ownership, I hope to develop a framework that will be useful in resolving
future ownership questions.
4
debt/equity characterization constitute two of the more difficult issues in all of federal
income taxation."); No~l B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without
Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 725 (1992)
("Unfortunately, development of the concept of ownership has been characterized by
unsophisticated analysis and a lack of uniformity."); Walter C. Cliff & Philip J. Levine,
Reflections on Ownership - Sales and Pledges of Installment Obligations, 39 TAX LAW. 37,
42 (1985) ("Ownership issues.., cannot be answered mechanically and are devoid of
simple solutions. It is difficult to glean a standard from the case law and Service rulings for
drawing the fine lines inherent in ownership analysis ... ").
2 For example, Edward Kleinbard developed the fundamental difference between tax
ownership of fungible and nonfungible assets in Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities -
perhaps the most influential intellectual statement of the 1990s in this area. See Edward D.
Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES 783 (1993). However, as its
title implies, Kleinbard's article is limited to considering only one type of fungible assets-
securities. Furthermore, Kleinbard devoted most of his attention to the analysis of the
timing authorities. Leasing transactions, including sale-leasebacks and leveraged leases,
have received a large share of attention. See, e.g., Richard E. Marsh, Jr., Tax Ownership of
Real Estate, 39 TA LAW. 563 (1985); Michael H. Simonson, Determining Tax Ownership
of Leased Property, 38 TAX LAW. 1 (1984); Peter L. Faber, Determining the Owner of an
Asset for Tax Purposes, 61 TAXES 795 (1983); Louis A. Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A
Hollow Sound When Tapped?, 37 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 n.2 (1981) (citing numerous earlier
articles on sales and leases going back to the 1940s). Additionally, several articles focus on
certain celebrated cases. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfnan, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's
Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981); William H. Kinsey,
Bootstraps and Capital Gain-A Participant's View of Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 64
MICH. L. REV. 581 (1966).
' See generally, Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income,
50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995) (questioning viability of the existing risk-based rules, including
those involving tax ownership, and considering alternatives); Cunningham & Schenk, supra
note 1 (suggesting that tax law should recognize multiple owners of property and have
income imputation rules).
' There are at least two comprehensive discussions of tax ownership issues. See JAMES
M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SECURITIZATION
TRANSACTIONS, at 68-85 (3d ed. 2001) (dividing numerous authorities into ten different
groupings, including categories for short sales and for the timing cases); David S. Miller,
Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax Ownership: Current Law and Future Prospects, 51 TAX
LAW. 279 (1988) (compiling a comprehensive source of tax ownership authorities and
suggesting an approach to analyzing tax ownership cases). However, neither Peaslee nor
Miller advocate the approach proposed in this article.
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My main argument is that confusion plaguing the law of tax ownership is
largely unnecessary and may be considerably reduced if one recognizes that
tax ownership issues should be analyzed differently depending on the context
in which they arose. The contextual approach I propose here is based on an
observation that two fundamental distinctions profoundly affect the tax
ownership analysis. The first is the distinction between fungible and
nonfungible assets. 5 The second is the difference between an inquiry into the
timing of an ownership transfer (I will call it the when case) and an
examination of the substance of that transfer (I will call it the whether case).
Taking these two distinctions into account results in four separate categories:
(1) fungible when cases, (2) nonfungible when cases, (3) fungible whether
cases, and (4) nonfungible whether cases.
Having identified these categories, I attempt to discern whether authorities
in each group can be reconciled and, if so, on what basis. Unfortunately, cases
are replete with generic references to a "bundle of rights,' 6 benefits and
burdens, and never-failing arguments based on the taxpayers' intent.7 Only
rarely do authorities refer to the precedents that are relevant based on the
proposed framework. Conversely, citations to irrelevant decisions are
commonplace. Separating the authorities into four groups helps to go behind
the rhetoric and reveal the underlying approaches. Somewhat unexpectedly,
authorities within each category are fairly consistent with each other, in
outcomes if not in reasoning. Conversely, the approaches differ, sometimes
dramatically, from one category to the next. Once the numerous cases are
sorted out into the appropriate groups, and once the test applicable for each
group is identified, the law of tax ownership becomes considerably more
5 Edward Kleinbard stressed the importance of fungibility in analyzing tax ownership of
securities. See Kleinbard, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., Merrill v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 66, 74 (1963) (stating that "ownership of a
property is not a single indivisible concept but a bundle of rights with respect to the
property").
7 Practically every commentator who thought about tax ownership argued that the courts
and the government should abandon consideration of the parties' intent. See, e.g.,
Simonson, supra note 2, at 30-31 (calling inquiries into subjective intent a "red herring" and
explaining that "[tihe search for intent, and the attention and discussion devoted to both the
idea and the search, usually accomplish little and detract from the factors, identified or not,
that in fact control the decision"). Occasionally, courts themselves ridicule the parties or a
lower court for basing a legal conclusion on the taxpayer's intent. See, e.g., Major Realty
Corp. v. Comm'r, 749 F.2d 1483, 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Tax Court's questionable
finding that the parties did not 'intend' to close is 'immaterial to the characterization of the
transaction for tax purposes."') (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 751
(8th Cir. 1976)); American Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 451 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("We note first that more than the legal opinions and otherwise self-serving
testimony of the trial court witnesses about their past intention to transfer 'ownership' is
required under the circumstances here to rebut the presumption that the Commissioner's
determination was correct.").
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coherent and predictable.
There are many familiar examples in each of the suggested categories. A
sale of an office building is a classic nonfungible when case. The question
here is whether the tax ownership is transferred at the signing, the closing, or
somewhere in between. The nonfungible when authorities purport to make this
determination based on a multi-factor test. 8 I argue, however, that rather than
merely balancing the factors, most of these authorities answer the question by
identifying, in essence, the point of no return. Thus, in nonfungible when
cases, the sale takes place when neither the buyer nor the seller can back away
from the deal.
A forward sale of IBM stock is a typical fungible when case. Timing of
ownership transfer in this context hinges on the uncertainty about the shares
being sold (uncertainty that is entirely absent in the office building case and
that reflects the fundamental difference between fungible and nonfungible
assets). Although the forward buyer gains full economic exposure to IBM at
the inception of the contract, the ownership transfer is delayed until the
specific shares are identified, usually by delivery to the buyer. While this
conclusion seems directly contrary to the widely applicable rule dealing with
settlements of securities sales, I reexamine the rule's history and argue that the
rule might be viewed as a misguided attempt to follow the same principles that
apply to all fungible when cases.
Nonfungible whether decisions, such as sale-leaseback authorities, turn
largely on economic considerations. The question here is whether the taxpayer
actually sold the "sold" property, or merely pledged it as security for a loan.
The authorities inevitably cite title and possession along with economic
exposure as major factors affecting the analysis. Despite the recitations,
however, I suggest that title and possession usually have little weight because
they are frequently split in a predictable and repeated fashion. Allocation of
economic benefits and burdens, on the other hand, varies from case to case,
often in nuanced ways.
A sale and repurchase of securities, or a "repo," is a typical fungible whether
case. In this context, the authorities determine whether ownership has been
transferred at all by deciding whether the original owner has transferred control
over the securities to a repo buyer. Whoever ends up with control is the tax
owner. On the other hand, economic exposure is not determinative. The
courts' and government's repeated assertions that economics matters in this
setting arguably confuse the analysis. On the other hand, the lack of a detailed
consideration of the subtleties of control has resulted in a considerable
uncertainty surrounding tax treatment of popular market transactions.
Finally, fungibility itself is context-sensitive. Fungible assets such as
publicly traded securities may lose their fungibility and start "acting" as if they
were nonfungible. When this happens, the inquiry in either the when or
' See infra text accompanying note 123 (describing the multi-factor analysis used by
nonfungible when authorities).
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whether context shifts to that applicable to nonfungible assets. Understanding
this phenomenon is critical to placing a particular dispute into the appropriate
category, as I demonstrate using an example of a recent tax ownership
controversy.
The remainder of the article consists of seven parts. Parts I through IV
address each of the four categories and compare the principles governing each
category with those underlying a related one. Part V compares when and
whether authorities in general. Part VI considers a recent case raising a tax
ownership issue. A brief Conclusion completes the article.
I. THE FUNGIBLE WHEN AUTHORITIES
A. Short Sales, Prepaid Forwards and the Trade Date Rule
The fungible when authorities, as all when cases, address the tax ownership
question in circumstances where the nature of the transaction is clear: it is a
transfer of an asset for consideration, i.e., a sale. What is not clear is the exact
moment when this transfer occurs. The analysis used by courts and the
Internal Revenue Service to resolve this issue depends on whether or not the
asset in question is fungible.
The fundamental difference between fungible and nonfungible assets was
recognized by the Supreme Court several years prior to enactment of the
federal income tax. In Richardson v. Shaw,9 the Court considered whether a
broker owns shares purchased on margin for its customer.' 0 The Court
concluded that the broker's bankruptcy should not prevent the customer from
withdrawing the shares because the customer, not the broker, owned the
stock." Rebutting the argument that the broker should be viewed as the owner
because it was free to deliver to the customer certificates other than those
originally placed in the margin account, the Court focused on the fungible
nature of the asset involved:
A certificate of the same number of shares, although printed upon
different paper and bearing a different number, represents precisely the
same kind and value of property as does another certificate for a like
number of shares of stock in the same corporation. It is a misconception
of the nature of the certificate to say that a return of a different certificate
or the right to substitute one certificate for another is a material change in
the property right held by the broker for the customer. As was said by the
Court of Appeals of New York, "one share of stock is not different in
kind or value from every other share of the same issue and company.
They are unlike distinct articles of personal property which differ in kind
and value, such as a horse, wagon, or harness. The stock has no earmark
9 209 U.S. 365 (1908).
10 Id. at 371.
I Id. at 377-80.
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which distinguishes one share from another, so as to give it any additional
value or importance; like grain of a uniform quality, one bushel is of the
same kind and value as another."' 12
Not long after the arrival of federal income tax, the Service concluded that
the holding of Richardson v. Shaw regarding stock ownership applies for tax
purposes and, therefore, the client, and not the broker, is an owner of dividends
paid on the stock held in street name.1 3 Even earlier, the Service had tackled a
tax ownership issue when it considered whether securities dealers should
recognize gains and losses with respect to their open short sales at the end of
their taxable years. 14
In a short sale, a short seller borrows an asset, such as shares of stock, and
sells it into the market.' 5 The short seller undertakes to return shares identical
to those borrowed to the stock lender and usually posts the proceeds of the sale
with the lender as collateral. Eventually, the short seller acquires shares
identical to those borrowed and returns them to the stock lender, completing
(or "covering") the short sale. A short sale is important in both when and
whether contexts. The Supreme Court held early on that the first leg of a short
sale - lending of securities subject to the borrower's obligation to return
identical securities - transfers ownership of securities for tax purposes despite
being called a "securities loan."'1 6 This transaction is addressed in detail later
in the article. Once it is concluded that a stock lender loses ownership at the
inception of a short sale, it follows that the return of securities by the borrower
is also an ownership transfer. Timing of that transfer presents a classic when
question. The borrower's obligation to return identical securities to the stock
lender is similar to that of a taxpayer who agrees to sell the stock on a future
date, i.e., enters into a forward contract. Both transactions raise the question of
whether an obligation to deliver stock in the future should lead to an immediate
transfer of its ownership to the future purchaser.
Analyzing the tax consequences of a short sale in 1919, the IRS began by
emphasizing the fungible nature of the stock sold short: "Shares of stock are
fungible things, and their loan with an agreement to return things of the same
class is the mutuum of Roman law .... -'17 The focus on fungibility is hardly
12 Id. at 378-79 (citations omitted).
I S.M. 4281, IV-2 C.B. 187, 187 (1925).
14 S. 1179, 1 C.B. 60, 60 (1919).
15 For a comprehensive discussion of short sales and tax rules applicable to these
transactions see Edward D. Kleinbard & Erika W. Nijenhuis, Short Sales and Short Sale
Principles in Contemporary Applications, in 53 N.Y.U. ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION ch. 17 (1995).
16 Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 451-54 (1926).
17 S. 1179, 1 C.B. 60, 61. A mutuum is "a loan for consumption," see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1022 (6th ed. 1990). Because it is expected that the asset will be consumed, it
is necessarily acknowledged that the borrower will return an asset identical to the one
borrowed, but not the very same one. In essence, a mutuum is a loan of a fungible asset. At
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surprising because the distinction between fungible and nonfungible assets
underlies the very nature of a short sale. Generally, only fungible assets may
be sold short. If the asset is fungible, the lender, being fully aware of the
borrower's intent to sell the specific asset borrowed, would accept the
borrower's promise to return an identical asset in the future for two reasons.
First, it makes no difference to the lender whether the asset returned is the very
same asset that was borrowed (the specific asset), or is different but
indistinguishable from it (the identical asset). Second, it is reasonable for the
lender to expect that the borrower will keep his promise because the asset in
question is widely available. 18 Thus, in tax ownership cases, an asset is
fungible if it is widely available, at least to the party relinquishing tax
ownership (the forward seller or the stock borrower obligated to return the
stock), and if the party acquiring tax ownership (the forward buyer or the stock
lender expecting a return of the stock) is indifferent as to which particular asset
is eventually delivered as long as it belongs to the same category of
economically identical assets.
Having recognized the importance of fungibility, the IRS observed that as
long as a short sale remains open (i.e., until the borrower returns specific
shares to the lender), tax consequences of the transaction cannot be
determined. 19 In a short sale (as in a prepaid forward contract discussed next),
the amount realized from the sale is known before the tax basis of the asset
sold. The amount realized is the amount received by the short seller upon a
market sale of the borrowed asset. The adjusted basis, however, is that of the
asset ultimately delivered to the lender to cover the short. Until the borrower
delivers the specific asset, its basis cannot be determined. In light of this
common law, such a loan is treated as a sale, not a bailment. Id. If the specific asset that
was lent must be returned to the lender, the loan is called commodatum - this is a loan of a
nonfungible asset. Id. at 274. In a commodatum, a lender retains ownership of the asset. Id.
at 937-38 (defining "loan for use"). See also, Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 786-87 n.16
(discussing these definitions).
18 For exactly the same reasons, one may enter into a forward contract to sell a share of
stock in one year without identifying any specific share as being subject to the contract.
Even if the forward buyer pays the purchase price, or a portion of it, when she enters into
this forward (i.e., if the forward contract is prepaid), the buyer is not concerned whether the
seller would be able to fulfill his obligations, as long as the buyer receives adequate
collateral. Generally, this would be true even if at the inception of the forward the seller
owns no stock at all. If an asset is nonflingible, expectations would be quite different. A
request sometime in the fall to borrow a friend's cottage on Cape Cod in order to sell it is
likely to be met with skepticism. The cottage is unique and, once sold, cannot be replaced
in the spring by returning a villa in the Hamptons.
19 "[I]t is clear that a taxpayer making a short sale can not know whether he has suffered
a loss or made a gain until an equivalent number of shares of the stock borrowed for that
purpose has been repurchased and returned to the lender. The accuracy of any gain or loss
accrued upon the books of a taxpayer making short sales would depend upon the cost of the
stock at the time it is purchased for return, and, it is apparent that this cost can not be
foreseen .... S. 1179, 1 C.B. 60, 62 (emphasis in original).
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uncertainty facilitated by the fungible nature of stock, the Service concluded
that a short sale should not be given tax effect until it is closed by delivery of
specific shares (with a known tax basis) by the borrower.20 The Supreme
Court strongly embraced the broader principle that a transaction should not be
viewed as closed for tax purposes until it is possible to ascertain its tax
consequences - a rule that has become known as the "open transaction"
doctrine. 2' In the tax ownership context, this principle means that a transfer of
ownership should not be recognized until its tax consequences can be
determined with certainty. Throughout the article I will refer to this principle
as the "certainty rule."
The decision reached by the Service in 1919 withstood eighty plus years of
tax disputes. The Service confirmed it several years later and formalized it in
the Treasury regulations in mid-1930s. These regulations remain in effect
today in an essentially unaltered form. 22 They were upheld by courts23 and
reaffirmed in several revenue rulings, the latest issued in 2004.24
It is not hard to see the wisdom of treating a short sale as an open
transaction if the short seller has nothing that conceivably could be viewed as
owned by the stock lender. But it is hardly self-evident that a taxpayer who
sells a stock short while holding identical stock (i.e., enters into a so-called
"short against the box" transaction) should be treated as the continuing owner
as well. After all, this taxpayer holds stock of the type he will ultimately
deliver (and that could be viewed as sold when the short sale is entered into).
Furthermore, the short seller completely immunizes himself from any
economic exposure to that stock. On the other hand, the stock lender is fully
exposed to the stock's upside and downside. Yet, the black letter law says that
it makes no difference whether a taxpayer enters into a short sale of securities
while holding identical securities or acquires identical securities later. The
short sale remains open in either case. 25 The only possible explanation for this
complete separation of tax ownership from economics is that uncertainty about
the specific asset being sold and the concomitant impossibility of determining
the tax consequences of the sale override the stock lender's full economic
20 See id. ("[T]he gain or loss is determined when the amount of stock sold short is
repurchased for return to the lender and the transaction closed.").
21 See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1936).
22 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1980) ("For income tax purposes, a
short sale is not deemed to be consummated until delivery of property to close the short
sale.").
23 See, e.g., Hendricks v. Comm'r, 423 F.2d 485, 487 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding Treas.
Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(1) and referring to it as "embod[ying] what has long been understood to
be the law").
24 Rev. Rul. 2004-15, 2004-8 I.R.B. 515; see also Rev. Rul. 2002-44, 2002-2 C.B. 84.
25 See I.R.C. § 1233 (2000). As one commentator put it, "Section 1233 can be viewed as
a legislative reenactment of the identification rule and the old cases holding that short sales
against the box are not dispositions." Lee A. Sheppard, Fixes to Ensure That Tax Is Paid on
Capital Gains, 69 TAx NOTES 1165, 1166 (1995).
2005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
exposure to the stock. This results in what Edward Kleinbard termed "riskless
ownership" of securities in his important article.26 Far from being unique to
short sales or transactions involving securities, the most consistent conclusion
of the numerous fungible when authorities is that transfer of economic benefits
and burdens has no effect on tax ownership as long as no specific asset is
identified.
This conclusion gives taxpayers potent tax planning opportunities when
combined with the so-called tax identification rules. 27 Taxpayers selling a
portion of their stock may (and frequently do) use these rules to choose the
specific shares being sold among a larger number of economically identical
shares purchased by them at different times and prices. Present in tax law
almost from inception, 28 these rules are exceedingly generous to taxpayers
because they allow "cherry picking," i.e., choosing among several
economically identical alternatives the one with the most favorable tax result.
A taxpayer who enters in a short against the box transaction can choose
whether some of her long shares held "in the box," or the newly acquired
shares, should be treated as covering the short position.29 When the Service
became aware of this trick, it concluded that taking advantage of tax
identification rules in the short sale context was too much for taxpayers to ask
for.30 Courts disagreed and upheld the taxpayers' positions time after time.31
26 Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 788.
17 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1 (c)(2)-(7). I will refer to these rules as tax identification
rules to distinguish them from the general principle providing that tax ownership of a
fungible asset is not transferred until the specific asset is identified. The scope of this
principle is much broader than that of tax identification rules which, for example, do not
apply to commodities and did not apply to debt instruments until well after the general
identification principle had been established.
28 Treasury regulations contained an identification rule for securities since 1918. "When
stock is sold from lots purchased at different times and at different prices and the identity of
the lots cannot be determined as to the dates of purchase, the stock sold shall be charged
against the earliest purchases of such stock." Regulations 33, art. 4., 60 (Revised) (1918),
quoted in Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 129 n.2 (1935). The Supreme Court rejected
an attempt by the IRS to deviate from these rules in the case of securities held in a
customer's margin account in street name. See Rankin, 295 U.S. at 129 (forcing the IRS to
recognize the taxpayer's identification of specific shares if those shares were properly
identified).
29 This opportunity to choose is particularly helpful if the taxpayer wants to re-establish
her long position. Instead of returning her existing long shares to cover the short (and,
presumably, realizing taxable gain), and purchasing new shares to re-establish the long
(presumably, resulting in a higher basis), the taxpayer could cover the short with the newly
purchased identical shares, possibly realizing a smaller gain or a loss, and continue to hold
the long shares that used to be "in the box" (albeit with a lower basis). The gain built into
these shares will remain untaxed until the taxpayer eventually sells the shares, and it will
escape tax entirely if the taxpayer holds the shares until death.
30 See, e.g., Griffin v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 588, 591-93 (1941) (disagreeing with the
IRS's suggestion that a taxpayer who owns a long stock, has an open short position with
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Eventually animated by a particularly large short against the box sale,32
Congress stepped in and eliminated this tax planning technique, but it did so
without raising the ownership issue. With the enactment of § 1259, taxpayers
entering into a short against the box trade (and several other transactions) are
viewed as constructively selling their appreciated stock and realizing the built-
in gain when they enter into the transaction.33 By creating a constructive sale
regime, Congress indirectly reinforced the fundamental conclusion that a short
against the box seller retains ownership of the stock held "in the box" under
general tax principles.34 A revenue ruling issued in 2003 confirms this result.
35
A principle that a fungible asset is not sold until identified was recently
confirmed when the IRS addressed a tax ownership question raised by the so-
called variable delivery prepaid forward contracts. As with short against the
box sales, the government initially disagreed with the taxpayer's intended
treatment. A case filed by the IRS in the Tax Court in August of 2002 sent a
mild shock wave through some Wall Street bankers, their tax advisors, and
their clients. The Service asserted in Stevenson v. Commissioner36 that the
respect to the same stock, and closes out both positions should not be permitted to identify a
different long stock as used to close the short sale); Bingham v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 186,
188-190 (1932) (rejecting the Service's argument that it should be permitted to identify
which of the long shares held by a taxpayer should be treated as sold when a taxpayer enters
into short sales of identical shares and fails to identify which specific shares were used to
establish the short positions).
31 See, e.g., Griffin, 45 B.T.A. 588; Bingham, 27 B.T.A. 186; see also Rev. Rul. 72-478,
1972-2 C.B. 487 (holding that a taxpayer may establish a short against the box position with
a broker, and may lend the long securities to that broker as long as the broker does not use
these securities to establish the taxpayer's short position).
32 A short against the box executed by Estee Lauder on the stock of Estee Lauder
Companies, Inc. deferred (and could have avoided permanently, considering that Ms.
Lauder was 87 years old at the time) more than $100 million of tax. See, e.g., Sheppard,
supra note 25.
33 I.R.C. § 1259 (enacted Aug. 5, 1997).
" The section clearly creates a deemed, rather than actual, realization event, providing
that upon entering into a constructive sale, "the taxpayer shall recognize gain as if such
position were sold," § 1259(a)(1) (emphasis added), and the holding period of property
treated as constructively sold "shall be determined as if such position were originally
acquired on the date of such constructive sale," § 1259(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Legislative history is consistent with this analysis, see H.R. REP. No. 105-220, at 512-16
(1997) ("Transactions designed to reduce or eliminate risk of loss, such as a 'short sale
against the box' ... generally do not cause realization .... The form of the transaction is
respected for income tax purposes and gain on the substantially identical property is not
recognized at the time of the short sale.").
11 See Rev. Rul. 2003-31, 2003-13 I.R.B. 643 (confirming that there is no tax disposition
upon entering into a short against the box).
36 See Stevenson v. Comm'r, No. 2002-22609 (T.C. Aug. 20, 2002), reprinted in 2002
T.N.T. 199-96. The case quickly received publicity, including an article in Forbes
magazine. Janet Novack, Kinky Tax Tricks, FORBES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 50 (describing the
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taxpayer should have realized gain on stock when he entered into a prepaid
variable delivery forward contract to sell it, not upon its maturity. In other
words, the government sought to defeat the entire purpose of this transaction. 3
7
Under a typical variable delivery prepaid forward contract, a taxpayer
holding a large amount of appreciated stock undertakes to deliver to the
forward buyer a variable number of shares of that stock or their cash equivalent
on a future date.38 In exchange, the forward buyer immediately pays the
taxpayer a large portion of the current price of the stock subject to the forward
(hence the term "prepaid"). To secure his future obligations, the taxpayer-
seller pledges the maximum number of shares deliverable under the contract to
the buyer, sometimes transferring the shares to an unrelated third party trustee.
The seller retains the right to vote the pledged shares and to receive the
dividends paid on those shares during the term of the forward. In addition, the
seller retains the right to substitute other identical shares or other collateral
such as U.S. Treasury securities with a value equal to a certain percentage of
the value of the maximum number of deliverable shares, marked to market on
a daily basis. In some cases, the seller may also allow the buyer to borrow the
shares on terms that satisfy the requirements of § 1058. 39
A typical contract provides that the number of shares the seller is obligated
to deliver when the forward matures varies based on the stock price on that
date (hence the term "variable delivery"). Although the prepaid forward in the
Stevenson case had a more complicated payout, a typical pattern is as follows.
Assuming that the forward is on 100 shares and the stock is trading at $20
when the forward is entered into, if the stock price on maturity date is less than
type of transaction entered into by Mr. Stevenson as "a strategy apparently used by many
wealthy individuals to raise cash and hedge risk while deferring taxes."); see also Lee A.
Sheppard, IRS Pursues Individual Constructive Sales Using Equity-Linked Securities, 96
TAX NOTES 1797 (2002).
17 The litigation was not entirely a surprise, in light of an earlier Field Service Advice
Memorandum addressing a similar (but not identical) transaction. Field Serv. Adv.
200111011 (Dec. 6, 2000). For a detailed analysis of the FSA and an argument against the
IRS's position see Robert A. Rudnick & Michelle L. Petock, Forward Sale Contracts: The
IRS's Recent Attempt to View Code Sec. 1259 As a Trap for the Wary, TAx'N FIN. PRODS.,
Summer 2002, at 19. For a brief summary of the transaction and a view sympathetic to the
government see Sheppard, supra note 36, at 1797-1801.
38 For a description and discussion of variable delivery prepaid forwards see, for
example, Edward D. Kleinbard & Erika W. Nijenhuis, Everything I Know About New
Financial Products I Learned from DECS, in 16 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 485, 491-93 (2002), and Dana L. Trier
& Lucy W. Farr, Constructive Sales Under Section 1259: The Best is Yet to Come, in 16
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS,
SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 1217,
1223 (2002).
" I.R.C. § 1058 (2005).
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$20 per share, the seller will deliver all 100 shares. If the stock price at
maturity of the forward is between $20 per share and $25 per share, the seller
will deliver shares with a total value equal to $2,000 (as the stock price
increases from $20 to $25, the number of shares decreases from 100 to 80). If
the stock price at maturity of the forward exceeds $25 per share, the seller will
deliver 80 shares.40 Typically, the seller will have the right to settle the
forward in cash.
Allegedly to attract curious young lawyers to practice of tax, or for another
noble reason, the two changes in the payout pattern that occur if the stock price
at maturity is $20 and $25 per share have been termed "kinks," and prepaid
forwards with payout patterns that have similar kinks are commonly referred to
as "kinky forwards."'41 From the seller's point of view, the most attractive, if
not kinky, feature of this instrument is that the seller typically receives a large
portion of the current value of the underlying shares at the inception of the
forward, substantially reduces his economic exposure to the shares, but does
not expect to recognize any gain from sale of the appreciated shares until the
forward settles several years later. In a sense, this is almost as good as a short
against the box, so the government's attention to this transaction is
understandable.
Fortunately for Mr. Stevenson and many others, the Service quickly
reconsidered its original position. In Revenue Ruling 2003-7,42 the
government concluded that a prepaid forward very similar to that contested in
Stevenson does not result in an immediate sale of stock under general tax
principles.43 The forward had kinks at $20 and $25 and other typical features,
including a three-year term, a pledge of stock by delivery to a third-party
trustee, and a cash-settlement option.44 The ruling assumed that the seller
intended to deliver some or all of the initially pledged shares when the time
came to settle the forward. 45
From the first sentence of the ruling - the statement of the issues - it is clear
that the government is focusing on the "right" factors. The shareholder, the
ruling states, "has the unrestricted legal right to deliver the pledged shares or to
substitute cash or other shares for the pledged shares on the delivery date,
and.., is not economically compelled to deliver the pledged shares. '46 In
40 In another typical payout pattern, if the stock price exceeds $25, the seller will deliver
a number of shares with a total value that is $500 less than the current market value of the
stock.
41 The primary purpose of introducing the uncertainty regarding the number of shares to
be-delivered upon maturity (i.e., the kinks) is to preclude application of the constructive sale
rules of § 1259 to the forward.
42 2003-5 I.R.B. 363.
43 Id. at 364.
44 Id. at 363.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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these few words, the ruling identified two principal tax ownership issues raised
by the prepaid forward: fungibility and a material condition precedent. As
long as the seller has the right to deliver other shares and also has the
wherewithal to take advantage of this right (for example by purchasing new
shares and delivering them under the forward without recognizing gain on the
existing shares), the pledged shares remain fungible and no identification
occurs. Consistently with the short sale authorities, the ruling concluded that
in the absence of identification the sale contract remained executory and the
forward seller retained ownership of the shares.4 7
The idea that ownership doesn't change hands until it is certain what
specific fungible property will ultimately be delivered is difficult to reconcile
with the well-established rule that exchange-traded securities are treated as
bought and sold on the "trade date," not on the "settlement date."48 A trade
date is the date on which the contract to buy or sell the security is made; a
settlement date is the date on which the security is delivered and the payment
is tendered. 49 Admittedly, the two dates are just a few days apart,50 but the
temporal proximity provides no reason to choose either of the two as the date
of sale. The trade date rule triggers an ownership change on the date when the
parties enter into an executory contract, not when they close it. While nothing
could seemingly reconcile this outcome with the short sale and forward
authorities, a historical detour might explain the reason for the diverging
standards.
Quite simply, the rule used to be exactly the opposite. When the Service
was first called on to decide when a seller should be treated as transferring the
ownership of exchange-traded stock, it decided that the settlement date was the
right moment in time.5 1 The Service reasoned that a loss from a sale should be
47 In addition to having a right to substitute other shares, the seller's ability to settle the
forward in cash, assuming it was real, was a material condition precedent that precluded
completion of the sale under the nonfungible when authorities discussed in the next part.
Although the ruling did not explain that the right to substitute the pledged shares and the
cash settlement option were so important quite for the reasons just described, identifying
these factors as crucial to the tax ownership inquiry was entirely consistent with the
approach suggested in this article.
48 See Rev. Rul. 2002-44, 2002-2 C.B. 84.
41 See Rev. Rul. 66-97, 1966-1 C.B. 190, 190.
S0 Currently, trades on the New York Stock Exchange executed the "regular way" settle
in three business days. See Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1
(1993). Prior to 1995, this period has been as long as five business days and as short as one
business day. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir.
2001) (mentioning that "[p]ursuant to regular NYSE terms," the trades in question were
settled within five business days); Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 451 (1926)
(observing that under the rules of the NYSE, settlement is required on the business day after
the sale); Gen. Couns. Mem. 12570, XIII-1 C.B. 114, 115 (1934) (describing the rule for
"regular" sales delivery within one business day).
51 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 12570, XIII-1 C.B. 114.
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evidenced by a closed and completed transaction and that no such transaction
existed until the stock certificate was delivered to the purchaser (or its
broker).52 A taxpayer who wanted to take his losses in the tax year when he
placed a sell order sought relief in court and prevailed. In Ruml v.
Commissioner,53 the court concluded that a plaintiff who ordered his broker to
sell all of his 4,000 shares in December of 1928 should be allowed to take a
loss in that year even though he did not deliver 2,500 of the 4,000 shares to the
broker until February of the following year.54 The taxpayer could not possibly
deliver the shares in 1928 because they were pledged to a bank and the
taxpayer was able to withdraw them only upon repayment of the bank loan in
February of 1929. 55
It is unclear whether the Service based its argument in Ruml on the short
sale and other fungible when authorities, but it is evident from the opinion that
the court reasoned primarily relying on nonfungible when cases. The court's
analysis is worth quoting both because it gave rise to the only line of cases
inconsistent with other fungible when decisions and because it was cited
almost in full by the Service in reversing its original position and adopting the
trade date rule in its current form:
It is clear that the petitioner intended to sell the specific shares he owned
and only those. If the broker made a short sale to his customer, it was for
his own account, not for the petitioner who had authorized no short sale
for his account. It seems to us clear that the transaction between the
petitioner and the broker was a sale by the petitioner to the broker of the
specific shares pledged to the bank, under an understanding with the
broker that certificates therefor were to be later delivered .... [W]hen
the evidence of realization is a sale of personal property, it is not always
necessary to deliver the property before there may be a deduction of a
loss. It is enough that the obligation to deliver is so fixed that the loss is
reasonably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount. Here the
transaction was so far advanced in December that the petitioner was
bound to deliver the stock to the broker at a price which was then
determined by the sale the broker made. That sufficed to make the loss
certain and established the amount. Moreover, the intention of the
petitioner and the broker being that the particular shares then owned by
the petitioner should be delivered to the broker, it follows that title to
them passed to the broker in December.56
As the discussion in the next part will show, the question whether a
transaction is advanced far enough to become irreversible is the test used for
52 Id. at 116.
53 83 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1936).
54 Id. at 257.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 257-58 (citations omitted).
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nonfungible assets in timing cases. The conclusion that the sale was completed
because "the petitioner was bound to deliver the stock to the broker at a price
which was then determined" by broker's sale begs the question - what stock?
To be sure, the amount realized from the sale was certain in December of
1928. But the basis of the shares sold was not. After all, if Mr. Ruml could
not repay the loan, the bank would not release the shares and Mr. Ruml would
have to buy new shares in the market and deliver them to the broker to cover
the open short position. In this scenario, it is entirely possible that Mr. Ruml
would have recognized a gain, not a loss, from the sale. Needless to say, the
court's knowledge of what actually occurred is of little help. Concluding that
the loss was sustained in 1928 appears to have flagrantly violated the certainty
rule.57
Or, maybe the departure from the certainty rule was not so blatant after all?
The Ruml court started its reasoning by observing that "[i]t is clear that the
petitioner intended to sell the specific shares he owned and only those," 58 and
concluded by reiterating that "the intention of the petitioner and the broker
being that the particular shares then owned by the petitioner should be
delivered to the broker. '59 The court used the taxpayer's intent as a means of
identifying the specific shares sold. Thus, it recognized the importance of
identification. Perhaps, the court was unwise to rely on the taxpayer's
intentions. After all, we can always change our minds, especially when doing
so would materially improve our tax position.60 Setting aside the Rumil court's
reliance on taxpayer's intent, its finding that a sale is complete when specific
shares certain to be delivered are identified resonates with the rest of the
fungible when authorities. 61
17 For a case where the uncertainty about specific shares to be delivered was more
apparent (but also ignored by the court), see Dashiell v. Comm'r, 100 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.
1938) (upholding a trade date rule in circumstances where the taxpayer held more shares
then he sold, and could potentially deliver any of these shares, based solely on taxpayer's
testimony that he meant to sell the shares held for the longest time).
58 Ruml, 83 F.2d at 257 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
60 Ironically, a decade after deciding Ruml, the same court expressly refused to rely on
taxpayer's intent in determining which shares should be treated as used to close a short
position:
[The specific shares] remained under control of the taxpayer and up to the time of
actual delivery could have been sold and replaced by other purchases .... [A] shifting
intent to cover a short sale ought not to be the critical event which would determine
gain or loss under a tax statute. It would leave the whole matter of fixing the event to
the taxpayer's own will. We hold that the time of delivery was the time at which the
covering transactions must be regarded as closed.
Richardson v. Comm'r, 121 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1941) (emphasis added). Recently, the
Service reaffirmed that the seller's intent to deliver specific fungible asset under an
executory contract does not result in a current sale of the asset. Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5
I.R.B. 363, 364 ("[Ilntent alone does not cause a transaction to be deemed a sale .... ").
61 After losing several more cases, the Service adopted the Ruml approach, see Gen.
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B. Commodity Futures and Contracts for Deferred Delivery
As the Service addressed the fungible nature of securities while considering
questions raised by securities dealers, it focused on the fungible nature of
commodities at the urging of the cotton and grain industries. 62 Long before the
enactment of federal income tax, cotton and grain merchants started to hedge
their businesses by purchasing and selling contracts for future delivery of their
products. These futures contracts traded on many exchanges throughout the
country and represented unconditional obligations to sell or purchase a fixed
amount of cotton or grain on a specified future date. In keeping their books,
the merchants reflected open futures contracts as parts of their inventories of
physical commodities. When it became necessary to determine how these
contracts should be taxed, the merchants requested that the Service allow them
to follow their accounting treatment for tax purposes.
63
In a 1920 Appeals and Revenue Memorandum, the IRS concluded that
under no circumstances can futures contracts be included in inventory: "There
is in fact no profit or loss in the purchase of a commodity until the transaction
has been completed by the sale of that particular commodity, nor is there any
profit or loss in a transaction in 'futures' until the transaction has actually been
closed."64 One year later the Service reiterated the point as follows:
[T]he Committee... holds it to be self-evident.., that any proposition to
add to an inventory the value of a commodity the title to which is not at
the time actually vested in the taxpayer, or to deduct from an inventory
the value of a commodity the title to which may or may not be vested in
the taxpayer but which is to be delivered only at some time in the future,
cannot by any correct system of reasoning or logic be maintained. 65
The reasoning looks familiar: because there is no way to know whether a
merchant holding a certain commodity will deliver it under the futures
contract, there is "no profit or loss" with respect to the commodity or the
futures contract until this question is resolved.66 In part, the government relied
Couns. Mem. 21503, 1939-2 C.B. 205, and later extended the rule to bonds, see I.T. 3442,
1941-1 C.B. 212. These decisions were later confirmed in Rev. Rul. 66-97, 1966-1 C.B.
190, 190 and Rev. Rul. 70-344, 1970-2 C.B. 50, 50. After some complications caused by
the interaction with the installment sale rules were eliminated, things returned to the status
quo established in 1939, see Rev. Rul. 2002-44, 2002-2 C.B. 84, 84 (confirming the trade
date rule, citing Rev. Rul. 66-97).
62 See, e.g., A.R.M. 100, 3 C.B. 66, 67 (1920).
63 Id.
I Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
65 A.R.M. 135, 5 C.B. 67, 78 (1921).
66 The industry eventually convinced the government to allow symmetrical treatment of
physical commodities and commodities futures through marking them to market (but not on
the grounds that the futures were part of the physical inventories). A.R.M. 135, 5 C.B. 67.
The Service reiterated all of its earlier conclusions in a trio of revenue rulings issued in
1974. See Rev. Rul. 74-223, 1974-1 C.B. 23, Rev. Rul. 74-226, 1974-1 C.B. 119, Rev. Rul.
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on its own regulations that provided at the time that "goods merely ordered for
future delivery and for which no transfer of title has been effected should be
excluded" 67 from inventories. Treasury regulations currently in force contain
almost exactly the same provision.68 The conclusion of the 1920 ruling was
confirmed in Revenue Ruling 74-227,69 which repeated its reasoning virtually
verbatim.
Finally, the Service concluded early on,70 and has continuously adhered to
the view, 71 that the effect of a futures contract on tax ownership does not
depend on the manner in which ownership of an underlying asset is acquired in
the first place. Revenue Ruling 74-226 considered whether so-called
"straddlers" were entitled to inventory their physical commodities. A
straddler's business involved purchasing physical commodities and
simultaneously selling the exact amount of that commodity forward by
entering into futures contracts. They were arbitrageurs seeking market
inefficiencies in the pricing of either the spot commodity or the futures
contract, not merchants selling physical commodities and partially hedging the
price risk. The ruling allowed the straddlers to inventory their holdings of
physical commodities and to mark their futures positions to market (while not
including them in inventories). 72 Obviously, the straddlers were in a business
quite different from that of cotton and grain growers and traders. They did not
produce the commodity and did not acquire it in order to hold and sell when
the prices move advantageously. They never had economic exposure to the
asset, nor any reason to own it free and clear (if that should matter). That is,
the straddlers were the ultimate riskless owners. Nevertheless, the IRS made
no attempt to argue that they did not own the commodities for tax purposes.
73
Thus, the Service has consistently maintained that a futures contract to
purchase a commodity does not make the holder of the contract an owner of
the commodity, even though such holder has virtually the same economic
exposure to the commodity as its outright owner. The rule is the same on the
sale side. A taxpayer does not cease to own a commodity by virtue of entering
into a futures contract to sell it even though the futures contract completely
eliminates her economic exposure to the commodity. In fact, her position
resembles that of a taxpayer who enters into a short against the box transaction.
For tax purposes, both taxpayers become riskless owners of a fungible asset.
While the Service developed its approach to commodities futures mostly
74-227, 1974-1 C.B. 120.
67 A.R.M. 100, 3 C.B. at 69 (quoting Regulations 45, art. 1581 (1920)).
68 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1960) ("A purchaser... should not include [in inventory]
goods ordered for future delivery, transfer of title to which has not yet been effected.").
69 Rev. Rul. 74-227, 1974-1 C.B. 120.
71 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 18658, 1937-2 C.B. 77.
71 See Rev. Rul. 74-226, 1974-1 C.B. 119.
72 Id. at 119.
71 See id.
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through a ruling process, a parallel development dealing with contracts for
deferred delivery of commodities (i.e., commodity forwards) took place in
courts.7 4  At a very early stage, two opposing views of the taxation of
commodity forward contracts were articulated, argued and adopted by different
circuits. A typical factual setting involved a transaction in which a seller
entered into a contract to sell a commodity to a buyer, but the contract has not
been fully performed at the end of a tax period. For example, the taxpayer in
United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.75 operated several sugar refineries
and sold the refined sugar wholesale. On its tax return for the fiscal year
ending on February 28, 1917, the taxpayer reported as sold almost two hundred
thousand bags of sugar that remained in its warehouse at the end of the year.76
The Service argued that the sugar was not sold until the following year when
the sugar was delivered, but the court agreed with the taxpayer.7 7 The court
relied in part on the taxpayer's intent to make a sale before the end of February
of 1917 and in part on state contract law. 78 But most importantly for our
purposes, the court addressed head-on the government's argument that the
contract was, in essence, merely an executory contract:
[I]t is contended that the contracts were executory and that title remained
in the company on February 28, 1917, because the property had not beeli
segregated and identified in separate form. Beet sugar of a standard and
uniform grade, in gabs of one hundred pounds each, is fungible property.
In that respect it falls within the same class as flour, grain, or oil. Title to
an unseparated part or unit of a larger quantity of fungible property passes
under a valid contract of sale without separation, or segregation, if that is
the intention of the parties. 79
Two other circuit courts had considered a similar issue a few years earlier in
Haas Brothers v. McLaughlin80 and Brown Lumber Co. v. Commissioner.81 In
both cases, the buyers of fruit and lumber took a loss in the tax year when they
contracted to purchase the goods, but did not receive them, in the amount by
which the fair market value of the goods at the end of the year was less than
their cost to the buyers.8 2 The government argued for the deferred treatment of
the sale and won. In both cases the courts concluded that because the specific
commodity was not identified at the end of the tax year, no ownership transfer
74 Forward contracts are very similar to futures (the main difference being the forwards
are not exchange-traded).
75 72 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1934).
76 Id. at 756.
77 Id. at 759.
78 Id. at 758.
79 Id. Like all of its contemporaries that were addressing tax ownership issue in similar
situations, the court phrased the ownership inquiry as a title transfer test.
80 39 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1930).
1 35 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
82 Haas, 39 F.2d at 382; Brown Lumber Co., 35 F.2d at 881.
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took place.
The fact that seller had fruit at the close of 1920 to meet the contract, in
its warehouses, as to time and grade, since none was segregated or set
apart, is not material. The fungible mass doctrine has no application. The
appellants were not to take part of a larger mass of like kind.83
Amalgamated Sugar and Haas made the choice abundantly clear. Both
courts wrote on a clean slate. Amalgamated Sugar relied on non-tax state law
cases dealing with ownership transfers. Haas had no citations in support of the
quoted paragraph. Instead, that court relied on the same Treasury regulations
regarding purchases and sales of inventories that the Service cited in its cotton
futures ruling in 1920.84 It is not clear why the Haas court concluded that the
"fungible mass doctrine" did not apply. It is clear, however, that Amalgamated
Sugar was not followed and Haas was. The identification requirement
prevailed.85 The current Treasury regulations state that a seller remains a tax
owner of inventory subject to a contract of sale as long as the property is not
"segregated and applied to the contract, '86 i.e., until the specific property is
identified.
An interesting, albeit a limited, example of how the principles discussed in
this part apply in yet another context are the so-called "price later" contracts. 87
These contracts for sale of a commodity have one unusual feature - the
purchase price is not determined when the goods are delivered. Instead, the
seller retains the right to designate as the selling price for its goods the market
price of that commodity on any day within a specified period (the "call date")
that can last for as long as a year after the date of delivery. Keeping the price
open exposes the seller to market fluctuations between the inception of the
contract and the call date. Thus, price later contracts present a situation that is
the exact opposite of a prototypical pattern discussed in this part. Ordinarily in
fungible when cases, the economics is transferred while the title and possession
are not. In a price later contract, the seller retains full economic exposure to
the asset sold, but surrenders title and possession at the inception of the
contract. Although none of the cases discussing price later contracts refer to
any of the authorities considered so far, their uniform conclusion that a sale
takes place when the commodity is delivered to a buyer is entirely consistent
with these authorities. Just as divesting of economic exposure does not
83 Haas, 39 F.2d at 382.
8 Id. (citing Regulation 45, art. 1581); see also supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
85 See White Oak Transp. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 307 (1931) (deciding to follow Haas
and distinguishing Amalgamated Sugar); see also Modesto Dry Yard Inc. v. Comm'r, 14
T.C. 374 (1950) (following Haas and requiring actual identification for ownership transfer
to occur).
86 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1960).
87 See generally, Applegate v. Comm'r, 980 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1992), Patterson v.
Hightower, 245 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1957); Molsen v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 485 (1985); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 87-26-007 (March 23, 1987).
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transfer ownership of a fungible asset in a when case, retaining economic
exposure by the seller does not delay the ownership transfer.88 As in most
other fungible when cases, it is the identification, not the economic exposure,
that determines the timing of sale in price later contracts.
The authorities addressing taxation of short sales, variable delivery
forwards, cotton and grain futures, and contracts for deferred delivery of
various commodities described above do not exhaust the list of the fungible
when cases. The approach developed by these authorities applies to determine
the timing of ownership transfers in other settings where fungible assets are
involved, even thought these additional decisions neither acknowledge their
intellectual "heritage," nor announce the suggested principle as the reason for
their decisions.8 9
C. Some Preliminary Observations
Although courts and the Service formulated their decisions regarding
commodities futures and forward contracts during the same period as they
considered the proper taxation of short sales, they did not view these areas as
related. Yet the same tax ownership issue is raised in all these settings and the
conclusions reached by the authorities in each case are entirely consistent.
Upon gaining full economic exposure to a fungible asset the buyer does not
88 Courts reached this conclusion with respect to both the seller and the buyer side of
price later contracts. See Applegate, 980 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (sale takes place when
possession transferred); Patterson, 245 F.2d 765, 766 (same); Molsen, 85 T.C. 485, 489
(purchase takes place when possession transferred).
89 For example, courts have characterized foreign currency forwards and futures as short
sales and implicitly treated them as open transactions until they were assigned, terminated or
settled. See, e.g., Carborundum Co. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 730, 736-38 (1980) (agreeing with
the IRS that a futures contract to sell foreign currency is a short sale subject to Section 1233,
but rejecting an argument that a sale of such contract shortly before its expiration is subject
to the rules of this section). The same is true for "when, as and if issued" contracts, i.e.,
forward contracts to buy or sell securities that have not yet begun trading on an exchange.
See Rev. Rul. 57-29, 1957-1 C.B. 519, 519-20 ("In computing the cost basis of assets for
any purpose, the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize an obligation of a taxpayer
reflected in an executory contract prior to the performance of the contract."). Similarly, the
IRS excluded futures contracts from the coverage of a revenue ruling that allowed farmers
to deduct in the year of payment the amounts paid for feed to be consumed in the following
year, explaining that "[tihe purchase of commodity future contract... is considered to be
the purchase of a right to acquire the specific commodity rather than a purchase of the
commodity itself .... Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C.B. 144, 144 (superseded by Rev. Rul
79-229, 1979-2 C.B. 210 without affecting the conclusion regarding commodity futures
contracts). Finally, when the Service considered the appropriate method of calculating gross
receipts of a subchapter S corporation engaged in commodity futures trading, it reiterated
that "a commodity futures contract is merely an executory contract" and "the taxpayer [that
offset one contract with another] has not purchased or sold the underlying commodity, but
has merely liquidated its rights and obligations in the executory contract .... Rev. Rul.
79-294, 1979-2 C.B. 305, 306.
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become its tax owner. Rather, the seller remains a riskless owner of the asset.
The delay in ownership transfer is caused by uncertainty regarding the specific
asset being sold that exists because the asset in question is fungible. Ignoring
this fundamental uncertainty violates the certainty rule, at least where the
fungible asset is subject to tax identification rules that allow taxpayers to
choose between economically identical assets with different tax attributes.
Tax identification rules are difficult to reconcile with the idea of
fungibility. 90  Not surprisingly, they have a limited scope. Many fungible
assets that are not capital assets for tax purposes (e.g., commodities) are
frequently taxed as inventories subject to ordering conventions rather than
identification rules. These conventions, such as the last-in-first-out or the first-
in-first-out rules,9 1 determine which particular items are deemed to be sold
regardless of which specific units are delivered to the buyer. Furthermore,
some inventory pricing conventions, such as valuing inventories at lower of
cost or market, 92 or at market,93 make tax bases of inventory items, originally
different due to varying purchase costs, either more uniform or entirely
uniform.94 Finally, gross income from inventory sales depends not on gain or
loss from the sale of each inventory item, but on the difference between the
annual gross receipts and annual cost of goods sold and other expenses.
95
Ordering conventions, valuation rules, and the manner in which gains and
losses from inventory sales are calculated make inventory items not only
economically fungible, but fungible for tax purposes (or tax-fungible) as
well. 96 Not so with capital assets. The amount and the long-term or short-term
90 For an argument that the identification rules are "completely inconsistent with the
economic realities of fungibility," see Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 787. See also Sheppard,
supra note 25, at 1166 ("The identification rule is fundamentally inconsistent with the
fungible nature of publicly traded securities of the same class.").
91 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(d) (as amended in 1973) (stating the FIFO
presumption); §§ 1.472-1 - 1.472-8 (setting forth the LIFO rules); Ozark Mills, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 1179 (1927) (holding that FIFO presumption may be rebutted).
92 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4 (1960).
93 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5 (as amended in 1993).
94 Not all pricing conventions may be used with any ordering convention, however. For
example, the lower of cost or market pricing is not available to taxpayers using last-in-first-
out ordering rule. See I.R.C. § 472(b)(2) (2000).
95 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (as amended in 1992). Although the term "cost of goods
sold" is not defined in the regulations, its well-established meaning is cost of opening
inventory plus cost of purchases during the taxable year less cost of closing inventory. See
4 BoRRs I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 105.8.1, at 105-125 (2d ed. 1992).
96 This statement is entirely true when the entire inventory is re-valued at market
annually, and not quite true in other cases. It turns out, however, that the majority of
fungible assets that are subject to inventory accounting are likely to be covered by the mark-
to-market convention. Securities and commodities represent a vast majority of fungible
assets. Securities dealers have always been allowed to value their inventories at market, see
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character of gain or loss from sale of a capital asset depend on the specific
asset being sold. With some limited exceptions, 97 no mechanisms exist that
would erase the differences in the bases of capital assets in a manner similar to
marking inventories to market. Thus, if a seller has several shares of the same
issuer purchased at different times and prices, it will make a difference for him,
assuming he is not a dealer in securities, which particular shares he delivers to
the buyer. But because the shares are fungible, it will make no difference to
the buyer. The buyer is indifferent because the shares are fungible. The seller
cares because they are not tax-fungible. Tax identification rules acknowledge
this disparity and allow taxpayers to use it to their advantage.
Resolving uncertainty regarding the specific asset being sold is important
where this asset is not tax-fungible, such as in a short sale or a prepaid forward
of stock held as a capital asset. This uncertainty, however, simply does not
exist for tax-fungible assets. Thus, the certainty rule would not be violated by
treating an unconditional contract for sale of a tax-fungible asset as transferring
tax ownership when it is entered into because no matter what particular units
are ultimately delivered, the tax consequences of the sale would be the same.
This is exactly the point made by the Amalgamated Sugar court. Why, then,
was this reasoning not followed, at least for tax-fungible assets such as
commodities? Why did courts keep demanding that the specific commodities
be identified?
The most apparent reason for the identification requirement is a historic
reliance on state contract law by the tax tribunals that developed the standard
in the first place. 98 There are other reasons, however, why the Amalgamated
Sugar rule, even if restricted to tax-fungible assets, was not likely to survive.
If adopted, the rule would make the tax ownership inquiry too context
sensitive. It would only apply if the asset subject to the ownership change
were tax-fungible. Tax fungibility, however, depends not on the asset itself,
but on the manner in which the seller treats it for tax purposes. The same
security may or may not be a capital asset depending on whether its owner is a
dealer or an investor. The same commodity item may or may not be subject to
inventory accounting. Both issues, i.e., the distinction between capital and
ordinary assets and the necessity of maintaining inventories have generated a
considerable amount of controversy. 99 Basing such a fundamental concept as
Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5, and are now required to do so, see I.R.C. § 475(a). Securities traders
are also permitted to mark to market their securities. See I.R.C. § 475(f). Commodities
dealers and traders were permitted to mark their inventories to market since 1921, see supra
note 66. Today, they are permitted to elect mark-to-market accounting by I.R.C. § 475(e)
and (f). In all these cases, economically fungible assets are also tax-fungible.
97 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(e) (as amended in 1996) (providing that taxpayers
may elect to determine the basis of their mutual fund shares by using an averaging method).
98 See, e.g., Haas Bros. v. McLaughlin, 39 F.2d 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1930) (relying in part
on California law).
99 See, e.g., Bittker & Lokken, supra note 95, 47.9 (2005) (describing the intricacies of
the capital/ordinary distinction); id. 105.8 (referring to the controversies arising from
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tax ownership on resolution of other contentious disputes should have given
pause to any decisionmaker looking for a workable rule. Furthermore, it
would hardly be desirable to make the buyer's ownership treatment dependent
on the seller's tax accounting for the asset. Today, this would be particularly
problematic because a seller that is a trader in securities or commodities may
choose between an all-ordinary mark-to-market treatment of § 475 and the
historic capital and realization tax rules. If the trader-seller makes the election,
her securities and commodities will be tax-fungible and the Amalgamated
Sugar rule would call for a conclusion that a forward buyer immediately
acquires tax ownership of a security held by such trader. If the trader-seller
does not make the election, a forward purchaser would not become the owner
until the specific asset is identified. No sane buyer would embrace such
regime.
Another problem that the Amalgamated Sugar rule and reliance on tax-
fungibility would create comes from what Kleinbard called the "many longs,
one owner" phenomenon.100 Looking at Amalgamated Sugar itself, the sugar
manufacturer and the buyer are both long sugar - the manufacturer is long
because it actually holds the commodity and the buyer is long because it is on a
long side of a forward contract. Does being long give both parties an
ownership claim?
In addition to a forward, a futures contract, a total return swap, a stock loan,
or a combination of a call and a put option will all result in a long position that
is economically identical to that of an outright owner. Of course, there will be
a short position on the other side of the contract. Because one need not own
the asset to enter into a derivative instrument replicating its economics, these
long and short positions may multiply indefinitely. The overall number of
shorts will always be one less than the overall number of longs, reflecting the
fact that one, but only one, of the holders of the long position actually owns the
asset. But this insight does not help in deciding which one of many longs is
the "real" tax owner. A tax system in which more than one taxpayer can claim
full ownership of a single tax-advantaged asset would hardly raise any
revenue. Taxpayers would shelter most, if not all, of their income with any
combination of numerous tax preferences associated with tax ownership of
property, such as depreciation, depletion and amortization deductions, the
dividends received deduction, tax-exempt interest, foreign tax credits, and so
on.101 An alternative tax system could be conceived of that would allocate
ownership among several taxpayers without duplication of its benefits and
burdens, but this solution has generally not been adopted by Congress and the
inventory accounting).
100 See Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 787.
101 This is not a mere speculation. In a particularly egregious example, when the
Chrysler Corporation paid an unusually large dividend, purported "owners" of the stock
claimed dividends received deduction in respect of 160% of dividends actually paid. See
Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 787 n.18.
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courts. 10 2 In order for the existing tax system to remain viable, it must identify
a single owner of each asset. Throughout the rest of the article, I will refer to
this principle as the "single owner rule."
This brings us back to Amalgamated Sugar. A rule that would treat a buyer
of a tax-fungible asset under an executory contract as a tax owner before the
specific property has been identified would not violate the single owner rule
only so long as the seller owns the property sufficient to satisfy its obligations
under the contract at the time when the contract is entered into and at all times
until the property is delivered to the buyer. This appears to have been the case
in Amalgamated Sugar. Obviously, this would not always be the case.
Authorities dealing with executory contracts take it for granted that a seller in
such a contract need not own the property to transfer its economics using a
derivative instrument, such as a forward. 10 3 Even if the seller does own the
property, because the property is fungible, usually no limitations exist on what
the seller may do with it while the contract is outstanding. Thus, a seller who
owns the property at the inception of an executory contract may sell it the next
day. If the buyer under the executory contract is already treated as an owner,
how should the tax system treat the party who purchased the property from the
seller while the contract remained executory? The single owner rule plays a
critical role in the whether cases dealing with fungible assets; it is of little
importance in the when cases considered in this part. Quite possibly, we
should thank the courts that declined to follow the Amalgamated Sugar
doctrine for sparing us from an inevitable tension between this doctrine and the
single owner rule.
Finally, the concept of tax-fungibility helps in understanding why
possession, a feature referred to as a critical factor in tax ownership analysis,
04
does not have an independent significance. Instead, possession resolves a
fungible when case only if it may serve as a proxy for the ultimate inquiry -
identification. This occurs only if the asset in question is tax-fungible. If a
buyer obtains possession of a tax-fungible asset at the inception of the contract,
neither buyer nor seller would bother to substitute an otherwise identical asset
in lieu of the one already held by the buyer. The buyer would be indifferent
102 For an argument in favor of such system, see Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 1, at
726-27. For some limited examples of such allocation under the existing tax law, see, e.g.,
Hunter v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 109, 117 (1965); Ashlock v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 405, 410-11
(1952).
103 See, e.g., Barde Steel Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 14 B.T.A. 209, 217 (1928) (explaining
that one can sell forward an asset that one does not own); Carborundum Co. v. Comm'r. 74
T.C. 730, 732 (1980) (considering the tax consequences of a disposition by the taxpayer of a
forward contract to sell British pound sterling while at no time during the term of the
forward did the taxpayer own any pound sterling). In the case of "when issued" securities,
the actual asset subject to the contract does not exist at all. See Rev. Rul. 57-29, 1957-1
C.B. 519, 519-20.
104 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 4, at 285 (asserting that possession and control are
prerequisites to tax-ownership).
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because the asset is fungible, the seller - because it is tax-fungible. Because
the seller in this case has no incentive to identify and ultimately deliver an
asset other than that initially delivered to the buyer, and because even if the
seller makes the substitution, no change in the seller's or the buyer's economic
or tax position would take place, a rule that treats the initially delivered asset as
irrevocably identified is entirely reasonable. Price later contracts are the case
in point.
The same is not true for assets that are not tax-fungible. A seller of a capital
asset may wish to substitute another asset for the one held by the buyer prior to
the closing of the sale because the substitution may change the seller's tax
consequences from the transaction. As long as the seller retains this right, it
would violate the certainty rule to treat the sale as closed. Hence, Revenue
Ruling 2003-7 concludes that a forward seller retains ownership of shares
despite pledging them to the forward buyer and delivering them to a third-party
trustee. Similarly, Revenue Ruling 72-478 holds that borrowing of the short
seller's long stock by a broker who executed the short sale does not close the
short sale. 10 5 While the broker holds the client's stock and while the client will
ultimately have to deliver identical stock to the broker to cover the short, the
transaction remains open because the client hasn't designated the stock
borrowed by the broker as used to close the short sale. Thus, possession is not
a dispositive factor in tax ownership analysis within the fungible when
category. Identification, on the other hand, always determines the timing of
ownership transfer in this context.
II. THE NONFUNGIBLE WHEN AUTHORITIES
A. The Basic Standard
While the discussion in this part starts with the Supreme Court decision in
Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co.,106 this widely-cited opinion'0 7 hardly laid a
foundation for the analysis of nonfungible when authorities. In a very brief
decision, the Court concluded that even though a prospective buyer who held
an option to purchase a piece of real estate notified the seller about his decision
to exercise the option in late December of 1916, and even though upon receipt
of this notice the seller ceased its operations and withdrew from the land, the
sale was not consummated until early January of 1917.108 The seller, the Court
explained, "did not prepare the papers necessary to effect the transfer or make
tender of title or possession or demand the purchase price in 1916. The title
and right of possession remained in it until the transaction was closed.
105 1972-2 C.B. 487.
106 281 U.S. 11 (1930).
107 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 1990); Dana
Distributors Inc. v. Comm'r, 874 F.2d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 1989).
"' N. Texas Lumber, 281 U.S. at 12-13.
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Consequently unconditional liability of vendee for the purchase price was not
created in that year."' 109
In the absence of a detailed analysis from the Supreme Court, lower courts
offered various solutions to resolve the timing question. After several tests
were proposed, the decision in Fordyce v. Helvering" 0 enunciated perhaps the
most complete and convincing approach, effectively putting an end to the
doctrinal disagreements in the nonfungible when context. In Fordyce, the
court considered what was the proper time when the acquirer's stock received
by the taxpayer-seller in a tender offer should be valued to determine the
amount realized from the sale."' The purchaser corporation made a public
offer to acquire up to a certain amount of the target's stock conditioned upon
acceptance of the offer by a minimum amount of target shareholders. 12 The
taxpayer delivered his shares to a depositary before November 12, 1929.113 At
that time, not enough shares had been deposited to make the offer self-
executing, but the purchaser reserved a right to accept a smaller number of
shares prior to November 22.114 On November 13, the acquirer exercised its
right and declared the tender offer effective. 15 Under the terms of the offer,
the acquirer had until November 26 to deliver its stock and cash
consideration.1 6 The target shareholders, including the taxpayer, received the
acquirer's stock and cash between November 27 and December 31, 1929.117
The purchaser's stock closed at $24.62 per share on November 13 and at
$29.94 per share on November 27.118 Needless to say, the Service argued that
the consideration received by the taxpayer-seller must be valued when actually
received, resulting in a substantially larger gain (and tax) for the taxpayer." 19
After reciting all of the events that took place on or prior to November 13, the
court reasoned as follows:
This was all done on the 13th and established the rights and liabilities of
the parties, and we think it of no consequence that [the purchaser] had
until the 27th for delivery of the shares and cash. When the conditions of
the bargain were all met, as they were [on] November 13th, and the
contract became binding, [the seller] lost all of his right to and control
over the [target] stock which he had delivered to the depositary, and at the
109 Id. at 13.
11 76 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
"I Id. at 433. While stock is an archetypical fungible asset, cases such as Fordyce
should be analyzed under the nonfungible rubric, see infra Part II.C.
112 Fordyce, 76 F.2d at 432.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
"1 Id. at 432-33.
118 Id. at 433.
"9 Id. at 434.
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same time had the unconditional promise of [the buyer] to make delivery
of the shares and money he was to receive in exchange. The exchange or
sale, by whichever name it is called, then and there became binding on
both parties, and the rights of both became fixed.... It was then that the
parties to the exchange were clothed with beneficial ownership.120
A review of numerous authorities leads one to conclude that transfer of
ownership of a nonfingible asset occurs when the transaction progresses to a
point when the seller (1) has a right to recover the purchase price and (2) is
unconditionally obligated to deliver the property being sold upon buyer's
performance (i.e., seller has no right to rescind), and the buyer (3) has a right to
the property (i.e., can demand specific performance) and (4) is unconditionally
obligated to pay the purchase price upon seller's performance. That is, a sale
occurs when the buyer's and seller's rights shift from the rights to their original
property (seller's right to the asset and buyer's right to consideration) to the
rights to the counterparty's property (seller's - to consideration, buyer's - to
the asset) and neither buyer nor seller has a right to reverse the transaction
unilaterally. Finally, the parties may contractually change either of their
respective rights and obligations.12
120 Id. at 434-35.
121 See, e.g., Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930) (sale didn't take
place in the earlier year because "unconditional liability of vendee for the purchase price
was not created in that year"); Major Realty Corp. v. Comm'r, 749 F.2d 1483, 1486-87
(11 th Cir. 1985) (concluding that buyer became unconditionally obligated to pay the full
purchase price on the early date, and citing North Texas Lumber for the proposition that "an
unconditional liability [is] a benchmark when a transaction is closed for tax purposes");
Claiborne v. United States, 648 F.2d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 1981) (concluding that ownership
was transferred because the seller could have forced the buyer's payment rather than
rescission of the contract); Bradford v. United States, 444 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (sale
completed at an early date because the buyer "had an absolute right to title" upon payment
of the purchase price); Wiseman v. Scruggs, 281 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1960) (holding
that the contract was not executory because it "created a present obligation on the part of the
sellers to execute and deliver deeds of conveyance as installment payments were made [and]
a present obligation on the part of the purchaser to make the installment payments .... ");
Rich Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 424, 427 (1st Cir. 1956) (holding that no sale
took place on an early date because the buyer "during that year was not unconditionally and
irrevocably bound to take the property and pay the agreed price .... "); N. Jersey Title Ins.
Co. v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1935) (finding a sale at an early date because "the
liability of vendee was unconditional in the earlier year"); Helvering v. Mibley-Mimnaugh
Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (holding that if the seller was an accrual
basis taxpayer, it must have accrued the purchase price on an early date because "in addition
to delivery of the property, the seller had otherwise complied with his contract, as the result
of which there existed an unconditional obligation on the buyer to comply"); First Am.
Bank of Nashville v. Oman, 209 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (holding that no sale took
place at an early date because the buyer at that time had no unconditional duty to pay); Perry
v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1718 (1976) (holding that the sale took place on the date
when the seller became entitled to buyer's stock); Merrill v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 66, 76 (1963)
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Of course, authorities do not go to the trouble of reciting the entire four-
prong definition suggested above. The most likely explanation is that although
the four-prong definition is comprehensive, it is also likely to be redundant.
Unless some special circumstances exist, there is no reason to expect that any
one of the four prongs will be met while any other will not be. After all, each
of the prongs reflects the same underlying state of affairs - a situation when a
contract of sale "became binding on both parties, and the rights of both became
fixed."122 A finding that any of the four prongs is met on a particular date
should generally suffice to support a conclusion that ownership was transferred
on that date.
Although many nonfungible when cases are decided based on the suggested
analysis, they virtually always cite the test set forth in Segall v. Commissioner:
There are no hard and fast rules of thumb that can be used in determining,
for taxation purposes, when a sale was consummated, and no single factor
is controlling; the transaction must be viewed as a whole and in the light
of realism and practicality. Passage of title is perhaps the most
conclusive circumstance. Transfer of possession is also significant. A
factor often considered is whether there has been such substantial
performance of conditions precedent as imposes upon the purchaser an
unconditional duty to pay.123
One readily recognizes in this passage one of many multi-factor tests that
are so dear, it appears, to the hearts of many judges and, therefore, so prevalent
in the law of taxation. 124 It is instructive, however, that Segall itself was
decided without much consideration of the factors just described. Other than
(concluding that the sale took place prior the passage of title because "subject to [the
buyer's] tender of the remainder of the purchase price, they could have forced conveyance
of the legal title"); Morco Corp. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 305 (1961) (holding that a
sale does not occur and a loss may not be deducted until the buyer performs to the extent
that would "[impose] upon the purchaser an unconditional duty to pay"); Rev. Rul. 73-369,
1973-2 C.B. 155 (sale is not completed at an early date because "buyer was not obligated to
complete the sale and burdens and benefits of ownership remained with the seller").
122 Fordyce, 76 F.2d at 434.
123 114 F.2d 706, 709-10 (6th Cir. 1940) (citations omitted).
124 These tests appear with remarkable consistency wherever one needs to make subtle
distinctions. Perhaps the king of multi-factor tests is the one that is supposed to draw a line
between debt and equity. See, e.g., William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369,
411-12 (1971) (listing the factors courts have considered in distinguishing debt from
equity). Tax ownership test applicable to nonfungible whether cases and used
indiscriminately whenever an ownership issue arises is not far behind, See infra, text
accompanying notes 196-199. Other examples include tests to determine agency, see, for
example, Nat'l Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422, 433-38 (1949); existence of a
partnership, see, for example, Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964); and
distinction between employees and independent contractors, see, for example, Eastern Inv.
Corp. v. United States, 49 F.3d 651, 653-54 (10th Cir. 1995).
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reciting North Texas Lumber and discussing the intent of the parties, the entire
reasoning of the opinion is as follows:
An executory contract was made on October 2, 1931. Some of the
purchase price was then paid and a promissory note for broker's
commission given, but [the buyer] did not have an unconditional right to
the execution of the documents transferring title until it delivered or
tendered the promised debentures on January 2, 1932; nor had [the seller]
an unconditional right to the [consideration] until it had delivered or
tendered the bills of sale contemplated. It follows, we think, under the
doctrine of the [North Texas Lumber] case, that for taxation purposes the
sale herein did not occur until January 2, 1932.125
The Segall factors proved to be a helpful addition to the tax ownership
analysis in the nonfungible when context, but not because they provided a
formula to determine the timing of sale. Rather, they are useful in ascertaining
when the rights and obligations of the parties become fixed. Therefore, it is
worth considering how each of these factors, as well as some additional
considerations added by the courts over the years, are taken into account in the
ownership analysis.
B. Title, Possession, Benefits and Burdens, and Other Factors
Transfer of title is an important tax ownership indicator in nonfungible when
cases. 126 Clearly, however, the timing of a title transfer does not always
determine the timing of a sale.' 27 Courts have recognized that title may be
retained by sellers without delaying a sale, most frequently to secure payment
of the purchase price.128
125 Segall, 114 F.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
126 See, e.g., Segall v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1940) (asserting that
"passage of title is perhaps the most conclusive circumstance" for determining when a sale
was consummated); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 394 (1995) (observing
that possession of bare legal title is an important indicator in deciding the timing of tax
ownership transfer, but not as significant as control over the property); Harmston v.
Comm'r, 61 T.C. 216, 229 (1973) (stressing that passage of title is an important
consideration, though not the sole determining factor); Dahlinger v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A.
176, 184 (1930) (holding that "a sale is complete when title passes").
127 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 86 F.2d 637, 639 (2d Cir. 1936) (accepting
that delivery of the deed may be postponed without delaying a sale); Baird v. Comm'r, 68
T.C. 115 (1977) (determining that sale occurred on early date even though title didn't pass
until the late date).
128 See, e.g., Wagner v. Comm'r, 518 F.2d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding sale on the
early date despite executed warranty deed remaining in escrow until the late date); Maher v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 441, 452 (1970) (ruling that retention of title by seller for security
purposes should be viewed as transfer of title and taking back a mortgage); Clodfelter v.
Comm'r, 48 T.C. 694, 700 (1967) (determining that seller's retention of title until all
payments have been received does not defer the sale).
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Authorities usually cite possession as another crucial factor in the
analysis. 129 This factor is very helpful when a complete transfer of possession
occurs in a single moment in time. In many cases this does not happen.
Instead, the seller may retain possession subject to restrictions contained in the
sale contract which may be quite substantial. 30 A buyer may obtain certain
rights with respect to the property prior to obtaining outright possession, such
as a right to enter upon the property and inspect it, to survey the property, to
begin substantial construction, or to control the property together with the
seller.' 3 1  Finally, possession is not a particularly helpful indicator of
ownership transfer when neither buyer nor seller actually use the property,
such as when the property is leased to a third party.'
32
Courts always take the benefits and burdens of ownership (in a narrow sense
of economic exposure, as this term is usually applied by courts) into account in
determining the timing of a sale. 33 Focus frequently falls on the moment
when risk of catastrophic loss is transferred, most likely because it is often
specifically negotiated by the parties. However, a careful consideration reveals
that economic exposure by no means dominates the analysis, and the ultimate
timing of the sale often does not coincide with the transfer of the economics.
Several reasons combine to account for this feature of the nonfungible when
cases. First, primarily in real estate cases, economic exposure, sometimes
referred to as "equitable title", shifts at a fairly early stage such as when the
executory contract is signed. Courts acknowledge this shift, but conclude that
129 See, e.g., Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber, 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930) (finding that sale did not
occur until the later date, in part due to the right of possession remaining in the seller until
the transaction was closed).
130 See, e.g., Rich Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 424, 425 (1st Cir. 1956)
(observing that seller retained possession of timber lands, but could not diminish their value,
such as by cutting and removing timber); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384,
394-95 (1995) (providing a list of restrictions imposed on the way in which seller could run
its business prior to the closing date; finding sale on the late date).
131 See, e.g., J.B.N. Tel. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting
that after signing the sale contract, seller continued to operate the manual telephone
equipment while buyer installed the automatic dialing equipment); Rich Lumber Co. v.
United States, 237 F.2d 424, 425 (lst Cir. 1956) (pointing out that buyer could survey the
property prior to completion of the sale); Harmston v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 216, 222 (1973)
(observing that while seller retained the property, buyer was given right to inspect it at any
reasonable time); Griffin Paper Corp. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 559, 565 (1997)
(mentioning that seller's representatives shared control with the buyer by occupying two
seats on the board of directors, an officer position, and one seat on the executive committee,
so there was no sale until the late date).
132 See, e.g., Wagner v. Comm'r, 518 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding sale on the
early date despite the fact that buyer did not obtain title or possession until the late date,
where a third party lessee possessed the property until the late date).
"I3 See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 393 (1995) (citing other
cases).
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ownership has not been transferred until a later date.' 34 Second, transfer of
economics frequently occurs gradually, making it difficult to pinpoint a single
moment when the benefits and burdens shift. In cases of this type, the buyer
and the seller share the benefits and burdens for some period of time as the
ownership transfer unfolds. 35 Third, in some cases the ultimate economic
exposure remains dependent on the completion of the sale, making it a
particularly poor indicator.1 36 Finally, on occasion, benefits and burdens are
transferred by a separate agreement while the sale contract determines transfer
134 In Major Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 373 (1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 749 F.2d 1483 (lth Cir. 1985), the Tax Court gave the following
explanation:
[T]he doctrine of equitable conversion, [provides that] equitable title passes to the
purchaser at the time a contract is signed (so that any loss or damage to the property
befalls the purchaser) .... It is clear that a contract to sell real estate which operates to
invoke the doctrine... is insufficient of itself to effectuate a completed transaction for
tax purposes since the transfer of title and full payment were conditions to the
completion of the transaction."
Id. at 381, n.15; see also, N. Texas Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 7 B.T.A. 1193, 1197 (1927),
affid, 281 U.S. 11 (1930) (accepting that equitable title passed on an early date "so that any
loss or damage to the property would have been the loss or damage of the purchaser," but
holding that the ownership remained with the seller until the late date). The concept of
equitable title is not restricted to real estate transactions. See, e.g., First Am. Bank of
Nashville v. Oman, 209 F. Supp. 902, 906 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (summarizing an unsuccessful
argument by the government that equitable title passed to buyer on early date and buyer
should be viewed as owner as of that date). But see, Int'l Paper, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 394
(equating ownership with equitable interest in the target stock if the benefits and burdens
also pass); Baird v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 115, 126 (1977) (holding that the buyer became the
owner of the property on early date because it became the equitable owner on that date and,
therefore, the benefits and burdens passed to the buyer at the time).
135 See, e.g., J.B.N. Tel. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 227, 229-30 (10th Cir. 1981)
(describing how though sale occurred on the early date, seller continued to operate the
manual telephone exchanges and was entitled to all income from the business until the late
date while buyer was converting the exchanges to automatic dial operation); Wagner v.
Comm'r, 518 F.2d 655, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1975) (describing an arrangement in which sale
happens on the early date, seller remains liable for taxes and insurance until the late date and
will retain the rents from the property until then); Harmston v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 216, 227
(1973) (summarizing the contracts in which the seller of orange groves retained many
benefits and burdens, while the buyer assumed risk of damage to the trees by acts of God,
other than frost).
136 One frequent example is the purchase of a business based on a balance sheet, i.e.,
when the purchase price is set by reference to the target company's balance sheet as of a
certain early date and later adjusted only for extraordinary changes. In this case, the
acquirer has full economic exposure to the target company provided the deal goes through,
and no exposure if it does not. See, e.g., Segall v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir.
1940) (finding that the executory contract was made in October, sale took place in January
of the following year, purchaser assumed liabilities of the target based on August balance
sheet).
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of all other attributes of ownership, including title and possession.'1 37
As the Segall test suggests, another important consideration is satisfaction of
conditions precedent. The rule is simple: if a meaningful condition precedent
has not been fulfilled, the contract of sale will remain executory.
138
Conversely, an insubstantial condition will not delay the sale. 139 Conditions
that belong in the former category include approval by a governmental
agency, 140 approval by purchaser's shareholders,' 41 completion of repairs and
improvements on the property by the seller, 142 receiving good title to the
property, 143 and obtaining financing by the buyer.144 Some of these conditions
may be insignificant if their eventual satisfaction is a forgone conclusion.
Thus, in certain cases such conditions as approval by a governmental
agency, 145 approval by the directors and stockholders of the purchaser,
146
issuance of a title insurance policy, 147 listing on a stock exchange, 48 and
obtaining financing 149 did not delay the sale. In any case, the inquiry is not
137 See, e.g., Kwiat v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 327, 335 (1992) (concluding that
ownership was transferred on early date because benefits and burdens were transferred by a
combination of seller's put and buyer's call and because other ownership attributes were
transferred to buyer at that time); Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 837, 843-44
(1978) (holding that although the benefits and burdens were transferred in large part by a
combination of seller's put and buyer's call on the early date, no ownership transfer took
place until late date); Griffin Paper, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 565 (same).
138 See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 394-95 (1995) (finding no
sale until transaction was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission).
139 See, e.g., Merrill v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 66, 75-76 (1963) (concluding that sale had taken
place and issuance of a title insurance policy was not a material condition where the same
title insurance company had issued a policy on the same property to the seller two months
earlier).
140 See, e.g., Keck v. Comm'r, 415 F.2d 531, 532 (6th Cir. 1969) (referring to approval
by Interstate Commerce Commission); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 394
(1995) (same); Dyke v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 1134, 1138 (1946) (same).
141 See, e.g., Perry v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1718, 1723-24 (1976).
142 See, e.g., Merrill, 40 T.C. at 76.
143 See, e.g., Walter v. Comm'r, 753 F.2d 35, 39 (6th Cir. 1985).
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Herbert J. Inv. Corp. v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 825, 827 (E.D. Wis.
1974) (acknowledging that where both parties believed that ICC approval was assured their
obligations were sufficiently fixed).
146 See, e.g., Baird v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 115, 127 (1977).
147 Merrill, 40 T.C. at 76 (finding that issuance of a title insurance policy is not a
material condition where the same title insurance company issued the policy on the same
property two months earlier).
1'8 See, e.g., Perry v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1718, 1724-25 (1976) (treating the
AMEX listing as an immaterial condition because the parties believed that failure to list was
highly unlikely).
' See, e.g., Baird, 68 T.C. at 127.
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how many of the conditions have been met relative to the number of the
remaining ones, but an assessment of the importance of those that are still not
satisfied.5 0
Transfer of ownership may be delayed for yet another reason - uncertainty
regarding the underlying property. This uncertainty may exist because a buyer
has not had a chance to inspect the property and verify the information
provided about it by the seller. 15' Uncertainty may also exist because a seller
retains the right to alter the property until a fixed future date, or because the
property may change for a number of reasons other than a catastrophic event.
In these circumstances, a buyer may protect itself by obtaining a right to call
the sale off. Because it is impossible to predict whether the seller will change
the property and, if it does, whether the buyer will exercise its right to rescind
the contract, courts are reluctant to find a completed sale until this uncertainty
is resolved.152
Payment of the purchase price is yet another factor taken into account in
determining the timing of sale. Although payment of consideration is relevant
because it demonstrates performance by one of the sides, many, if not most, of
the nonfungible when decisions consider situations in which a portion of the
purchase price was either prepaid (i.e., paid before the sale closed), 153 or, more
150 See, e.g., First Am. Bank of Nashville v. Oman, 209 F. Supp. 902, 906 (M.D. Tenn.
1962) (recognizing that "the only factor in any debate is whether there had been such
substantial performance of conditions precedent as imposed upon the purchasers an
unconditional duty to pay" and concluding that material conditions remained even though
many have been satisfied on the early date). On the other hand, "every remote contingency
and condition need not be satisfied before a sale is deemed to occur." Penn-Dixie Steel
Corp. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 837, 843 (1978).
151 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir.
1934) (explaining that uncertainty about the amount of standing timber affected the
purchase price), Rich Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir. 1956)
(referring to the lack of certainty about the size of the land parcel being sold).
152 See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 384, 393 (1995) (holding that
no sale took place because buyer, among other things, retained the right to rescind the
contract if there were any material loss, casualty, or adverse change with respect to the
target company); Oman, 209 F. Supp. at 906 (finding no completed sale despite title of stock
being sold placed in escrow, purchase price fixed, irrevocable voting proxy granted by seller
to buyer, and any stock dividends declared after the early date transferred to buyer at closing
because seller retained the power to affect the business and buyer retained the right to
terminate the sale).
153 See, e.g., Morco Corp. v. Comm'r, 300 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding that
purchaser prepaid about 3% of the purchase price in 1952 and 1954, but no sale occurred
until purchaser paid the full price in 1955); Segall v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir.
1940) (finding prepayment of about one third of consideration in 1931, but no sale until
1932); Doyle v. Comm'r, 110 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding that prepayment of
about one third of the purchase price was "earnest money" in an unconsummated sale and
therefore not income because it did not trigger ownership transfer).
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frequently, deferred (i.e., paid after the sale closed).' 54 Putting aside the
question of proper accounting for the amounts received, the timing of payment
appears to have a fairly limited effect on pinpointing the exact moment of the
tax ownership transfer.
Overall, review of numerous nonfungible when authorities leads one to
conclude that there is no magic rule or overriding consideration. Clearly, the
ultimate inquiry is whether the rights of each party to the counterparty's
property have become unconditionally fixed. The answer to this question
depends on many different features, including transfer of title, possession,
economic risks and rewards, payment of the purchase price, resolution of
uncertainties about the asset in question, and satisfaction of material conditions
precedent. The cases are frequently fact-intensive and involve careful
balancing because a buyer and a seller often share important attributes, such as
control and economic exposure, to varying degrees. If one clear rule emerges
from these authorities, it is that the analysis is flexible and no single factor is
controlling.
C. "Nonfungible" Securities
At first glance, some decisions discussed in this part appear to contradict the
conclusions of the short sale, commodities futures and other fungible when
authorities. Fordyce, for example, involved a tender offer, i.e., a sale of
publicly traded stock. 155 The court spent no time, however, pondering whether
any specific shares were sufficiently identified. Did the court miss a critical
issue? Perhaps not. A closer look reveals that ownership analysis must be
even more context-sensitive than it might have originally appeared. It is not
sufficient to conclude that some types of assets are fungible and other types are
not and that legal theories of tax ownership are different for each type. One
also needs to take the next step and consider whether a typical fungible asset,
such as a publicly traded stock or an inventoriable commodity, may lose its
fungibility in a particular factual setting. The Fordyce court took for granted
that in the situation before it, there was no meaningful uncertainty regarding
which particular shares would the taxpayer ultimately deliver.' 56 Without any
154 See, e.g., Clodfelter v. Comm'r, 426 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that
a closed transaction existed where buyers took possession and sale price was fixed,
notwithstanding the fact that the price was to be paid partly in deferred installments);
Comm'r v. Baertschi, 412 F.2d 494,498 (6th Cir. 1969) (acknowledging consummation of a
sale while about 70% of the price remained unpaid). Recognizing the wide-spread use of
deferred payments, Congress enacted § 453 that specifies a method of including purchase
price in income where part of the price is paid after the sale. I.R.C. § 453 (2000) (enacted
Oct. 19, 1980).
155 See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
156 This belief appears entirely rational for several reasons. First, because the taxpayer
delivered all of his shares, he could substitute any other shares only from new purchases in
the market that was likely to be fairly thin. Second, a market purchase would expose the
taxpayer to a risk that the tender offer would not succeed, the market price would drop to
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uncertainty, the publicly traded target stock had become, in substance,
identified.
Another example of how fungible shares may lose fungibility is Bradford v.
United States.'57  Mr. Bradford learned about an intriguing business
opportunity to purchase a large block of shares of Knights Life Insurance
Company: 55,384 shares at $62.50 per share to be exact. 158 While the price
seemed advantageous, Mr. Bradford simply did not have the funds to make this
purchase. 159 The solution he and his associate (the sellers) devised was to find
a buyer for the stock before they bought the stock themselves. 160 On January 8
they signed an agreement with American General Insurance Company (the
buyer), which obligated the buyer to purchase all Knights Life shares held by
the sellers for $67.50 per share if the sellers acquired at least 55,000 shares
prior to January 31.161 The sellers undertook to use their best efforts to
purchase up to 75,000 shares of Knights Life. 162 To enable the sellers to take
advantage of a reduced tax rate imposed on long-term capital gains, the
agreement provided for a closing more than six months from the date of its
execution. 163 The delay also satisfied some of the buyer's business objectives.
The sellers were required to deliver their shares to the buyer's nominee, with
transfer stamps affixed and subject to no lien or encumbrance. 164 On the same
date, the sellers obtained a commitment from two banks to provide funds
sufficient to purchase the amount of Knights Life shares necessary to satisfy
the sellers' agreement with American General. 165 The transaction went as
planned, but the IRS refused to go along. It argued that Mr. Bradford did not
acquire a long-term holding period in the stock and won.
The Bradford opinion represents a classic- example of nonfungible when
analysis. The court observed that the buyer's obligation came into existence
what it had been before the tender was announced, and the taxpayer would end up holding
extra shares for which he overpaid. Third, it appears unlikely that a taxpayer who decided
to participate in the tender offer would acquire additional shares of the target and not tender
those shares as well. Because there was no meaningful uncertainty regarding which specific
shares would be delivered to the acquirer, there was no reason to treat the shares any
differently than a parcel of land or a building, which is exactly what the court did.
1 444 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
158 Id. at 1139.
119 Id. at 1136.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1137.
162 Id.
163 Id.
" Id. The agreement provided further that all stock dividends would be delivered to the
buyer together with the shares, cash dividends paid on the shares prior to the closing would
be retained by the sellers, and the excess of cash dividends retained by the sellers over the
cash dividends paid during the same period of the preceding year would reduce the purchase
price. Id.
165 Id. at 1138-39.
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once the sellers met the only material condition - to purchase at least 55,000
shares of Knights Life. 166 As soon as they did, "as a practical matter the sale
was consummated" because
American General's liability was, as a practical matter, unconditional
since the shares were in the name of its nominee, in form for good
delivery and nothing remained to be done except the payment of the
purchase price. On the other side of the fence, [the sellers] had no right to
cancel. 167
The court observed that the sellers' profit from the sale was fixed at the
moment of acquisition, that American General was fully exposed to any
appreciation or depreciation in value of the Knights Life stock, and concluded
that the sellers' "holding period for the shares here in controversy began and
ended with their acquisition. 1 68
The decision makes perfect sense if the stock is treated as a nonfungible
asset. Although the court did not address the issue, the facts strongly indicate
that there was nothing fungible about the Knights Life stock. The sellers had
to borrow a considerable sum in order to purchase about fifty six thousand
shares of this stock. They were contractually obligated to deliver all of it.
Moreover, the agreement with American General obligated the sellers to
deliver all of their Knights Life shares up to 75,000. The amount offered at a
favorable price was only 55,384. On these facts, the likelihood that the sellers
would actually deliver shares other than those originally deposited with the
buyer's nominee was remote at best. As a practical matter, no uncertainty
existed about the asset being sold, so the court correctly concluded that as a
practical matter, the specific shares became identified the moment the sellers
acquired the stock. 169
A connection between fungible and nonfungible when reasoning that
underlies Bradford, but is not expressly addressed in this decision, is found in a
1928 Board of Tax Appeals opinion dealing with a fungible commodity.
Barde Steel Product Corp. v. Commissioner170 was one of a series of cases
dealing with deferred delivery contracts described earlier, 171 but it had an
interesting twist that led to an entirely different reasoning. The court in Barde
Steel did not need to resolve the central issue raised in similar controversies
like Amalgamated Sugar and Haas, i.e., whether specific fungible goods were
unconditionally appropriated to the contract. The buyer in Barde Steel
claimed, and the court assumed, that the buyer's certification of specific steel
166 Id. at 1143.
167 Id.
161 Id. at 1144.
169 See id.
170 14 B.T.A. 209 (1928).
171 See supra text accompanying notes 75-86.
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served to identify the goods. 172 The identification question being resolved, the
buyer was looking for a quick approval of its ownership claim. 173 The Board,
however, had an entirely different question in mind. It proceeded with an
analysis consistent with that enunciated later in Segall, distinguished
Amalgamated Sugar,174 and found that a material condition precedent
(certification by the seller) had never been met and, therefore, no sale took
place when the parties entered into the sale contract. 175
Barde Steel addressed expressly what other courts took for granted.
Commodities such as steel in Barde Steel, or securities such as publicly traded
stock in Bradford and Fordyce, do not change their fundamental characteristics
depending on the particular circumstances surrounding individual transactions.
But for tax purposes, these circumstances may result in defacto identification.
Such identification occurs when, as a practical matter, the likelihood that
anything other than the specific asset held by the seller at the inception of the
transaction will be eventually delivered to the buyer is so remote that it should
be disregarded. Furthermore, while it may appear from the discussion of the
fungible when authorities that identification of a fungible asset subject to a sale
contract means an immediate ownership transfer, this conclusion, while often
correct as a practical matter, would generally be mistaken. Identification
merely resolves the first, albeit central, issue relevant in determining tax
ownership. Once the specific fungible asset is identified, it loses its fungibility
and begins to "act" like a nonfungible one. A different analysis - the one
found in Segall and Fordyce - must then be applied to determine whether the
ownership of this "nonfungible" asset has been transferred.
To be sure, in most cases dealing with fungible assets nothing impedes the
ownership transfer once the asset has been identified. Not surprisingly, most
fungible when authorities simply skip the second step of the analysis.
Sometimes, however, the second step cannot be ignored, as Bradford and
Fordyce demonstrate by treating shares of stock as nonfungible assets and
considering when the respective rights and obligations have become
unconditionally fixed. Another example of this (implicit) two-step analysis is
the prepaid forward revenue ruling discussed above.' 76 In the ruling, the IRS
focused not only on the lack of identification of the specific shares to be
delivered under the forward, but also on the possibility that the forward would
be settled in cash. The government must have recognized that identification of
the shares would not dispose of the ownership issue because there was a
condition precedent (taxpayer's right not to deliver stock at all) that had to be
resolved before the taxpayer could be viewed as unconditionally obligated to
deliver any stock, identified or not. In sum, there is no inconsistency between
172 Barde Steel, 14 B.T.A. at 216-217.
113 Id. at 217.
114 Id. at 221-22.
175 Id. at 218.
176 See supra, text accompanying notes 42-47.
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Bradford and Fordyce on the one hand and the cases dealing with cotton
futures and short sales of stock on the other. To the contrary, the two lines of
authorities are mutually reinforcing.
D. Differences Between Fungible and Nonfungible When Authorities
As the discussion in this and the previous parts demonstrates, analysis in the
timing cases differs depending on the fungibility of the asset in question. The
crucial issue with respect to fungible assets is the uncertainty regarding the
specific asset that will eventually be sold. The certainty rule and the single
owner rule result in an open transaction treatment at least until the
identification occurs. Because transferring the asset's entire economics to the
seller has no bearing on identification, it is irrelevant for the purposes of the
fungible when analysis. The approach is very different for nonfungible assets.
No uncertainty exists as to what is being sold. Instead, the focus of the inquiry
is whether the respective rights and obligations of the parties have become
unconditionally fixed. Title, possession, economic exposure, conditions
precedent, payment of the purchase price, and verification of the asset are all
relevant to the analysis with no single factor controlling.
Another way we can delineate the difference between the two types of cases
is to consider the remedies upon breach. The default remedy in the
nonfungible world is specific performance. 177 This remedy does not make
sense if the asset is fungible, even if it is identified, and is not discussed in the
fungible when cases. A buyer of a nonfungible asset wants to become the
owner of a specific asset. A villa in the Hamptons would not do if one wanted
a cottage on Cape Cod. But a buyer of a fungible asset wants to become an
owner of an asset of a specific type having paid a specific price. It would
make no difference to the buyer which specific bale of cotton or share of stock
it receives and whether the particular bale or share certificate comes from the
seller, or from anyone else, as long as the buyer retains the economic benefit of
the bargain. Money damages would completely compensate the buyer in these
circumstances. On the other side of the fence, a seller of a nonfungible asset
wants to cease being its owner, often by a particular point in time. Offering the
seller a sum of money and advice to go find another buyer would not
necessarily make the seller whole. But if the asset is fungible, the seller can
easily find another buyer, and so long as she receives the same price (whether
from the new buyer or from the new buyer in combination with damages from
177 As discussed above, once a sale of nonfungible property progresses far enough, the
seller becomes required to deliver the property, rather than merely obligated to pay
monetary damages upon default. See, e.g., Wiseman v. Scruggs, 281 F.2d 900, 902 (10th
Cir. 1960) (noting that the contract "created a present obligation on the part of the sellers to
execute and deliver deeds of conveyance as installment payments were made .. ");
Merrill v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 66, 76 (1963) (concluding that the sale took place prior the
passage of title because "subject to [the buyer's] tender of the remainder of the purchase
price, they could have forced conveyance of the legal title").
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the original one), the seller is happy. Finally, it is highly unlikely that seller of
a fungible asset would ask for a right to take back the specific asset sold if the
buyer defaults because the seller could easily obtain an identical asset
elsewhere. Precisely for that reason a seller would not likely be granted this
right even if he asked. If the asset is nonfungible, a court is much more likely
to consider returning the asset to the seller who would not be able to obtain it
from anywhere else.178
Finally, a typical fungible asset is "simple." In a way, it has to be in order to
be fungible. Sale of an IBM share or a bale of cotton is unlikely to be delayed
by governmental approvals, lengthy inspections of the asset, financing and
other contingencies. Once the asset is identified, there is just not much that
can go wrong with it. On the other hand, a typical nonfungible asset is
"complex." Its transfer is usually subject to meaningful conditions precedent.
The asset may change over time and the sale contract may provide for various
remedies should this occur. The buyer may require an inspection of the asset
which takes time and extends uncertainty regarding the ultimate sale. One
example of this distinction familiar to any transactional lawyer is a difference
between a public and a private acquisition. The former, such as a tender offer
described in Fordyce, is a relatively straight forward transaction. Other than
insuring that the stock delivered to the buyer is valid and gathering public
information about the target, the buyer's advisers are somewhat limited in what
they can do. A simple condition precedent may delay the transaction slightly
(as it did in Fordyce itself), but the delay is unlikely to be significant. Things
are quite different in a private deal. Verification of the asset alone - the
infamous "due diligence" - may last for weeks. Lawyers negotiate for all sorts
of conditions to closing that, if breached, allow the parties to rescind the deal.
In no circumstances are the rights and obligations of the parties fixed until the
transaction is closed. The complex nature of nonfungible assets necessarily
complicates the ownership analysis. On the other hand, the simple nature of
fungible assets means that once a fungible asset has been identified, it is much
more likely that its ownership will be transferred immediately or soon after the
"' The court in Barde Steel gave the following rebuttal to the buyer's argument that a
certain provision of the sale contract should be interpreted as granting the buyer a right of
specific performance:
[T]he contract is very different in character from those in which specific performance
is ordinarily recognized. So far as appears the seller is concerned only in selling the
steel at a specified price while the petitioner, as buyer, is interested only in acquiring
the profit which might be anticipated from resale. Compensation in the form of
damages would be adequate relief to either party in such circumstances. Since this is
usually ground for denying relief in the form of specific performance or its equivalent,
it seems odd, that, had the parties contemplated anything approaching such
extraordinary relief in case of the seller's default, they did not at least attempt by
express terms to grant such right to the buyer.
Barde Steel, 14 B.T.A. at 219. The Service made a related point in 1925, noting that
"tracing of title to fungible property in the face of various legal and equitable estoppels [is]
difficult .... " S.M. 4281, IV-2 C.B. 187, 189 (1925).
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identification. In sum, there are substantial differences between the tests used
by fungible and nonfungible when authorities.
III. THE NONFUNGIBLE WHETHER AUTHORITIES
A. The Basic Standard
Whether authorities are not concerned with identifying the specific moment
in time when the tax ownership is transferred from one party to another.
Instead, they focus on whether the particular transaction resulted in a transfer
of tax ownership at all. In the vast majority of cases dealing with nonfungible
assets, at least one possible characterization of the transaction is a sale coupled
with an additional contract such as a lease, an option, or a management or
agency agreement. Alternative treatments of the overall transaction include a
loan, a lease, an agency, or a sham.
The discussion of the whether authorities in this article reverses the
previously established order and begins with the nonfungible cases. While
fungible and nonfungible when cases are based on mostly independent
reasoning, the fungible whether authorities have an important similarity to their
counterparts dealing with nonfungible assets, but present an additional
question critical to the analysis. It seems logical, therefore, to start with the
simpler, nonfungible case.
It is rather ironic to begin with an assertion that the nonfungible whether
setting presents a "simpler" case. Controversies of this type have given rise to
many Supreme Court opinions, produced extensive scholarship, and, most
likely, have involved the largest dollar amounts of the four categories
discussed in the article. Yet, as the discussion will show, a single factor
predominates the analysis in these decisions - economic exposure to the asset.
The parties dispute what should be counted in evaluating this exposure and
what should be the result stemming from a particular spatial and temporal
division of the economics, 179 but there is virtually no disagreement about the
underlying assumption that economic exposure holds the key to tax ownership
in this particular context.
One classic example of a nonfungible whether case is a leveraged lease
transaction frequently used to finance equipment purchases. For decades, the
government and the taxpayers argued about the circumstances in which a lease
should be treated as a sale.' 80 If a lease were recharacterized as a sale
combined with a loan from seller-lessor to buyer-lessee, the lessee would be
179 See generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Income Tax Consequences of Sales of Present
and Future Interests: Distinguishing Time from Space, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1988) (describing
various ways of apportioning interests in property as temporal and spatial divisions).
180 See, e.g., Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 836, 850 (1972), aff'd per
curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974); Lockhart Leasing Co. v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 301, 315
(1970); Judson Mills v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 25, 32 (1948); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Comm'r,
11 B.T.A. 547, 556-57 (1928).
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treated as the owner of the property and would be precluded from deducting
the entire amount paid to the lessor as rent. 18 1 The lessor, in turn, would be
denied depreciation deductions. Although litigation of these issues started as
early as the 1920s, the Service made a comprehensive statement of the criteria
it viewed as relevant to the inquiry only in 1955 when it issued Revenue
Ruling 55-540 to address "many new and unique types of agreements." 182
The ruling listed the following factors as relevant to the analysis: whether a
portion of rental payments are made specifically applicable to equity to be
acquired by the lessee, whether a lessee will acquire title once it pays all of the
stated rentals, whether the rents are excessive, whether rents payable in a short
period amount to a large portion of the purchase price, whether a lessee has an
option to acquire the property for nominal value, and whether a portion of
rental payments is specifically designated as interest. 183 All of these factors
probe the same issue: does the economic arrangement result in an acquisition
of the property by the lessee or compel the lessee to acquire the property at the
end of the lease? The former result obtains, for example, if rents amount to the
entire purchase price such that lessee takes title at the end of the term. 84 The
latter arrangement exists when rents exceed market rents or when lessee has an
option to acquire the property for nominal value.185
A Revenue Procedure issued by the Service decades later takes a different
approach and concentrates more on the economic exposure of the other party
to the contract - the lessor. 186 According to this procedure, the IRS will not
issue an advance ruling guaranteeing the intended tax treatment of the lease
unless, inter alia: the lessor has a certain amount of "at risk" investment at the
inception, throughout the term, and upon expiration of the lease; the equipment
is reasonably estimated to have a meaningful useful life at the end of the lease
term; the lessee has no right to purchase the property from the lessor for less
than fair market value; and the lessee does not spend so much on improving
the leased property that it is economically locked into purchasing that property
at the end of the lease. 187
Litigation arising from leveraged lease transactions does not raise
fundamental questions regarding the factors relevant in determining tax
ownership. Rather, the taxpayers, the government, and the courts tend to
consider the same set of economic criteria and disagree over whether in a
particular case the taxpayers pushed the envelope too far, giving the lessor too
little economic exposure to the asset. 188
11 See Lockhart Leasing, 54 T.C. at 313.
182 1955-2 C.B. 39, 39.
181 Id. at 41-42.
184 Id. at 41.
185 Id. at 42.
186 See Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-1 C.B. 1156.
187 See id. at 1157-58.
188 See, e.g., Swift Dodge v. Comm'r, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (treating the lease as
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A related and even more celebrated area of controversy involves sale-
leaseback transactions. These are used most frequently as a substitute for
secured borrowing by the seller-lessee and the leased property is usually a
depreciable asset, such as machinery, equipment, or commercial real estate.
The Supreme Court established an early precedent by concluding that a sale of
real estate coupled with a 99 year leaseback with an option to renew the lease
and purchase the realty for a specified price was, in substance, a mortgage. 189
A much more recent Supreme Court opinion dealing with a similar transaction
- Frank Lyon Co. v. United States'90 - has been widely criticized for its lack of
clear standards and the uncertainty it created regarding the importance of
taxpayers' tax avoidance intent. 191
Although the Frank Lyon decision hardly provides a useful guide for a
detailed analysis of a particular transaction, it is helpful indeed for the purposes
of our discussion. The Court strongly confirmed the "general and established
principles"'192 (applicable in the specific context of a case before the Court, we
might add) that location of title is of minor importance, that form does not
control, and that economics play a dominant role in determining tax ownership.
"[T]axation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed - the actual benefit for
which the tax is paid .... " In applying this doctrine of substance over
form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a
transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed. The
Court has never regarded "the simple expedient of drawing up papers" as
controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to
the contrary. 193
In a buildup to its holding, the Court offered a twenty-seven factor summary
a sale where lessee was exposed to both the upside and the downside of the leased asset and
lessor's exposure was similar to that of a secured seller in a conditional sale); Estate of Starr
v. Comm'r, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959) (treating a lease as a sale where leased property
has negligible salvage value at the end of the lease to anyone but the lessee).
189 See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
190 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
191 See, e.g., Kingson, supra note 1, at 418 (arguing that "Lyon... polluted (and
continues to pollute) tax law"); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 677 (referring to the case as
"notorious"); Wolfinan, supra note 2, at 1099-1100 ("Frank Lyon did not have to happen.
The elucidation of principle in tax cases should not depend on irrelevant or legalistic
distinctions. A Supreme Court opinion ought not become the basis for tax lawyers to make
a laughingstock of the Court as they now do when quite routinely they add unnecessary
third parties to financing transactions in order to qualify for the shelter of Frank Lyon.").
The most likely explanation, if not justification, for the Court's attention to the parties'
intent was that the Court endorsed a transaction of a type widely used by the tax shelter
industry, and the Court may have wanted to distinguish the case before it from the shady
deals done by the shelter promoters.
192 Lyon, 435 U.S. at 573.
'9' Id. at 572-73 (citations omitted).
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that referred in large part to the parties' relative economic exposure. 194 The
Court took into account, for example, the substantiality of the purchase price,
the reasonableness of the rentals, the existence of the option to purchase and
the uncertainty regarding its exercise, absence of any side agreements
regarding the purchase option, absence of lessee's liability on lessor's
indebtedness incurred to purchase the asset, and lessor' risk of asset
depreciation and lessee's default. 195 Post-Lyon authorities do not deviate from
Lyon's reliance on the economic analysis in determining tax ownership.
One of these decisions gave birth to the most frequently cited tax ownership
test. The test enunciated in Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner 96
provides precious little support for the argument advanced in this article - it
makes no reference to fungibility and mixes the inquiries relevant in
nonfungible when and whether contexts. On the other hand, the decision itself
is entirely consistent with other nonfungible whether authorities. In this case,
the Tax Court disregarded a sale completely (rather than recast it as an
alternative transaction). The taxpayer, a corporation engaged in real estate
business, purportedly purchased cattle having paid about three percent of the
purchase price in cash and the remainder in a nonrecourse promissory note
secured solely by the cattle. 197 As the "owner" of the cattle, the taxpayer
claimed investment credits and depreciation deductions based on the high
purchase price as well as deductions for management fees and interest paid
under the promissory note. 198 In short, this was a classic late 1970s tax shelter.
Summarizing the factors considered by the courts in determining whether
ownership has passed from one taxpayer to another, the court listed the
following "Grodt & McKay factors:"
(1) whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3)
whether an equity was acquired in the property; (4) whether the contract
creates a present obligation on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and
a present obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5) whether the
right of possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the
property taxes; (7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the
property; and (8) which party receives the profits from the operation and
sale of the property. 199
Readers will recognize that the first, fourth and fifth factors made their way
into this list from Segall and other nonfungible when authorities, which the
Grodt & McKay court carefully cited. In fact, the fourth factor is the ultimate
test used by these authorities to determine the timing of the transfer. It is not at
194 Id. at 582-83.
195 See id.
196 77 T.C. 1221 (1981).
197 Id. at 1223.
'9' Id. at 1234-35.
199 Id. at 1237-38 (citations omitted).
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all clear how a determination that an obligation to sell and to purchase is
binding helps to determine whether a purported sale (whenever it takes place)
should be treated as something else or disregarded entirely. Not surprisingly,
the Grodt & McKay court did not use this factor in its analysis. On the other
hand, the third, sixth, seventh and eighth factors all describe different aspects
of economic exposure to the asset. The Tax Court relied on these factors in
reaching its ultimate conclusion.20 0 As for title and possession, the purported
owner had one (title) but not the other (possession)2 1 - a separation typical of
a nonfungible whether case and more relevant in understanding why the
ownership question arose than in resolving it.
Another setting in which the tax ownership issue appears front and center is
a sale of a business coupled with an agreement retaining the seller to manage
the business and making the purchase price payable only from the business's
profits. The famous (or perhaps infamous) example of this transaction was
addressed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Brown.20 2  The
government argued that the buyer, a tax-exempt organization, did not become
an owner of the seller's business because it made no investment and assumed
no risk, all of which was retained by the seller.20 3 The Court disagreed and
pointed out several factors demonstrating the buyer's economic exposure to the
business.2 0 4 First, the Court noted that upon payment of the stipulated price,
the buyer would own the business outright.20 5 Second, if the business failed to
produce a certain amount of profits and, therefore, the minimum installment
payments were not made, the seller would have a recourse to the assets of the
business.20 6  Finally, the Court pointed out that the purchase price was
reasonable and resulted from arm's-length negotiations.207 Regardless of
which side had the better argument, both sides clearly focused almost
exclusively on allocation of economic exposure, and even more narrowly, on
allocation of the risk from the business.
Another subset of nonfungible whether authorities deals with a situation
where a seller is certain (or virtually certain) to repurchase an asset from a
buyer either as a result of a contractual obligation or based on the facts and
circumstances. Because the repurchase price is fixed, the buyer is not exposed
to the upside or downside from the asset. Not surprisingly, the authorities find
that tax ownership was never transferred from the seller to the buyer.
200 See Id. at 1240-43.
20t See id. at 1238 (finding that the petitioners may have had title, but finding the
evidence inconclusive); id. at 1241-42 (attacking the petitioner's right to possession as
illusory).
202 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
203 Id. at 570.
204 See id.
205 Id. at 569.
206 Id. at 567, 574-75.
207 Id. at 572-73.
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Examples of circumstances in which it was determined that the seller was
bound to repurchase include an express obligation to repurchase, 208 a
combination of a put and call options exercisable at the same time and for the
same price, 20 9 or an option that, in the court's opinion, is certain to be
exercised. 2 10
The nonfungible whether authorities address many different factual settings.
Creative taxpayers continue to design increasingly complicated structures in
attempts to transfer tax benefits of ownership.211 However, the conceptual
approach used by the above authorities is remarkably consistent: they focus on
allocation of economic risks and rewards from the asset in each specific
transaction, balance each party's exposure to the property and decide whether a
purported owner has enough exposure to be respected as such for tax purposes.
B. "Nonfungible" Securities
As the discussion of the Bradford, Fordyce and Barde Steel decisions has
demonstrated, it is possible in a when context that units of an otherwise
fungible asset may become identified in a particular set of circumstances,
making authorities generally applicable to nonfungible assets relevant in the
analysis. It shouldn't be surprising that similar identification may occur in a
whether setting as well. For example, the taxpayer in Patton v. Jonas entered
into an option agreement to purchase a large portion of the preferred and
common stock of O'Neil-Duro Company, but lacked the funds to exercise it.
2 12
When a family corporation owned by the taxpayer, Mr. Patton, and his
relatives refused to lend money to the taxpayer, they reached an alternative
agreement. The corporation purchased a large portion of the shares subject to
an option and granted the taxpayer a right to purchase these shares at cost (i.e.,
granted the taxpayer a call). 213 Mr. Patton, in turn, guaranteed to the family
corporation that the dividends paid on the shares would be no less than the
average rate of income earned by it from other investments.2 14 He also agreed
to indemnify the corporation for any loss of principal from the transaction.
2 15
The corporation retained a right to sell the shares of O'Neil-Duro Company to
Mr. Patton at any time (i.e., it obtained a put).216 Eleven years later the
208 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-47, 1983-1 C.B. 63.
209 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87.
210 See, e.g., Vickers v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 391 (1977) (treating a sale and option
to repurchase as no sale until option expired, treating the option in effect as exercised
despite the fact that it expired later); Blake v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 546 (1947) (holding that a
sale plus option to repurchase was a loan, option treated as exercised).
211 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-44 I.R.B. 760, 763.
212 249 F.2d 375, 376 (7th Cir. 1957).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 377.
216 Id.
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taxpayer purchased the shares from the corporation for their cost plus the
difference between the dividends paid during the period when the corporation
held the shares and the agreed upon fixed return. 2 17 Mr. Patton treated the
transaction as a loan and deducted the difference as interest.218 The Service
denied a deduction arguing that the corporation owned the shares for tax
purposes.2 19
The court agreed with the taxpayer. Focusing solely on the economics of
the transaction, the court reasoned that the corporation had no risk from the
shares because it could sell them to Mr. Patton at any time and because Mr.
Patton guaranteed its principal investment. 220 Similarly, the corporation had
no opportunity to profit from the investment because of the taxpayer's call.2
21
Finally, the corporation's return was fixed and entirely independent from the
dividends paid on the shares. 222 Thus, the corporation ,
was merely a conduit in plaintiffs chain of title and, in essence, did
nothing mote than advance the necessary funds for the stock purchase in
return for a defeasible title thereto. [The corporation's] real economic
interest in the stock contained all the essential ingredients of the ordinary
security interest incident to the normal debtor-creditor relationship, as
distinguished from those involved in a stock purchase.2 23
While the court did not address the issue of fungibility, it was quite clear
that the specific shares purchased by the family corporation would be
ultimately delivered to Mr. Patton. In addition to economic considerations
making alternative dispositions unattractive, Mr. Patton was a stockholder,
director, and vice-president of that corporation who, one would think, had
sufficient control to prevent undesirable sales of these shares to third parties.
A similar fact pattern was addressed in Green v. Commissioner.224 Mr.
Green was in the shoes of the corporation in Patton and his fellow attorney and
friend Mr. Smith was in Mr. Patton's shoes.225 Substantively, the case was
easier because instead of a combination of a put and a call, the parties in Green
entered into a forward obligating Mr. Green, the initial buyer of the stock, to
sell it to Mr. Smith within twelve months for a fixed sum.226 The shares
involved represented practically all of the issuer's stock, so no meaningful
uncertainty existed regarding which specific shares would be delivered under
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 376.
220 Id. at 378.
221 See id. at 379.
222 Id. at 378.
223 Id.
224 367 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1966).
225 Jd. at 824-25.
226 Id.
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the forward.227 Neither the government nor the taxpayer argued for a loan
characterization. The government asserted that the arrangement was a
partnership. The taxpayer argued that the form should be respected and its
thirty-seven percent profit should be taxed at capital gains rate.228 Both the
Tax Court and the circuit court concluded that Mr. Green was never a partner
or the owner of the stock, but rather a lender, albeit at an exorbitant rate that
would have violated the state usury law.229
A final piece in the trilogy is Comtel Corporation v. Commissioner.230 The
case involved a public tender offer by Zeckendorf Hotels Corporation for the
stock of Commodore Hotel, Inc.23 1 The buyer might have overpaid: over
ninety-one percent of the shares were tendered, but the buyer was unable to
amass enough cash to purchase the shares.232 However, it found investors that
agreed to create a new corporation - Comtel. Two investors and a Zeckendorf
nominee contributed equal amounts of cash to Comtel which in turn secured a
loan sufficient, together with the contributed cash, to purchase the Commodore
shares. 233 Zeckendorf borrowed these funds from Comtel, used them to
acquire the Commodore shares, and sold them to Comtel for exactly the same
price (repaying the transitory loan with the sale proceeds). 234 As part of the
transaction, Comtel gave Zeckendorf an option to repurchase these shares for a
two-week period slightly more than six months after the date of the first
transaction. 235 In addition, Comtel shareholders entered into indemnity and
subordination agreements that assured the two investors return of their capital
plus a fixed profit of about twelve percent.236 Finally, Comtel was not
permitted to sell the shares or pledge them, except to the bank that provided the
original loan.2 37 In substance, these arrangements bound Comtel to deliver the
specific shares to Zeckendorf if it exercised its call.
The court concluded that Comtel was a lender, not an owner of the stock.238
In addition to discussing the parties' intent, the court observed that the
investors made a risk-proof investment, that Comtel's rights were similar to
those of a mortgagee of a nonrecourse debt, that Comtel's profit from the
option had no relation to the value of the Commodore shares, but was in the
227 The transaction covered 12,096 shares out of the total of 14,519. See Green v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480, 1481.
228 Id. at 1485-86.
229 Green, 367 F.2d at 825.
230 376 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1967).
231 Id. at 792.
232 See id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 793.
237 Id. at 794.
238 Id. at 797.
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nature of interest. 239 In other words, consistently with other nonfungible
whether authorities, the court analyzed the economics of the transaction.
Discussing limitations on Comtel's disposition of the Commodore stock, the
court referred to it as "unique property,"240 which it certainly was in the
context of the case.
Comparing Comtel with Patton and Green is a convenient opportunity to
introduce the distinction between a two-party and a three-party case. The point
of describing this distinction, however, is to show that it is mostly without a
difference. Comtel, a transitory owner or an intermediary, purchased the stock
from, and sold the stock to, the same party - Zeckendorf. So Comtel is a two-
party case. Patton and Green are three-party cases. The ultimate owner
induced an intermediary to purchase the stock from a third party and
immediately contracted to acquire the same stock from the intermediary.
Other than mechanics, these alternative transactions have few meaningful
differences, especially if, as happened in Comtel, the party lending the
purchase price is the intermediary itself.
24 1
While intermediaries in all three cases discussed so far were treated as
lenders, a transitory stockholder may also be denied ownership status if she is
treated as an agent.242  Not surprisingly, courts rely on the lack of the
intermediary's economic exposure to the stock, as well as control exercised
over the intermediary's actions by the principal, in concluding that the agent
never became the owner for tax purposes.
Overall, cases discussed in this section demonstrate two points. First, a
fungible asset may lose its fungibility and, if it does, the analysis applicable to
239 Id. at 794.
240 Id. at 795.
241 Of course, instead of lending the amount equal to the purchase price to Zeckendorf,
Comtel could have purchased the Commodore shares directly from their historic
shareholders, making it a three-party case. Similarly, the ultimate buyers in Patton and
Green could have borrowed (from the intermediaries or from other lenders), purchased the
stock, immediately sold it to the intermediaries, used the proceeds from this sale to repay the
loan, and entered into a forward contract to repurchase the stock from the intermediaries.
Both types of cases may be found among the traditional nonfungible whether authorities,
see, for example, Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66 (describing an agreement which
provided that a corporation, in substance, would borrow from a political subdivision to
acquire land as either a purchase of land by the political subdivision followed by a lease to
the corporation (a three-party transaction), or a purchase of the land by the corporation with
borrowed funds followed by the sale to the political subdivision and immediate leaseback of
the land (a two-party transaction), as well as fungible whether cases, as discussed later in the
article). Compare Nebraska Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994) (two-
party repo), and Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115 (6th
Cir. 1970) (two-party repo), with First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467
F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972) (three-party repo), and Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United
States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970) (three party repo).
242 See, e.g., Rupe Inv. Corp. v. Comm'r, 266 F.2d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 1959).
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nonfungible assets would govern the tax ownership inquiry. Second, the
primacy of the economic analysis in the whether context does not depend on
whether a particular asset is nonfungible, such as equipment or real estate, or
fungible but identified, such as publicly traded stock.
IV. THE FUNGIBLE WHETHER AUTHORITIES
A. Stock Loans and Subordination Agreements
The discussion of fungible whether authorities begins by focusing on a
transaction not closely considered until now: a transaction that transfers tax
ownership, but is not a sale. This transaction is a securities loan - a transfer of
stock or other securities in exchange for a promise to return identical securities
upon request. As discussed earlier, a stock loan is a necessary component of
any short sale.243 Because short sales were wide-spread before the arrival of
income tax, the question about the effect of a stock loan on tax ownership
arose as early as 1915, and by 1925 it reached the Supreme Court.244
The specific question in Provost v. United States was whether a stock loan
(and a return of a borrowed stock) constituted a transfer of legal title to the
shares, making it subject to the stamp tax.24 5 Brokers of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") argued that a stock lender is in the same position as a
pledgor of stock.24 6 They contended that because there is no transfer of title
(meaning ownership) of the stock when it is pledged, there should be no stamp
tax when it is lent. 247  In addition, the brokers reasoned that because a
borrowing broker always deposits cash collateral equal to the full market value
of the stock with the stock lender, the lender should be viewed as borrowing
money from the broker - a transaction specifically excluded from the scope of
the stamp tax statute.248
The Court's response to these arguments is quoted at length below for two
reasons. First, it laid the foundation for the entire framework of analysis
developed by the nonfungible whether authorities. Second, some of the critical
points in the Court's reasoning were glossed over by the later decisions, to
their great detriment. Thus, it is important to set the tone with a relatively full
expression of the Court's view. The Court began by alluding to the economic
features of a stock loan, recognizing that the stock lender retained the entire
economics of the lent stock:
During the continuance of the loan the borrowing broker is bound by the
243 See supra Part I.A.
244 See Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 457 (1926).
245 Id. at 450.
246 Id. at 454.
247 Id.
24 See id. "[D]eposit[s] of stock certificates as collateral security for money loaned"
were specifically excluded from tax. Id. at 450 n. 1.
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loan contract to give the lender all the benefits and the lender is bound to
assume all the burdens incident to ownership of the stock which is the
subject of the transaction, as though the lender had retained the stock.249
If this were a nonfungible whether case, the inquiry would have ended right
then and there and the brokers would have won. Fungibility of the stock made
a critical difference for the analysis. The Court went on to address the
arguments of the brokers:
[The broker's] arguments ignore the essential legal characteristics of the
loan transaction. It may be agreed for the purpose of this discussion...
that the relation of the customer and the broker with whom the customer
deposits stock as security for advances ... is technically that of pledgor
and pledgee, with authority and power on the part of the broker to
repledge to the extent of his advances .... Although the broker has an
implied authority to substitute other securities of the same kind and
amount for the securities which he holds for his customer, and to repledge
them to the extent of his advances, courts have not dispensed with the
requirement that he should at least have, either in his own possession or
lodged with his bank on the repledge, specific securities of the kind and
amount purchased for this customer, available for delivery to the
customer on payment of the balance due.
But the borrower of stock holds nothing for account of the lender. The
procedure adopted and the obligations incurred in effecting a loan of
stock and its delivery upon a short sale neither contemplate nor admit of
the retention by either the borrower or the lender of any of the incidents
of ownership in the stock loaned.
Unlike the pledgee of stock who must have specific stock available for
the pledgor on payment of his loan, the borrower of stock has no interest
in the stock nor the right to demand it from any other. For that reason he
can be neither a pledgee, trustee nor bailee for the lender, and he is not
one "with whom stock has been deposited as collateral security for money
loaned." For the incidents of ownership, the lender has substituted the
personal obligation, wholly contractual, of the borrower to restore him, on
demand, to the economic position in which he would have been, as owner
of the stock had the loan transaction not been entered into.250
The analysis could not be clearer: a pledgee does not become a tax owner of
a pledged stock while a borrower does become a tax owner of a borrowed
stock because the pledgee has a limited control over the pledged securities
249 Id. at 452.
250 Id. at 454-56 (citations omitted). Although the holding of the case addressed only the
application of the stamp tax statute, it is impossible not to recognize that the Court
concluded that a stock loan transferred ownership of the stock for tax purposes.
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while the stock borrower's control is complete. This result obtains even
though a stock borrower gains no economic exposure to the borrowed stock, all
of which is retained by a lender. In other words, control overrides economic
exposure in determining tax ownership of a borrowed stock.
The Service followed this reasoning even before the Supreme Court had a
chance to affirm the Court of Claims decision in Provost. The dilemma that
the government faced was a classic example calling for an application of the
single owner rule. While I introduced this rule during the discussion of
fungible when authorities such as forwards,2 5' it was probably a stock loan that
raised the issue of multiple potential owners of a single fungible asset for the
first time. In the Solicitor's Memorandum issued in 1925, the Service
considered who should be treated as owning dividends paid on a borrowed
stock.252 There were two potential candidates: the stock lender (A) who lent
the stock to a borrower (B), and a third party purchaser (D) who bought the
stock from B (with B selling the stock short).253 The Service observed that if
after these transactions take place, the stock issuer pays a dividend, the rules of
the New York Stock Exchange would require A's broker to credit A's account
with an amount equal to the dividend and D's broker would be required to do
the same.2 54 Although there would be two dividend-equivalent payments, the
memorandum reasoned:
There is but one dividend.... It follows that for the purposes of
computing normal income tax only one purchaser is entitled to deduct it
[i.e., is the owner of the dividend] .... The question is, as between A
and D, Which of the two is entitled to take the deduction? It is the
opinion of this office that D rather than A is alone entitled to take it.
Although the "Street" designates the delivery of the certificate of stock
from [A] to [B] as a "loan," it was held in Provost Bros. & Co. v. United
States... that title to the stock passed to the borrower.... The credit
entered in favor of A by [A's broker] is, then, not a dividend but a sum of
money measured by a dividend, and is credited to him not as an owner of
stock but because of the terms of the contract . ... 255
Was A's stock loan, therefore, a taxable disposition? Were payments
received by A ineligible for tax-preferred treatment accorded to dividends?
251 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
252 S.M. 4281, IV-2 C.B. 187 (1925).
253 The fact pattern is simplified by eliminating the discussion of rights and obligations
of A's, B's and D's brokers.
254 Id. at 188.
255 Id. This conclusion was confirmed later. See Rev. Rul. 80-135, 1980-1 C.B. 18, 19
(holding that the "lender of the municipal bond is not entitled to exclude from gross
income... the amount, equal to the interest on the bond, received from the broker who
borrowed the bond" because "the lender is no longer the owner of the bond"); Rev. Rul. 60-
177, 1960-1 C.B. 9, 10 (concluding that "payment by the 'Short-Seller' of the stock.., is
not a dividend" because the purchaser is the real owner of the stock).
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Not quite. The memorandum observed that the brokers did not tell their
customers when they borrowed the customers' margin shares, and that the
brokers held these shares in large pools, making it impossible to determine
whose client's shares were actually lent.256  Recognizing that "the
administrative difficulties involved in the above ruling are considerable", the
memorandum concluded that "[i]nasmuch as 'loans' of stock incident to short
sales are comparatively rare, it would seem expedient" to permit the traders
and brokers to ignore the reality and treat both A and D as owners as long as
A's broker does not know that she lent the shares specifically belonging to
A.25
7
Clearly, this was a ruling of convenience. What looked like a good
compromise at the time led to decades of uncertainty. The government used
several different justifications to defend the result reached in 1925, growing
increasingly frustrated with the issue.258 In the end, Congress had to step in,
noting (in quite an understatement) that "uncertainty has developed as to the
correct income tax treatment of certain securities lending transactions. '259
256 S.M. 4281, IV-2 C.B. 187, 188 (1925).
257 Id. at 188-89.
258 In 1948, the Service issued a private ruling to NYSE where it stated that "the
borrower does not become the owner of the stock he borrows and that he is required to
return the stock any time the lender notifies him to do so" and, therefore, "the loan of stock
and the return thereof to the lender under the circumstances set forth above, is not a
disposition of property which results in recognized gain or loss for Federal income tax
purposes.... ." The ruling was published by two major tax services - including Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. (known as CCH). See Special Rul. (Apr. 19, 1948), [1948] 5 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 10158; see also 6 [1948] Fed. Taxes (P-H) P76,270. Clearly, the
ruling's authors didn't check the Supreme Court opinion in Provost. Several decades later,
the government concluded that if the loan involved common or preferred stock and if the
borrower returned identical stock, the overall transaction was subject to the nonrecognition
rules of § 1036. See Rev. Rul. 57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295. Decades went by, and the IRS
modified its approach again. It dismissed "some public misunderstanding" of the 1948
ruling and confessed that the ruling's conclusion was "legally unsupportable." See Gen.
Couns. Mem. 36948 at * 17 (Dec. 10, 1976) (acknowledging that "[a]lthough the Service's
published position with respect to securities 'lending' transactions has remained consistent
with the Provost decision, some public misunderstanding of this position... resulted from a
private ruling letter" and that the Service "believed ... the conclusion reached in this ruling
letter is legally unsupportable"). The government's new conclusion was that an ownership
transfer resulting from a stock loan was not taxable because "the transaction remains open
and the income tax consequences cannot be determined until the borrower satisfies his
obligation to the lender." Id. at *20. Section 1036 was mentioned only as a fall-back
argument in the limited circumstances when it applied. See id. at *27. Finally, the Service
refused "to issue rulings as to whether a securities lending transaction constitutes a sale or
exchange or whether the transaction interrupts the lender's holding period." S. REP. No. 95-
762, 1978-C.B. 357, 359 (1978).
259 Id.
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Congress enacted § 1058 to resolve this uncertainty. 26  As long as securities
lending complies with its requirements, the lender recognizes no gain or loss
from the transaction and her basis and holding period in the securities are
unaffected by the lending. 261
Notably, § 1058 says nothing about tax ownership. If anything, it indirectly
supports the conclusion that a securities loan is an ownership change because it
provides for nonrecognition treatment - something that would be needed only
if the underlying transaction would (or at least could) otherwise be a
realization event. In the end, despite the tortured history of securities lending,
its tax consequences are clear under current law: stock loans transfer tax
ownership, but are subject to a nonrecognition provision, at least as long as
they meet the requirements of § 1058.262 Provost is as good a statement of the
law today as it was in 1925.
Another set of disputes regarding tax ownership of fungible securities
resulted from two acts of British government: the British Finance Act of
1916263 and the Financial Powers (U.S.A. Securities) Act of 1941.2 64 Because
the Court of Claims decisions addressing each of the Acts are similar in most
respects, I will focus on the more recent one. To finance its expenditures
during the Second World War, the British government borrowed $425 million
from the United States. 265 The loan was collateralized by stocks of American
corporations obtained by the British government from its citizens under the
U.S.A. Act. 26 6 Pursuant to this law, any British subject who owned American
stocks was required to deliver them to the British Treasury, together with
dividend orders and voting proxies. 267 A death of a Briton whose shares were
among those collateralizing the $425 million loan sparked a controversy with
the IRS.
In Bickford-Smith v. United States,268 the Service asserted that the plaintiffs'
decedent "owned and held" the stock of The Ensign-Bickford Company of
Connecticut at the time of his death, and that an estate tax was payable on its
value. 269 While the decedent continued to be the registered owner of the stock
260 I.R.C. § 1058 (2005).
261 Complying with the additional requirements of the regulations proposed under § 1058
is also advisable.
262 But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1058-1(e)(1), 48 Fed. Reg. 33,912 (July 26, 1983)
(providing that failure to comply with the requirements of § 1058 triggers recognition of
gain or loss under § 1001). Another provision that could provide for nonrecognition
treatment of a stock loan is § 1036.
263 Bickford-Smith v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 660, 673 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
264 Id. at 671.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 80 F. Supp. 660 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
269 At the time of the decedent's death, § 862 of the Code provided that "[s]tock in a
[Vol. 85:431
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TAX OWNERSHIP
on the books of The Ensign-Bickford Company, he certainly did not hold the
stock at the time of his death.270 Being a law-abiding citizen, the decedent
delivered his shares to the British government and they were deposited,
together with other stock, as collateral with the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York where they remained at the time of his death. 271 In return for the shares,
the decedent, as any other depositor, obtained a receipt stating that his stock
was placed "at the disposal" of the British Treasury, and that when dividends
were paid on the stock, the Treasury would pay an equivalent amount in pound
sterling to the holder of the receipt.272  Furthermore, the Treasury was
obligated to return the stock to the depositor, or to return "any security of that
description" in lieu of the shares actually deposited, or, should the Treasury
exercise its right to dispose of the shares, to pay the depositor fair market value
of these shares. 273
The court recognized that the decedent retained full economic exposure to
the stock, and that this constituted a "strong indicia of ownership. ' 274 The court
concluded, however, that the British government, not the decedent, owned the
stock:
[The decedent] had no right to the return of the stock, either soon or late.
He had no right even that the stock be kept available, subject to the
pledge to the ... [U.S. government], until the [British] Government either
released it to him or extinguished any possibility of a release and
substituted its obligation to pay him the then value of it .... [A]II the
documentary indicia of ownership [was] in the Government, plus a
complete immunity from any claim for a return of the stock, and a
complete power to do as it pleased with the stock at any time, being
accountable only for paying the equivalent of dividends in the meantime,
and for, at its option, paying the market value or returning the same or
substituted shares at some time in the future. We think that the plaintiffs'
decedent had a chose in action, which the ... British Government could
satisfy by alternative performances, at its option, and that he did not
continue to own the stock.275
It is hardly surprising that this analysis sounds so similar to the discussion in
Provost. In substance, the British government borrowed the shares of
American companies from its citizens. Unlike a NYSE broker-borrower,
domestic corporation owned and held by a nonresident not a citizen of the United States
shall be deemed property within the United States," and other provisions made such stock
subject to the federal estate tax. See id. at 671.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 672.
274 Id. "The right to income from property, and the chance of gain and risk of loss from
later increases or decreases in its market value usually accompany ownership .... " Id.
275 Id.
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however, the government had no obligation to return identical stock - only its
value in cash. The Service must have thought that it could limit Provost to
stamp tax analysis to even bother litigating Bickford-Smith. It was mistaken.
The Court of Claims expressly found that Provost applied and the ownership
was transferred even though the stock of The Ensign-Bickford Company was
neither actually sold by the British Treasury, nor transferred to the British
Government on the issuer's books.276 The power to dispose, not the actual
disposition, the court explained, determined the outcome. 277
Cases and rulings dealing with subordination agreements have not made a
profound impact on legal thought regarding tax ownership, although the
Service may have given them a second life in recent revenue rulings. 27 In any
case, these authorities provide another reminder about the importance of
control over a fungible asset in the whether context. Disputes about tax
consequences of subordination agreements were an indirect result of the
minimum capital requirements promulgated by several stock exchanges and
the Securities and Exchange Commission. These rules required stock brokers
that were members of the exchanges to have a certain amount of capital
available for claims of their customers and general creditors. The
subordination agreements were devised to meet these requirements. The
agreements came in two main flavors - each discussed in a revenue ruling and
a few cases.
Under the first type of a subordination agreement (I will call it a "note
subordination agreement"), a client delivers to a broker a non-recourse
"secured demand note" together with cash and marketable securities securing
the note.279 The value of the securities exceeds the face amount of the note.
The client is free to withdraw any of its securities as long as it replaces them
with other marketable securities or cash of equal value. The client retains the
right to vote the shares and collect dividends and interest on the shares and
bonds placed in the subordination account. The client also is required to
maintain the aggregate value of securities supporting the demand note at or
above its face amount to avoid liquidation of collateral by the broker. If the
broker encounters "an event of financial restriction" (such as insolvency,
bankruptcy, or determination that the securities were needed to meet the capital
requirements of the exchange), the broker can demand payment under the note
276 Id. at 673.
277 Id. The Court of Claims revisited the issue addressed in Bickford-Smith several years
later and reaffirmed its views without a substantial analysis. See City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 186, 187 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
278 See Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-34 I.R.B. 380; Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363.
279 The description of a note subordination agreement is a "composite sketch" that comes
from several incomplete descriptions of this type of agreement. See Meisels v. United
States, 732 F.2d 132, 133-34 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (describing a subordination agreement with
Hayden Stone, a member of the NYSE and Amex); Lorch v. Comm'r, 605 F.2d 657, 658
(2d Cir. 1979) (considering a similar agreement); Rev. Rul. 73-122, 1973-1 C.B. 66
(describing a subordination agreement entered into by the members of the NYSE).
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and, if the client refuses, liquidate the collateral and retain the proceeds,
presumably not in excess of the face amount of the note. If the broker draws
down the note, the broker is required to issue to the client either its shares or its
junior debentures that would be subordinated to all claims of all present and
future creditors of the broker.
Another type of a subordination agreement (I will call it a "pledge
subordination agreement") does not involve any debt obligations. Instead, a
client deposits securities and/or cash into an account with a broker that is
subordinated to all claims of all present and future creditors of the broker.
280
Unless an event of financial restriction occurs, the client retains full beneficial
ownership of the securities, including the right to vote, the right to current
income, and the right to withdraw the securities or dispose of them, provided
that other securities or cash of equal value are deposited in the account. If an
event of financial restriction occurs, the broker has a right to dispose of any
securities in the account and to use the cash to satisfy claims of its other
creditors. The client in this case would have a claim against the broker in an
amount equal to the sale proceeds, but this claim would be the most junior
claim against the broker.
Based on the authorities discussed in this section, one would expect that the
first arrangement would be analyzed as a non-recourse loan secured by a
pledge of fungible assets. The client should remain owner of these assets
unless the client defaults under the note and the broker becomes free to sell the
collateral on the client's behalf to satisfy the client's obligations. The second
type of subordination agreement is a pledge that turns into something similar to
a securities loan upon occurrence of a contingency. Thus, the client should
remain the owner of the securities until, upon contingency, the broker becomes
free to dispose of them regardless of whether the broker actually sells the
securities.
The Service reached exactly these conclusions in two revenue rulings.2 81
Unfortunately, neither ruling contained a legal discussion or cited any
authorities. While the ensuing litigation resulted in some confusion, 282 the
Second Circuit confirmed the government's analysis of a note subordination
agreement.283 A case involving a pledge subordination agreement deserves a
280 This description is also a "composite sketch" based on several cases and rulings. See
Stahl v. United States, 441 F.2d 999, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing a subordination
agreement with Balough & Company); Michtom v. United States, 626 F.2d 815 (Ct. Cl.
1980) (describing a subordination agreement with Hayden Stone); Miami Nat'l Bank v.
Comm'r, 67 T.C. 793, 794-96 (1977) (describing a subordination agreement with First
Devonshire Corp., a member of the NYSE); Rev. Rul. 69-455, 1969-2 C.B. 9 (describing a
subordination agreement entered into by the members of the NYSE).
281 Rev. Rul. 73-122, 1973-1 C.B. 66 (note subordination agreement); Rev. Rul. 69-455,
1969-2 C.B. 9 (pledge subordination agreement).
282 See, e.g., Michtom, 626 F.2d at 818 (detailing the parties' arguments), en banc
(reversing an earlier decision of its panel).
283 See Lorch, 605 F.2d at 661.
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closer look.
In Miami National Bank v. Commissioner, the Service argued that the client
lost ownership of shares placed in a subordinated account with his broker, and,
therefore, the client could not have transferred these shares to an acquirer.284
As a result, the acquirer did not own enough shares of the target to file a
consolidated return with it. 285 The broker holding the stock went bankrupt, but
never sold the stock.286  Eventually, the client paid cash to the broker,
withdrew the shares, and delivered them to the acquirer.287 The Service
contended, first, that the client transferred ownership of the stock to the broker
when he delivered the shares pursuant to the agreement. 288 Alternatively, the
government argued that, at the very least, the client lost ownership of the stock
when the broker went bankrupt.289 The Tax Court rejected both arguments.
As to the first one, the court pointed out that the government's position had an
unfortunate effect of contradicting its own revenue ruling.290  The court
reasoned that the client remained the owner of securities because he retained
full economics of the stock and a right to substitute cash or other securities for
it. 291 The court found it particularly important that, in addition to having a
legal right, the client had sufficient means to substitute cash or other securities
for the shares held in the subordinated account.292 In other words, his right of
substitution was real. The court responded to the second argument by noting
that the stock was never sold 293 - hardly a convincing answer, at least without
additional explanation.
While not without their share of confusion, subordination agreement
authorities are generally consistent with cases such as Provost and Bickford-
Smith. Economic exposure to the underlying asset does not dominate the
analysis. The critical issue is control over the property in question, revealed by
the power to dispose of it or substitute it for other property.
B. Sale Repurchase Agreements and Related Authorities
Controversies related to tax ownership of securities subject to sale-
repurchase agreements have a long history. The first round took place in the
1930s, with both taxpayers and the government having some success. 2 94 The
284 67 T.C. at 799.
285 Id. at 798.
286 Id. at 797.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 799-800.
289 Id. at 802.
290 Id. at 799-800 n.3; see also Rev. Rul. 69-445, 1969-2 C.B. 9.
291 Id. at 800.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 802.
294 Compare First Nat'l Bank in Wichita v. Comm'r, 57 F.2d 7, 7-8 (10th Cir. 1932)
(disregarding the form of a repo and treating it as secured lending), with Bank of Cal., Nat'l
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parties sparred again in the 1970s, with the IRS gaining a decisive advantage.
Finally, the government achieved, it appeared, a complete victory when it won
a repo case in the Supreme Court in 1994.295
The first of several decisions issued by appellate courts in the 1970s is also
the most important one because later opinions relied heavily on its reasoning.
The plaintiff in American National Bank of Austin v. United States was a
dominant player in underwriting local municipal bonds.296 Under the existing
law, Texas municipalities had to refinance their bonds all at once, so "a single
concern or syndicate, [sic] had to acquire all of the bonds in an issue. '297 Bank
of Austin was such a concern. However, it could not legally sell the bonds to
the public, making bond dealers another necessary link in the chain.298 On
some occasions, bond dealers paid the purchase price for the bonds to the bank,
the bank forwarded the funds to the municipality, received the bonds, and
delivered them to the dealers' customers. 299 In other words, the bank simply
acted as an intermediary. In other cases, however, the dealers asked the bank
to take the bonds "up for our account. '300 Upon such request, the bank used its
own funds to purchase the bonds on behalf of the dealers. 30 1 The dealers
offered the bonds for sale to their customers both before and after the bank
paid for them, and a substantial portion of the bonds were usually sold before
they were issued.30 2 Ordinarily, once the dealer sold a bond, it forwarded the
proceeds to the bank adding, if necessary, a sufficient sum to purchase the
bonds at their book value. 30 3 All interest accrued on the bonds while they were
held by the bank was retained by the bank. 304  There were no written
agreements between the bank and the dealers. 30 5 Nevertheless, during the
years in question and where the bank had paid the issuing authority, the bank
Ass'n v. Comm'r, 80 F.2d 389, 390 (9th Cir. 1935) (upholding taxpayer's characterization
of a repo as a sale followed by a repurchase).
295 As any student of tax law knows, no IRS victory is ever complete. Once the Service
prevailed in treating repos as secured loans, other tax planning opportunities presented
themselves in spades. For a detailed discussion of tax issued raised by repos, see, for
example, William W. Chip, Are Repos Really Loans?, 95 TAx NOTES 1057, 1057-58 (2002),
and Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 797-99. For more background discussion, see generally
Marcia Stigum, THE REPO AND REVERSE MARKETS 1-8 (Jean Roberts ed., 1989).
296 421 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that, at the time of the appeal, Bank of
Austin was "engage[d] in transactions involving from 50 to 80 per cent of all bonds issued
by Texas political subdivisions").
297 Id. at 445.
298 Id. at 447.
299 Id. at 446.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 447.
303 Id. at 448.
304 Id. at 447.
305 Id. at 446.
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never refused to sell a bond to a dealer, and no dealer failed to pay the bank an
amount equal to the value of the bond on the bank's books regardless of the
success or failure of the particular issue's flotation. 30 6
While the court made no attempt to align its decision with other fungible
whether authorities, such as Provost, the opinion leaves little doubt about the
reasons for the ultimate conclusion:
[The bank] looked solely to the interest accruing on the bonds for its
profit. The dealers profited if they could sell the bonds for more than
their adjusted bids, but bore the risk that the bonds could not be sold for
at least that much. In short, [the bank] was in effect a lender secured by
collateral in its possession. ... The dealer exercised complete dominion
over the bonds after they came into the bank's possession. He sold them
at his pleasure, at prices he determined, and without reference to the bank,
except that the proceeds were collected from the customer by the bank
and applied to the dealer's account. Obviously the inventory of bonds
was being held by the bank for the dealers and subject to their disposition.
To us the bank was simply a lender of its funds to the dealers.30 7
The conclusion relies on two familiar arguments: the bank lacked economic
exposure to the bonds and had no control over them. Because both arguments
point in the same direction, however, we are left with little guidance regarding
their relative importance. This ambiguity is not the only problem with the
opinion. First, basing its conclusions regarding lack of the bank's economic
exposure on the parties' actions, the court neither stated explicitly that the
absence of written agreements did not affect its analysis in light of the parties'
conduct, nor put any limitations on the court's ability to treat the conduct of the
parties as an equivalent of a legally binding agreement. Lack of analysis is
even more problematic with respect to the court's control argument. Why did
it conclude that the dealers "exercised complete dominion over the bonds"? 30 8
Was it because they "sold them at [their] pleasure" to their customers? 30 9 But
the dealers clearly did not deliver the bonds to the customers at the time of
sale. At best, then, the dealers sold the bonds forward. Perhaps the court's
point was that the dealers must have been absolutely certain that they would
obtain the bonds from the bank if they felt comfortable selling the bonds
forward to their customers. However, a right to purchase the bonds (i.e., a call
option), would be sufficient for that purpose. Was the court saying that a call
right is equivalent to "complete control"? And if so, how would the court
reconcile this with the conclusion that a stock lender ceases to own the stock
despite being able to demand its return on short notice?
In light of such cases as Patton and Comtel, it seems very important that the
306 Id. at 449.
307 Id. at 452.
308 Id.
309 Id.
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bank could not itself sell the bonds to the public. That is, even if the dealers
could not require the bank to hold the bonds until they were delivered to the
dealers' customers, there just wasn't much the bank could do with the bonds
otherwise. Thus, as a factual matter, the uncertainty regarding which specific
bonds would ultimately be delivered by the bank was relatively small.
However, the bank's inability to sell the bonds was mentioned only once in a
long factual description and the court did not refer to it in the analysis. 310 It
also appears that, as a matter of practice, the bank never oversold. That is, it
never sold to the dealers more bonds than were issued by the municipality,
covering its net short position by purchasing the bonds in the market.3 11 If it
did, there would have been uncertainty regarding which specific bonds (with
potentially varying tax attributes) were actually delivered by the bank. Again,
the opinion never addressed the question. 312
The court in First American National Bank of Nashville v. United States313
had to address two new arguments. First, the bank argued that Bank of Austin
should be distinguished because unlike Bank of Austin, Bank of Nashville was
a licensed bond dealer, i.e., it could have sold the bonds to customers directly
and did not have to rely solely on the bond dealers. 314 The court saw no merit
in this contention - perhaps a conclusion that was reached too fast in light of
the authorities such as Patton, Green, and Comtel.315 The bank's second
argument was based on North Texas Lumber.3 16 It argued that "ownership of
the bonds in question did not pass to the [repo buyers] ... until those parties
actually paid for the bonds and took delivery of them. '317 The court dismissed
this argument, explaining, in essence, that North Texas Lumber was a when
case and, therefore, was entirely inapplicable to the whether case before it. 318
Although this distinction should be lauded as a great support for the four-
310 Id. at 447 ("[The bank] cannot legally sell bonds to the public because it does not
have a securities license.").
311 It is not clear whether the bank could legally engage in such activity.
312 Another opinion, in Union Planters National Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426
F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1970), addressed a somewhat different fact pattern. The entire discussion
was limited to a few sentences and a conclusion that the government's argument in the case
was stronger than in Bank of Austin. Id. at 118. The few sentences focused solely on
economics: the bank's protection from risk of loss and its retention of coupons while
holding the bonds. Id. The only reference to control over the bonds was made in describing
the government's argument, not in the court's analysis. See id. at 117.
313 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972).
314 Id. at 1101.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 1100-01.
311 Id. at 1101.
318 "[A]ppellant's reliance on the [North Texas Lumber] line of authority begs the
question - the issue in this case is whether appellant ever owned the bonds for tax purposes,
not whether appellant surrendered ownership at the time the contracts for sale were
executed." Id. (emphasis in original).
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category classification suggested in this article, the later discussion will show
that perhaps the bank should have made its argument slightly differently, and
perhaps the court should not have dismissed it so cavalierly.
Citizens National Bank of Waco v. United States, the only recent decision
that found a repo buyer to be the tax owner of municipal obligations, also
relied on the economic exposure and control over the asset in reaching its
conclusion. 319 The court reasoned that the "Bank had the right to sell the
bonds to third parties and retain any profit made on such sale as its own
property 320 and that this was "a very important fact in this case." 321 Needless
to say, it would have been helpful if the court explained what it considered
more important: that the bank retained the opportunity to profit from the bonds,
had a right to sell them, or both.
A continuing uncertainty regarding the taxation of repos eventually drew
attention of the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, as much as the Court
contributed to the analysis of fungible whether authorities in Provost, it failed
to do the same in Nebraska Department of Revenue v. Loewenstein.322 The
specific question was whether interest earned by several mutual funds from
repo transactions involving U.S. Treasury obligations was exempt from
taxation by the State of Nebraska.323  The plaintiff in the case was a
shareholder of two mutual funds that were repo buyers (and, arguably, money
lenders). 324 The mutual funds acquired the Treasuries from their counterparties
and sold them back for the same price increased by accrued interest set at
market rates unrelated to the coupon interest paid on the Treasuries. 325 The
repurchases took place either on a fixed date or upon demand of either party. 326
The counterparties could substitute Treasury securities held by the mutual
funds and the mutual funds forwarded coupon interest paid on the Treasuries to
the counterparties. 327
The Court concluded that the mutual funds earned interest income from the
loans made to their counterparties, not from the Treasuries they held, based on
319 See 551 F.2d 832, 842 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Unlike all the repo cases discussed to this
point, this case involved a single transaction in which a bank purchased municipal bonds
from one of its customers that needed cash and simultaneously secured a right to resell the
bonds to the customer at the same price (i.e., a put). Id. at 835-36. When all was said and
done, the bank sold all of the bonds back to the customer at the customer's request. Id. at
836. The Service argued that there was an implied agreement that all of the bonds would be
repurchased by the customer, but the court disagreed.
320 Id. at 838.
321 Id. at 842.
322 513 U.S. 123 (1994).
323 Id. at 125.
324 Id. at 125-26.
325 Id. at 126.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 130-31.
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four features present in each transaction. First, the mutual funds paid a fixed
sum to the counterparty at the commencement of a repo and the counterparty
repaid that sum with interest at the repo's termination. 28 Second, if the
counterparty defaulted, the mutual funds could liquidate the Treasuries, retain
the proceeds up to the amount due from the counterparty plus expenses, and
hold the counterparty liable for any shortfall. 329 Third, the amount of the
Treasuries held by the mutual funds was adjusted such that their value
remained 102 percent of the original purchase price.330  Fourth, the
counterparty could substitute other Treasuries for those held by the mutual
funds as long as the incoming and outgoing securities had the same value.
331
The Court's reasoning reveals that despite criticism of its decision in Frank
Lyon, it continued to use a descriptive, rather than an analytical, approach to
resolving tax ownership issues. Other than repeating that the third and the
fourth factors reflect an arrangement that would have existed in a debtor-
creditor relationship, the opinion did not explain what meaning and relative
weight it ascribed to each of the four factors. What could this meaning be?
Assuming that the Court implied, when it recited the first factor, that its
description of what actually happened revealed a binding agreement existing
between the parties from the inception of the transactions, the first factor
stands for more than one proposition. It demonstrates, first, that that there was
an agreement to repurchase, not just a put right held by the mutual funds or a
call right held by the counterparty. It follows that the mutual funds could not
freely sell the Treasuries to a third party without taking a short position in the
Treasuries and exposing themselves to a potentially unlimited risk. It also
follows that the mutual funds had neither risk of loss nor opportunity for gain
from the Treasuries. Finally, it means that mutual funds' return was fixed and
guaranteed. The Court's second and third factors only confirm the conclusion
about the fixed and guaranteed return. The fourth factor, however, is highly
relevant. The counterparty in Loewenstein had the same right of substitution
that the Provost court considered important and that leaves no doubt as to
control over the Treasuries. Thus, all the relevant arguments flow from the
four Loewenstein factors, and they are entirely consistent with the analysis of
other fungible whether authorities. It would have been helpful, however, if
these arguments, rather than a description of the arrangement, were stated
expressly in the opinion.
The holding of Loewenstein was limited to determining the owner of interest
derived by the mutual funds; it did not depend on "whether a repo is
characterized as a sale and subsequent repurchase. '332 "[T]he dispositive
question is whether the [mutual funds] earned interest on 'obligations of the
321 Id. at 131.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 133.
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United States Government,' not whether the [mutual funds] 'owned' such
obligations," the Court explained.333 Immediately thereafter, it addressed the
tax ownership question:
Even if it did matter how repos were characterized..., Frank Lyon Co.
does not support [taxpayer's] position.... [O]ur decision in that case to
honor the taxpayer's characterization of its transaction as a "sale-and-
leaseback" rather than a "financing transaction" was founded on an
examination of "the substance and economic realities of the transaction."
This examination included identification of 27 specific facts. The
substance and economic realities of the [mutual funds'] repo transactions,
as manifested in the specific facts discussed above, are that the [mutual
funds] do not receive either coupon interest or discount interest from
federal securities by participating in repos. Rather, in economic reality,
the [mutual funds] receive interest on cash they have lent to the Seller-
Borrower. 334
Remarkably enough, the Court considered an analogy to Frank Lyon,335 a
nonfungible whether authority, but failed to discuss Provost, a fungible
whether case. After all, one of the arguments made by the brokers in Provost
was that a stock loan by a customer to a broker who deposited full cash
collateral with the customer was the same as a money loan by the broker to the
customer collateralized by the customer's stock336 - the exact transaction that,
as the Court concluded, took place in Loewenstein.337 The Provost Court
rejected the brokers' argument because, unlike a money lender holding stock
collateral as a pledgee, the brokers (stock borrowers) had no restrictions on
disposition of the stock. One of the briefs filed in Loewenstein reveals that the
mutual funds were contractually prohibited from selling the bonds. 338 If the
Loewenstein Court appreciated the overall similarity between the case before it
and the Provost decision, and if it focused on the distinction between the
brokers' freedom to dispose of the stock and lack of the mutual funds' freedom
to dispose of the Treasuries, perhaps we would have a much clearer
understanding of the importance of control in determining tax ownership of
fungible assets. More importantly, the Court's failure to distinguish Provost,
combined with lack of attention to the control factor in the lower courts' repo
decisions, resulted in a considerable uncertainty regarding tax treatment of
repos.
In addition to litigating, the Service issued several revenue rulings
333 Id. at 134.
334 Id. (citations omitted).
"I Id. at 133.
336 Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 454 (1926).
337 Loewenstein, 513 U.S. at 134.
338 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Inv. Co. Inst. at 7, Neb. Dep't of Revenue v.
Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994) (No. 93-823) ("[U]nless the dealer defaulted, the funds
were barred from reselling or reregistering the securities underlying the repo.").
[Vol. 85:431
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TAX OWNERSHIP
addressing repos and similar transactions. 339 While in large part they were
fairly uncontroversial in recasting particular repos as secured loans, one ruling
generated much excitement by holding that something that might have been
treated as a loan was a valid sale. In Revenue Ruling 82-144,340 the
government concluded that a regulated investment company ("RIC") that
purchased a portfolio of municipal obligations from a dealer and
simultaneously acquired a small number of puts that gave the RIC a right to
sell the obligations back to the dealer became the owner of the obligations for
tax purposes. The puts were non-assignable, they were purchased for an
arm's-length price, had maturities substantially less that the remaining term of
the obligations, and terminated if the RIC disposed of the obligations to which
they related. The purpose for acquiring the puts was to provide liquidity.341
The RIC was free to dispose of the obligations at will.
The Service stressed that the dealer could not demand a repurchase of the
obligations (did not have a call to go with the RIC's put) and did not solicit
buyers for them. Analyzing the authorities, the Service concluded that "two
significant factors of ownership are: (1) which party to the transaction has the
right to dispose of the property; and (2) which party bears the risk of profit or
loss with respect to the property. '342 Because the RIC was free to sell the
obligations and retained "the full benefit of any appreciation in the value of the
obligations, '343 the Service concluded that the RIC became their owner. Thus,
the ruling is yet another example of a repo-related authority enunciating a two-
part ownership test based on economics and control without explaining the
relative importance of each factor.
The government's reliance on the taxpayer's reason for acquiring the puts
seems unfortunate as well. Obviously, if the RIC cared about liquidity only, an
agreement by the dealer to repurchase the securities at their then market value
would have completely satisfied the RIC's needs. On the other hand, even if
the RIC had bought the puts to protect itself from risk of loss (not just to obtain
liquidity), and if the puts had protected all of the obligations (not just a small
part), the conclusion should not have changed because the bonds were fungible
and the RIC was free to dispose of them at will. Recognizing at least some of
the problems with the ruling, the Service announced in the following year that
it would no longer issue advance rulings addressing ownership of securities
where the purchaser has a right to put the security to the seller or a third
339 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-108, 1979-1 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 77-59, 1977-1 C.B. 196; Rev.
Rul. 72-47, 1974-1 C.B. 24.
340 Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34.
341 The ruling explained that because investors in the RIC had a right to redeem their
shares at any time, the RIC needed an increased liquidity in order to provide cash for the
redeeming shareholders. Id. at 35.
342 Id.
343 Id.
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party. 344 The conceptual questions raised by the ruling remain unanswered.
C. Reconciling Fungible Whether Decisions
Cases dealing with repos and related authorities are an important part of
fungible whether cases, yet they hardly establish clear principles. They refer to
both the relative economic exposure and the parties' control over the securities,
but they do not provide a more nuanced analysis, and in some cases the
economic exposure seems to play a more important role.345 Despite this lack
of clarity, the prevailing view among commentators is that the repo cases and
rulings assume that the buyer would hold the specific securities transferred to it
by the seller until the repurchase. 346 The modern repo markets, however,
function quite differently. The buyer is permitted to dispose of the securities
received from the seller and return identical but different securities upon
repurchase. 347 The government has acknowledged this reality, yet has made no
attempt to state its current position. Should these modem repos be treated as
loans too? If so, is there any way to reconcile this outcome with the treatment
of securities loans that have been viewed as transferring tax ownership since
Provost?348
34 See Rev. Proc. 83-55, 1983-2 C.B. 572. Although at the time many transactions in
the market fit this description, see, e.g., Willard B. Taylor, Debt/Equity and Other Tax
Distinctions: How Far Can We Go?, 62 TAXES 848, 853 (1984) (recognizing the high
number of transactions in which the "put is exercisable in all events .. . [and] becomes a
form of guarantee or credit insurance"), the announcement may have produced the intended
"chilling effect" and reduced the volume of the new deals. See Steven D. Conlon, Vincent
M. Aquilino & Dale S. Collinson, Tax Law Fundamentals of Tax-Exempt Derivatives, 55
TAX NOTES 381, 391 (1992) (referring to Rev. Proc. 83-55's effect on put programs for tax-
exempt bonds). The chilling effect might not have been as serious as it appeared to some
commentators, however. See Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 799 (remarking that the
"[m]unicipal bond sale/put programs of the type contemplated by Revenue Ruling 82-144
have proliferated since then, leaving tax advisors with the near-impossible task of deciding
what business terms are acceptable under that ruling.").
345 Although power to dispose was important in Citizens National Bank of Waco v.
United States, 551 F.2d 832, 838 (Ct. Cl. 1977), and in Revenue Ruling 74-27, 1974-1 C.B.
24, other authorities did not discuss it even where the question was pressing as it was, for
example, where the buyer-bank had a securities license and could freely dispose of the
repo'd bonds. See, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098,
1102 (6th Cir. 1972); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d
115, 118 (6th Cir. 1970).
346 See, e.g., Chip, supra note 295, at 1059, Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 798.
347 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 798 (suggesting that "by the time anyone
noticed, untold trillions of dollars of repos had been consummated - and been reported for
tax purposes as money loans" despite the buyer's freedom to dispose of repo'd securities);
ABA Committee Reports on Securities Lending Transactions, 91 T.N.T. 107-33 (1991)
(noting that "[i]f the [repo] buyer-creditor is in the securities industry it often will re-
hypothecate the securities.").
348 As one commentator cautioned, "[s]hould a taxpayer or the Service mount a court
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There appear to be at least two ways to interpret repo authorities in light of
Provost, Bickford-Smith and the subordination agreement decisions. One
interpretation, that supported by the commentators, is that buyer's power to
dispose is inconsistent with the loan treatment. That is, a repo buyer with the
power to sell the securities is their tax owner, not a secured lender. There is
certainly strong support for this conclusion, 349 but it is difficult to accept in
light of the fact that some authorities failed to address this issue completely,
including in circumstances when the buyer could have had such a power.
350
Another approach is by no means revolutionary. In fact, one needs to go
further back to find a basis for it. Back to Provost, that is. As the Supreme
Court stressed in that opinion, the stock loan is different from a pledge not
because a borrower has a right to dispose of the borrowed stock, but because it
"holds nothing for account of the lender. ' ' 351 On the other hand, in case of a
broker-pledgee, "[a]lthough the broker has an implied authority to substitute
other securities of the same kind and amount for the securities which he holds
for his customer, . . . he should at least have... specific securities of the kind
and amount purchased for his customer, available for delivery .... "352 Under
Provost, therefore, a repo buyer need not hold the same securities that it
purchased from the seller in order for a repo to be treated as a loan. It only
needs to hold at all times identical securities in the sufficient amount.
If that is the rule, all repo authorities make more sense. The issue in most of
them was taxation of the coupon interest paid on repo'd securities and
collected, invariably, by repo buyers. To collect this interest, the buyers must
have held the securities - maybe not the ones sold to them, but at least
identical to those sold. This was such a basic fact, and it was so central to the
entire controversy, that it is not particularly surprising that the courts did not
focus on it. To be sure, there is a difference between being obligated to hold
identical securities and holding them as a factual matter. But it can hardly be
contested that it is easier to explain the repo authorities in a consistent manner
challenge to the current consensus on the tax treatment of repos [as loans], the challenge
might be upheld." Chip, supra note 295, at 1057-58.
349 Compare Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waco v. United States, 551 F.2d 832, 843 (Ct. CI.
1977) (treating a buyer who is free to dispose as a tax owner), and Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2
C.B. 34 (treating a taxpayer with a power to sell securities purchased from a dealer as their
owner despite taxpayer's right to sell the securities back to the dealer), with Neb. Dep't of
Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 125 (1994) (treating repo as a loan when the seller
has the right to substitute and the buyer has no power to dispose), and Rev. Rul. 74-27,
1974-1 C.B. 24, 25 (treating repo as a loan when the buyer has no power to dispose and is
required to hold repo'd securities); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States,
426 F.2d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1970) (reaching a similar conclusion).
350 See, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1099
(6th Cir. 1972) (treating a repo buyer who was a licensed bond dealer with a clear
opportunity to sell as a borrower rather than owner).
351 Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 455 (1926) (emphasis added).
312 Id. (emphasis added).
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that also comports with other fungible whether authorities if the Provost-based
approach is adopted. 353
Finally, the Provost test makes sense if we apply the basic principles
discussed earlier in this article: the certainty rule and the single owner rule.
354
Consider several different ways in which the buyer or seller in a repo (or, more
generally, a party holding fungible securities and a party that relinquished their
possession) may control the securities in question. First, a seller may have a
right to substitute the repo'd securities while a buyer has no power to dispose
of them.355 Here, the certainty rule supports the conclusion that no disposition
takes place and the repo should be treated as a loan. The opposite result may
create endless realization events upon every substitution which, as experience
has demonstrated, could be quite frequent. 356 On the other hand, there is no
countervailing need to treat a repo as a sale to accommodate the single owner
rule.
A second alternative is the complete opposite of the first: a seller has no
right to substitute while a buyer has an unlimited power to dispose. 357 Not
finding a sale in this case would violate the single owner rule. If a repo is
treated as a loan in this scenario and the buyer sells the asset to a third party,
both that party and the repo seller would be treated as owners of the same asset
311 As a practical matter, the Provost-based approach has a benefit of presenting a much
smaller problem for the modem securities industry compared to the inflexible requirement
to hold specific securities in order to obtain a loan treatment. It eliminates any need to track
fungible assets-something that could hardly be done anyway. Most repos are based on
U.S. Treasury securities. See Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 798. These securities are traded
only in book-entry form. See ANDREA S. KRAMER, FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: TAXATION,
REGULATION, AND DESIGN § 2.02 (3d ed. 2000). The very idea of a "specific" security
makes little sense in this context. The Provost-based approach assures securities dealers of
a loan treatment for repos as long as they have somewhere among their holdings, or even
pledged to a bank, securities identical to those "purchased" under a repo. While not a
guarantee, the likelihood that a dealer may meet this requirement has to be higher than the
probability that it holds the specific securities received from the repo seller.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 and 100-102.
355 See, e.g., Neb. Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123 (1994); see also Rev.
Rul. 69-455, 1969-2 C.B. 9 (applying prior to the event of financial restriction).
356 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Wichita v. Comm'r, 57 F.2d 7, 8 (10th Cir. 1932)
(noting that the dealers substituted bonds on a frequent basis, sometimes several times a
day). In many instances, § 1058 and § 1036 would provide for a nonrecognition treatment
upon the substitution, but not in all cases. For example, if the securities involved are debt
obligations, § 1036 is unavailable. If the party possessing securities, such as a repo buyer or
a stock borrower, does not have an unconditional obligation to return identical securities, or
to forward all interest or dividend payments to the repo seller or the stock lender, § 1058
does not apply. See, e.g., Miami Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 793, 803 (1977) (holding
that the obligation to return securities is not unconditional).
357 See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waco v. United States, 551 F.2d 832, 836 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Bickford-Smith v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 660, 673 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Rev. Rul. 82-
144, 1982-2 C.B. 34.
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- an unacceptable result. Not surprisingly, some authorities have expressly
concluded that the party with a power to dispose is the asset's owner, and the
commentators have agreed that authorities that have not addressed the issue
have assumed the same outcome.
The third scenario demonstrates why the Provost-based interpretation of the
repo authorities comports with both the certainty rule and the single owner
rule. In this scenario, a seller has no right to substitute, a buyer has the power
to dispose, but must hold identical securities at all times. While the buyer is
free to sell the asset ("A") received from the seller, the single owner rule is not
violated even if the buyer does so as long as it holds an identical asset ("B").
The two assets simply switch tax attributes. Because other than tax attributes
the two assets are indistinguishable, nobody is affected by the switch. The
seller that receives what used to be asset B upon repo's termination is
indifferent as long as her holding period continues and her basis in the asset
remains unchanged. The buyer is also indifferent as long as he is viewed as
selling to the third party the asset that he owns, i.e., asset B, even if in fact
asset A is sold. And the third party purchaser of the asset definitely does not
care about the difference between A and B. Thus, the tax system may happily
assume that no matter what actually happens, for tax purposes, it is always
asset B that is sold by the repo buyer. If so, the buyer always retains asset A,
and the seller may be treated as its continuing owner without violating either
the certainty rule or the single owner rule.
There are two more combinations, both reflecting a sort of a stalemate. In
the fourth scenario, a seller has no right to substitute and a buyer has no power
to dispose.358 Treating the seller as a continuing owner in this case creates no
problems with the single owner rule because the buyer cannot dispose of the
asset. Of course, not finding an ownership transfer cannot possibly create a
problem with the certainty rule. Hence, the authorities conclude that the
ownership remains with the seller because that's the party with the economic
exposure.
Things are more complicated in the last, fifth scenario - quite unique but
based in reality. Here, the seller has a right to substitute and the buyer has a
power to dispose. This appears to have been the case in Miami National
Bank359 after the broker went bankrupt. The Tax Court rejected the
government's argument that buyer's (broker's) power to dispose resulted in a
transfer of tax ownership and concluded that no sale took place because the
shares were never actually sold.360 Perhaps the court could have strengthened
this conclusion with the following reasoning. Finding a current ownership
transfer where the seller retains a right to substitute creates a problem with the
certainty rule, unless the transfer is subject to a nonrecognition rule -
358 See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 445-50 (5th Cir.
1970); Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, 80 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1935).
359 Miami Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 793 (1977).
360 Id. at 802-04.
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something that cannot be assumed. 36' Not finding a sale when the buyer has
the power to dispose violates the single owner rule. This catch-22 might be
resolved by observing that because neither solution is satisfactory ex ante, a
reasonable approach would be to base a decision on what occurred ex post.
Because in the end the stock returned to the seller (subordination agreement
customer), this approach would support the conclusion reached by the court.
In essence, it would apply the open transaction doctrine to these unique
circumstances.
The Provost-based analysis puts Revenue Ruling 82-144 in a somewhat
different light. Arguably, the Service focused, at least in substantial part, on
entirely irrelevant factors and missed a critical one - the strike price of the
puts.36' Although the points are related, the strike price of the puts is critical
not because it demonstrates how much economic exposure the taxpayer
retained per se, but because it would affect the likelihood that the taxpayer
would sell the bonds back to the seller. If the strike is much higher than the
purchase price of the bonds, it is virtually certain that the taxpayer would
exercise the puts because no other buyer would be prepared to pay so much for
the bonds. This would make the taxpayer's power to dispose theoretical,
strengthening an argument that the seller should be viewed as a continuing
owner of the bonds.363 Another statement in the ruling gains a new meaning
based on the suggested analysis. The ruling posited that the puts would
disappear if the bonds were sold.364 Thus, assuming that puts were valuable,
the taxpayer was required (or, more precisely, economically compelled) to
hold the bonds at all times in order to preserve its rights under the puts. That
is, it could not sell the bonds into the market (hoping to take advantage of an
increase in price) and later buy new ones (hopefully, after the price has
dropped) and deliver them under the puts. Inability to preserve the puts upon
selling the bonds to third parties provides a powerful incentive to retain the
bonds and cuts against the government's conclusion in the ruling.
Overall, more than any other category, the fungible whether authorities
support the caveat made in the beginning of this article - their outcomes are
mostly consistent with the proposed contextual analysis, but their reasoning
sometimes provides little support for it. Provost, Bickford-Smith, and some
subordination agreement authorities strongly indicate that control dominates
the ownership analysis, rather than being one of the factors affecting it. Other
subordination agreement decisions raise questions about the meaning of
control. Repo and related authorities place substantial emphasis on the
361 See supra note 356.
362 The ruling failed to state clearly whether the puts had the same strike price as the
purchase price of the municipal bonds, unless the statement that a "full benefit of any
appreciation" accrued to the taxpayer was meant to say that this was in fact the case. See
Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34, at 35.
363 See Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 799 (making similar observations).
36 Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34, 34-35.
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economics, occasionally refer to control, but ultimately do not provide a well-
reasoned analysis. In the end, it seems that control should be viewed as the
dispositive factor. This conclusion helps to reconcile all authorities within the
fungible whether category. In addition, it is consistent with the certainty rule
and the single owner rule.
D. Differences Between Fungible and Nonfungible Whether Authorities
It is hard not to notice that the analysis in stock loan and repo cases differs
from the approach taken in sale-leaseback and related nonfungible whether
authorities. Cases dealing with fungible assets are usually focused on
identifying which of the two potential tax owners controls the asset. This issue
is entirely absent if the asset is nonfungible. Instead, the tax owner is
identified based on comparing the economic substance of the arrangement to
the form chosen by the parties. Like the distinction between fungible and
nonfungible when authorities, this disparity is caused in part by the fungibility
itself. There is, however, another difference between the two types of
authorities that is unique to the whether context.
The analysis differs depending on the type of the asset because the
separation between the big three tax ownership features - title, possession and
economic exposure - usually depends on whether or not the asset is fungible.
In a typical nonfungible case, title is separated from possession and many, if
not all, economic benefits and burdens of ownership. The question here is
whether there is any reason to respect a title-holder as an owner (other than the
fact of holding the title). This reason exists if the title-holder has some
economic exposure to the asset, even if this exposure is less than that of the
party possessing the property. Absent such exposure, title is a mere security
device.
In a fungible case, uncertainty about tax ownership usually arises because
possession and title are severed from economic exposure. The inquiry in this
context is whether a party with both title and possession of the asset should be
respected as its owner. It should not if another party controls the asset in
addition to being exposed to its economics. The outcome is not surprising.
Title and possession are generally important in tax ownership analysis
precisely because a title-holder with possession ordinarily controls the asset.
When it does not, these features tend to confuse, rather than clarify, the
ownership inquiry.
Separating control from title and possession is only possible if the asset is
fungible. The controlling party may substitute an otherwise identical asset, or
even a different asset of the same value, without raising any objections from
the counterparty possessing the asset because the counterparty is indifferent as
to which specific asset it possesses as long as its has sufficient value. Thus, a
client pledging stock to her broker, and a repo seller that retains a right to
substitute securities held by the repo buyer, control the securities held by the
broker and the buyer, respectively, and are treated as their owners. The outer
boundary of control is a restriction (rather than a prohibition) on the power to
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dispose of the asset imposed on the party with title and possession that
generally has the power to dispose. The restriction obligates this party to hold
identical securities at all times.
Control, as we have seen, manifests itself in the seller's right to substitute
and the buyer's power to dispose of the asset. When either of these rights, but
not both, is present, identifying the party with control, and, therefore, the
owner of a fungible asset, is straight forward. When neither right is present, or
when both rights coexist, neither party controls the asset. When this happens,
a fungible asset becomes identified.
Of course, the stalemate in which neither of the two potential owners of a
fungible asset controls it is precisely the conundrum encountered by the
nonfungible whether authorities. They consider situations in which neither
party controls the property because title is separated from possession. Not
surprisingly, the solution is the same in both cases - the analysis turns to
economic risks and rewards. Thus, identification of a fungible asset brings the
tax ownership inquiry within the analytical framework of the nonfungible
whether authorities. This is exactly what we have observed earlier while
considering the when cases such as Bradford and Barde Steel: rules for
nonfungible assets applied to a security or commodity in the when context
once it became identified.
This analysis reinforces a conclusion that the two-prong ownership test (i.e.,
control and economics) exemplified by Revenue Ruling 82-144 and present in
various forms in many fungible whether authorities is a shortcut, not the real
gauge. The control prong is not merely given more weight in the analysis, it
answers the tax ownership question all by itself as long as it is possible to
identify one party that controls a fungible asset. If neither party has control, or
in a confusing scenario when two parties arguably control the same fungible
asset, the inquiry turns to the benefits and burdens of ownership which, at that
point, is the only relevant factor. This conceptualization of the test for fungible
assets provides additional support for, and at the same time is supported by, the
earlier conclusion that the nonfungible whether authorities ascertain tax
ownership based exclusively on the parties' relative economic exposure.
Another difference between fungible and nonfungible whether authorities
arises from the distinction between simple and complex assets discussed earlier
in the when context. The famous Grodt & McKay Realty test applying to
nonfungible assets boasts eight factors and as many as four additional factors
have been added to the mix. 365 The Supreme Court's record of twenty-seven
factors in Frank Lyon stands unsurpassed.366 Fungible assets simply do not
have nearly as many features to consider, so it is not surprising that compared
to Frank Lyon's twenty-seven factors Loewenstein had only four and Revenue
Ruling 82-144 limited itself to two. 36 7
365 Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981).
366 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582-83 (1978).
367 Neb. Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1994); Rev. Rul. 82-
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Finally, mostly for historic reasons, nonfungible whether authorities have a
much stronger tax avoidance flavor than their counterparts dealing with
fungible assets. The Supreme Court opinion in Brown supported a fairly
aggressive and far-reaching tax avoidance transaction. 368  Sale-leasebacks
played a prominent role in the tax shelter industry of the 1970s. The so-called
lease-in, lease-out deals and their progeny are examples of the latest wave of
tax avoidance schemes.369 On the other hand, typical cases addressing tax
ownership of fungible assets in the whether setting deal with transactions that
are either primarily business-motivated or produce widely-accepted results.
Repos of municipal securities generated measurable tax savings and this fact
was not lost on the courts. However, repos came into existence not as a tax
play, and they continue to exist after the courts denied the contemplated tax
savings. Likewise, although one might argue that lending a security to a
broker without recognizing a built-in gain produces a tax benefit, this benefit is
now expressly conferred by Congress. For whatever reason, when the Service
attacked clear tax avoidance transactions involving fungible assets, it simply
chose not to raise the tax ownership issue and argued that the transaction
lacked economic substance or was a sham instead.370 Although this strategy
appeared to have worked in the early nineties, it backfired more recently in
context of foreign tax credit arbitrage transactions discussed later.
V. COMPARING THE WHENAND THE WHETHER AUTHORITIES
A. Nonfungible Assets
Once the distinction is made between an inquiry into when the sale of a
nonfungible asset results in transfer of tax ownership and whether a transaction
transfers ownership at any point, it is difficult not to see the difference in the
ownership analysis in these two contexts. Yet any suggestion that this
demarcation line is clearly recognized by existing authorities is doomed to fall
under an endless string of examples to the contrary. Thus, the following
argument highlighting the difference is aspirational, at least in part.
To begin with the obvious, it hardly advances the analysis in a when case to
observe that the parties called the transaction a sale and referred to themselves
as a "buyer" and a "seller." Unfortunately, nonfungible when authorities
occasionally refer to these factors. 37 1 On the other hand, it is difficult to see
144, 1982-2 C.B. 34, 35.
368 The potential damage to the fisc was evidenced by a swift and strong Congressional
reaction that followed. See, e.g., William H. Weigel, Unrelated Debt-Financed Income: A
Retrospective (and a Modest Proposal), 50 TAx LAW. 625, 626 (1997).
369 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-44 I.R.B. 760.
370 See, e.g., United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that
repo-to-maturity transactions were economic shams); Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738, 761
(1990) (finding that repos-to-maturity lacked economic substance).
371 See, e.g., Baird v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 115, 126 (1977); Maher v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 441,
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how a prototypical timing inquiry into "whether the contract creates a present
obligation on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation
on the purchaser to make payments" 372 helps to reach a conclusion in a
whether setting. Nevertheless, this became one of the Grodt & McKay factors
and every whether authority reciting these factors, and there are more than a
few, refers to this inquiry as part of its analysis.
On a more fundamental level, the two types of cases are different because
when cases are dynamic and whether cases are static. Resorting, not without
hesitation, to the "bundle of sticks" metaphor, 373 one could say that in whether
cases the sticks are clearly separated between the parties and the question is to
determine whose sticks outweigh. In when cases, both the buyer and the seller
are holding on to many of the sticks at the same time, with the seller's grip
weakening as the transaction progresses. Because of this difference, the
whether authorities analyze the result while the when authorities consider a
process. Thus, in the timing cases one commonly encounters a situation where
both the buyer and the seller control the property in question to some extent
and both parties have economic exposure to the property at the same time.
This virtually never happens in the whether context. To be sure, a lessor and a
lessee are both exposed to the economics of the property subject to the lease,
but their exposure is not contemporaneous.
Another difference is the role played by title and possession. In a vast
majority of whether cases dealing with nonfungible assets, location of title and
possession is predetermined and is always the same. Because basing the
ownership analysis on this inevitable allocation would not be productive,
authorities focus on the economics instead. Thus, although both title and
possession are among the Grodt & McKay factors, 374 they usually have little
bearing on the analysis in the whether setting. The situation is entirely
different in the timing cases. In each such case, both title and possession are
transferred from a buyer to a seller at some point. Identifying the exact
moment of this transfer helps to determine when the rights and obligations of
the parties have become fixed. Therefore, while title and possession play a
central role in when cases, they are much less important in the whether context.
The difference in emphasis on the economic exposure follows necessarily
from the above discussion. In circumstances where title and possession are
inevitably split between the two potential owners, economic benefits and
burdens is the critical remaining consideration by which to measure the
competing ownership claims. Not surprisingly, the nonfungible whether
authorities focus painstakingly on the economics. The nonfungible when
authorities deal with circumstance where all of the "sticks" composing
ownership will move sooner or later, so there is no reason to base the decision
451 (1970); Clodfelter v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 694, 701 (1970).
372 Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981).
313 See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 570.
1374 Grodt & McKay Realty, 77 T.C. at 1221, 1237-38 (1981).
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on transfer of any one particular stick, including the economic exposure to the
asset. Thus, the timing cases place less emphasis on the economic risks and
rewards.
B. Fungible Assets
As we have seen in the when context, pinpointing the moment when
ownership of a fungible asset changes hands turns on the uncertainty regarding
the asset in question. No transfer takes place until the specific asset is
identified even if a seller transfers all of the economic exposure to the buyer at
an early stage. In the whether setting, authorities focus on identifying the party
controlling the fungible asset. Control usually manifests itself by either the
seller's right to substitute the asset or the buyer's power to dispose of it.
It only takes a short step to observe that these two approaches are intimately
related. Indeed, once a specific asset is identified as being covered by the
contract, the owner of the asset no longer has a right to dispose of it or to
substitute another asset for the one identified, i.e., the owner loses control at
that point. Conversely, as long as a party retains a right to dispose of the asset
or to substitute another one, i.e., as long as it controls the asset, the specific
asset remains unidentified. This close relation between identification and
control is precisely what made Kleinbard's argument about the importance of
fungibility in tax ownership analysis so powerful. 37 5
Ending the inquiry here, however, would produce an incomplete picture.
The most obvious issue that calls for an explanation is that a large number of
the fungible whether authorities repeatedly refer to benefits and burdens, while
fungible when authorities mostly ignore this factor. Furthermore, there is a
disconnect between the when and whether authorities dealing with both
identified and unidentified fungible assets. In sum, despite sharing the same
fundamental issue, fungible when and whether authorities have important
differences. We turn to these differences next.
There is nothing surprising in the references to the benefits and burdens
found, for example, in the repo cases and Revenue Ruling 82-144. As the
article argues, these references are only a shorthand for saying that if the
control factor does not determine the owner, the answer depends on the
economic exposure because that is the test in nonfungible whether cases.
Fungible when authorities could not possibly place substantial emphasis on
economics not only because fungibility causes an entirely different issue to
dominate the analysis. Another reason is that even if a specific asset is
identified and is no longer fungible, the relevant frame of analysis is that of
nonfungible when authorities. As we have seen, these authorities relegate
economic exposure to a subsidiary role.
315 While Kleinbard used authorities dealing with short sales and securities loans to
illustrate his points, the discussion in this article shows that support for Kleinbard's insights
has a much broader base. In fact, most fungible authorities, both when and whether, support
his approach.
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Highlighting another difference between when and whether authorities is
easier if we focus first on situations in which a specific fungible asset has been
identified. Remarkably enough, a basic fact pattern gave rise to two very
different conclusions regarding tax ownership. The simple transaction is a
purchase of a fungible asset and a contemporaneous (or even preceding)
agreement to sell the asset in the future. The transaction involves three parties:
a Seller (the original owner of the asset), an Intermediary (a buyer / re-seller),
and a Buyer (the ultimate purchaser). The court in Bradford held that the
Intermediary - Mr. Bradford - became a tax owner of the shares, but failed to
acquire a long-term holding period because he only owned them for a brief
moment. Intermediaries in Patton, Green, and Comtel also acquired shares
and entered into forward contracts (in substance, if not in form) to sell the
shares to the Buyers. Each of these cases held, however, that the Intermediary
never became the owner of the shares for tax purposes, but was a lender to the
Buyer. Can these decisions be reconciled?
The reasoning of the Patton-Comtel line of cases seems persuasive. Tax law
readily disregards circuitous cash flows, transitory ownership of assets, and
even transitory entities.376 Application of the most stringent variety of the step
transaction doctrine - the binding commitment test 377 - also suggests that an
Intermediary that acquires an asset and immediately sells it to a Buyer (a
characterization called for by the when authorities) should not be treated as
owning the asset at any point. On the other hand, treating the Bradford
transaction as a loan does not seem like a clearly correct result. After all, the
Buyer in Bradford was a large insurance company that hardly needed to
borrow from Mr. Bradford (the Intermediary), and, most likely, could have
borrowed cheaper if given a choice. The simple pattern addressed in Bradford
and in the Patton-Comtel trilogy gives rise to a tension between when and
whether decisions primarily because at least in some circumstances the
authorities are reluctant to convert a Buyer into an unwitting and unwilling
lender.
The tension persists if the fungible assets are not identified. Repos provide
a good example. The buy-and-sell-forward transaction also describes a three-
party repo. 37  In a repo, a party selling the underlying asset (such as a
municipality) is a Seller, a repo buyer (such as a bank) is an Intermediary, and
... See, e.g., Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 612-14 (1938) (disregarding a
form of cash distribution to shareholders followed by repayment by the shareholders of the
distributing corporation's debt and treating the transaction as a direct repayment by the
corporation itself); Rev. Rul. 80-221, 1980-2 C.B. 107 (disregarding stock ownership as
transitory); Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73 (disregarding a transitory subsidiary).
377 See, e.g., McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir.
1982) ("The 'binding commitment' test forbids the use of the step-transaction doctrine
unless if one transaction is to be characterized as a first step there is a binding commitment
to take the later step.") (internal quotes and citation omitted).
378 For an explanation of the distinction between a two-party case and a three-party case,
see supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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a repo purchaser (such as a bond dealer) is a Buyer.379 A sale contract that
allows a seller to substitute freely another asset for the one originally delivered
would be treated as executory (no ownership transfer) by the when authorities
because the specific asset has not been identified. Thus, if a Seller in a repo
has a right of substitution, the Seller should be viewed as the owner of the
repo'd securities under the when reasoning. The whether authorities conclude
that repos in which the seller has this right are loans. The when and whether
approaches are in harmony.
If the Seller has no right of substitution, the first leg of a repo viewed
independently would be treated as a completed sale according to the when
reasoning. If the Intermediary must retain the specific securities received from
the Seller (which, as many commentators believe, is a necessary prerequisite
for treating a repo as a loan), these securities lose their fungible nature and
become identified. In this case, repos reflect the tension just discussed in
connection with the Bradford and Patton-Contel decisions.
But what if the Provost-based analysis leads one to conclude that a repo is a
loan as long as the Intermediary must hold identical (but not the specific)
securities throughout the repo term? If so, the securities remain unidentified in
the Intermediary's hands and the resale leg of a repo viewed by itself remains
executory (no current sale) under the when reasoning. The implicit conclusion
made in Patton, Green, and Comtel that a sale followed by an immediate resale
should be viewed as a loan is no longer applicable because the resale is not
immediate. The when authorities view the Intermediary in these circumstances
as an owner of the repo'd securities throughout the term of the repo. The
whether authorities view the Intermediary as a lender who never acquires
ownership of the securities. In other words, treating repos as loans where
repo'd securities remain unidentified (i.e., where a repo buyer is not obligated
to hold specific securities received from a repo seller) is even more
inconsistent with when analysis of fungible assets than the case where
identification occurs because it disregards a prolonged (rather than a transitory)
ownership of securities by the Intermediary. While possibly viewed as an
argument against the Provost-based interpretation, this inconsistency may
merely mean that tax ownership analysis is context-sensitive.
380
1'9 In a two-party repo, the Seller and the Buyer are the same person.
380 The when/whether tension persists, albeit in a different form, even if the Intermediary
is not required to hold any securities (specific or identical) until the forward matures (or the
repo is settled). The when reasoning suggests that the Intermediary in this scenario should
be treated as an owner of the securities. While the whether authorities agree (i.e., do not
treat the Intermediary as a lender), it is worth considering if inconsistency between when
and whether authorities in this context might be desirable. Intermediary's economic return
from the buy-and.-sell-forward transaction is based largely on time value of money.
Congress recognized this economic reality, but was careful to avoid treating the buy-and-
sell-forward transactions as loans. The Congressional solution is embodied in § 1258 that
converts a portion of capital gain from a "conversion transaction" into ordinary income. A
conversion transaction includes, inter alia,
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The readers may recall that a taxpayer came close to pointing out this
inconsistency in Bank of Nashville.38 1 Because in that case the bank (the
Intermediary) was itself a licensed bond dealer, it was by no means certain that
it would hold the specific bonds received from the issuers throughout the term
of the repo. Instead of citing North Texas Lumber,382 a nonfungible when case,
the bank should have argued that under the short sale authorities, commodities
futures rulings, and the rest of the fungible when decisions, the uncertainty
about the specific bonds to be delivered in the second leg of the repo meant
that this leg must have remained open until the actual delivery. Unfortunately,
the bank failed to identify the relevant authorities, and the court missed an
opportunity to consider the subtle distinction between a when and a whether
inquiries. As if one needed another confirmation that failing to address the
issues doesn't resolve them, the tension between when and whether approaches
resurfaced again in the recent controversy discussed next.
VI. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TAX OWNERSHIP - A RECENT EXAMPLE
A contemporary controversy raising the tax ownership issue involves a
fairly simple transaction sold to several large U.S. corporations by Twenty-
First Securities Corporation ("Twenty First"), an investment firm specializing
in tax-advantaged strategies. For example, Compaq Computer Corporation
executed it as follows:
On September 16, 1992, Twenty First, acting on Compaq's behalf,
bought ten million Royal Dutch ADRs from the designated seller, which
was another client of Twenty-First. Twenty-First immediately sold the
ADRs back to the seller. The trades were made in 46 separate New York
any transaction (1) substantially all of the taxpayer's expected return from which is
attributable to the time value of the taxpayer's net investment in such transaction, and,
(2) which is (A) the holding of any property (whether or not actively traded), and the
entering into a contract to sell such property (or substantially identical property) at a
price determined in accordance with such contract, but only if such property was
acquired and such contract was entered into on a substantially contemporaneous
basis ....
I.R.C. § 1258(c). Congress explained the need to enact this section by noting that "[t]he
committee is aware that taxpayers are able to enter into transactions the economic substance
of which is indistinguishable from loans in terms of the return anticipated and the risks
borne by the taxpayer." H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 636-37 (1993). Nonetheless, Congress
specified that "gain realized by a taxpayer from disposition or other termination of a
position that was part of a conversion transaction that would otherwise be treated as capital
gain will be treated as ordinary income (but not as interest) for all purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code." Id. at 637 (emphasis added). In a sense, § 1258 was needed because the
whether authorities did not reach far enough. At the same time, Congress's reluctance to
treat market purchases and sales as loans suggests that the limited reach of fungible whether
authorities may be appropriate.
381 First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972).
382 Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930).
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Stock Exchange (NYSE) floor transactions - 23 purchase transactions
and 23 corresponding resale transactions - of about 450,000 ADRs each
and were all completed in a little over an hour.3 83
All purchases were done pursuant to the special NYSE settlement terms and
settled on September 17; all sales were executed pursuant to the regular terms
of the exchange and settled on September 21.384 Compaq was a shareholder of
record between September 17 and September 21.385 This brief period was of
no small significance because of the manner in which large corporations pay
dividends to their shareholders.
Usually, before the dividend is paid, the issuer declares the amount of the
dividend, the record date, and the payment date (which is frequently several
weeks after the record date). Owners of the issuer's shares (or ADRs
representing beneficial interests in the shares) at the close of business on the
record date receive the dividend on the payment date. The shares or ADRs
trade "cum dividend," i.e., with the price not reduced on account of the
dividend, if the purchaser of a share is entitled to the dividend. If the purchaser
would become the holder of record after the record date for the dividend, the
shares or ADRs are purchased "ex dividend" and are worth less than the "cum
dividend" shares roughly by the amount of the announced dividend, all other
things being equal. 386 In Compaq, the dividend declaration date for Royal
Dutch ADRs preceded September 16 and the dividend record date fell between
September 17 and September 21.387 By executing the purchases pursuant to
the special terms and the sales pursuant to the regular terms, Compaq assured
itself of record ownership on the dividend record date. 388
Compaq did on purpose what most investors try to avoid at all costs - it
bought high and sold low, realizing a short-term capital loss of about $20.5
million. 389 Not coincidentally, it had an unrelated capital gain of over $200
million to shelter the loss. 390 On the other hand, Compaq received $22.5
million in gross dividend and paid about $1.5 million in fees. 391 Furthermore,
383 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001). ADRs, or
American Depository Receipts, are trading units allowing foreign corporations to have their
shares traded on the major U.S. stock exchanges. Id. at 779. An ADR is a certificate of
ownership of a trust that holds the foreign issuer's shares. For all practical purposes, trading
in ADRs is like trading in the underlying shares, such as shares of Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company in the Compaq case.
384 Id. at 780.
385 Id.
386 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 215-16 (1999).
387 Id. at 217-19.
388 Id. at 219.
389 Compaq, 227 F.3d at 780.
390 Id. ("Compaq used the capital loss to offset part of a capital gain of about $231.7
million that Compaq had realized in 1992 from the sale of stock in another company.").
391 Id.
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Compaq paid about $3.4 million in foreign withholding taxes and claimed the
same amount as a foreign tax credit under § 901.392 Because this tax credit far
exceeded $640,000 of U.S. tax on the transaction, 393 the excess was available
to offset tax on other income. The Service denied the tax credit arguing that
the entire transaction lacked economic substance. 394 The Tax Court held for
the Service and assessed a negligence penalty against Compaq.395 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.396 A virtually identical transaction
carried out by Twenty-First on behalf of IES Industries followed a similar path,
with the taxpayer winning in the Eighth Circuit.397
It is hardly surprising that the Service chose to attack these transactions on
the ground that they lacked economic substance. After all, this strategy was
successful before, 398 and the Service was determined to prove that foreign
taxes should generally be treated as an expense for the purposes of an
economic substance inquiry. 399 One wonders, however, whether it was wise to
stipulate, as the government did, that other than the economic substance issue,
it had "no objection to how Compaq chose to report its tax benefits and
liabilities concerning the transaction. 4 °°
There is no shortage of opinions about the economic substance doctrine in
general, and its application to the Compaq transaction in particular.40 1
392 Id.
39' The $640,000, according to the Compaq's calculations, was the tax on its net profit
from the transaction: the excess of gross dividends received over the loss from sale of the
ADRs and the fees incurred in the transaction. Id. at 782.
31 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 220 (1999).
395 Id. at 227.
396 Compaq, 227 F.3d at 788.
197 See IES Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 253 F.3d 350, 353-56 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'g, 84
A.F.T.R. 2d 99-6445 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
391 See, e.g., United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that
repo-to-maturity transactions were economic shams); Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738, 761
(1990) (finding that repos-to-maturity lacked economic substance).
399 The Service made this argument, for example, in Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, 334-
35. For a detailed analysis of the Notice, see James M. Peaslee, Economic Substance Test
Abused: Notice 98-5 and the Foreign Law Taxpayer Rule, 79 TAx NOTES 79, 98-107 (1998).
The Service recently withdrew Notice 98-5, although it will continue to scrutinize
transactions similar to those litigated in Compaq. See Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 I.R.B. 606.
400 Compaq, 277 F.3d at 781.
40 Some of the most celebrated decisions formulating the doctrine of economic
substance and a related business purpose requirement are tax ownership cases. See
generally, Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Wexler, 31 F.3d 117 (3d
Cir. 1994); Rice Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), Estate of
Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Sheldon, 94 T.C. 738 (1990); Grodt &
McKay Realty v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981). Some of the examples of recent
commentary on the issue include Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax
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Addressing this and related doctrines is beyond the scope of this article.
Setting economic substance aside, it is hard not to notice that the tax ownership
issue is front and center in the Compaq transaction. Although the government
was not making the ownership argument, the Tax Court came close to
addressing it when it asserted that Compaq "was acquiring a foreign tax credit,
not substantive ownership of Royal Dutch ADR's. ' '40 2 Moreover, the court's
holding - disallowance of the credits and the loss from sale of ADRs, as well
as of the dividend inclusion - is the exact outcome that would have resulted
had the Tax Court concluded that Compaq never acquired the ADRs.
However, the Tax Court rested its conclusion solely on the economic substance
argument, and the circuit court never addressed the ownership issue. Perhaps,
the court would have changed its conclusion if it asked itself whether Compaq
owned the ADRs.4
03
Following the approach suggested in this article, we should first observe that
the asset arguably owned by Compaq - the ADRs - is a fungible publicly-
traded security. The next question is whether, in the context of the particular
transaction, the specific ADRs acquired by Compaq lost their fungibility. It
seems clear that little, if anything, remained uncertain regarding the specific
ADRs that were going to be delivered by Compaq on September 21. The
uncertainty could have existed for one of two reasons: either Compaq had
other identical ADRs that it could have delivered, or Compaq could buy such
other ADRs and deliver them to settle the trades. It is not clear from the
opinions whether Compaq owned any other Royal Dutch ADRs prior to
September 16, but it appears fairly likely that it did not, or, at least, not in the
amount comparable to 10 million ADRs acquired in the transaction. Any
ADRs purchased on or after September 16 under the regular settlement terms
would come into Compaq's possession only after September 21. Perhaps,
Compaq could have conceivably purchased more ADRs on the special, next-
day settlement terms used by it in the first place. However, Compaq would
have to finance the purchase - something that it did not have to do in the
Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47 (2001); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic
Substance, 52 TAx LAW. 235 (1999); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate
Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221 (2000); Dana L. Trier, Beyond the
Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in Addressing the Corporate Tax
Shelter Problem, 78 TAXES 62 (2000); David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as
an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 73 (2001); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About
Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History, 54 SMU L. Rev. 209 (2001).
402 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 223 (1999).
403 David Hariton suggested that the Tax Court's holding, perhaps correct, should have
been based on the finding that Compaq did not own the ADRs "as an economic matter" in
light of an extremely brief period during which Compaq held the ADRs. See David Hariton,
Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and Legislative Intent, 53 TA LAW. 579, 610 (2000). For
a suggestion that leasing cases decided on the economic substance grounds would be better
resolved by making a tax ownership inquiry, see Kenneth W. Gideon, Mrs. Gregory's
Grandchildren: Judicial Restriction of Tax Shelters, 5 VA. TAX REv. 825, 841 (1986).
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transaction arranged by Twenty-First because it bought and sold
simultaneously. In that trade, Compaq managed to acquire 10 million ADRs
worth almost $900 million by depositing about $17 million in a margin
account and withdrawing it three hours later.4°4 Compaq would have been
required to part with a much more substantial sum for a longer period to
acquire additional securities in an amount that would create a meaningful
uncertainty regarding which specific ADRs it would eventually deliver on
September 21. In sum, although not entirely clear, it appears very likely that
although ADRs are fungible securities in general, the specific ADRs acquired
by Compaq on September 16 were bound to be delivered to the purchaser on
September 21. That is, as a practical matter, there was no possibility that
Compaq would substitute any other ADRs for those it purchased at the
inception of the transaction. Thus, in the specific context of the transaction in
question, the Royal Dutch ADRs purchased by Compaq on September 16
became identified. Hence, the relevant tax ownership authorities are those
dealing with nonfungible assets.
The essence of the Compaq transaction is very similar to the familiar pattern
where a taxpayer purchases an asset and simultaneously contracts to sell it
forward. Putting aside the settlement procedures (i.e., assuming that trades are
entered into and settle simultaneously on their settlement dates), Compaq may
be viewed as purchasing the ADRs on September 17 (the settlement date of the
buy-side of the transaction) and simultaneously entering into a forward
contract to sell the same amount of ADRs on September 21 (the settlement
date of the sell-side of the transaction). Viewed this way, the transaction looks
very similar to those considered in Bradford and Patton-Comtel decisions,
except that the forward in Compaq is much shorter than in any of those cases.
Which line of authorities is more relevant?
Conceptualizing the Compaq trade as a whether case immediately runs into
a problem of offering an alternative characterization of the transaction. If
Compaq did not acquire ownership of ADRs for tax purposes, what did it do?
In order to argue by analogy to Patton that Compaq was a lender rather than
the owner of the ADRs, one would have to identify the borrower. Viewing this
hypothetical borrowing as a two-party case,405 the borrower would be a party
that both received the purchase price from Compaq and returned it to Compaq
(presumably increased by the amount of the dividends paid during the term of
the loan). If the borrowing is thought of as a three-party case, 406 the borrower
would be someone on whose behalf Compaq acquired ADRs and who acquired
them from Compaq pursuant to a plan.
Starting with a two-party characterization, there could have been no
assurance that the seller of the ADRs and their ultimate buyer would be one
I Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 217-218 (1999).
405 For an explanation of the distinction between a two-party case and a three-party case,
see supra note 241 and accompanying text.
406 See id.
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and the same person because the transactions were executed on a stock
exchange. To be sure, this was exactly what happened. Indeed, the circuit
court described the transaction as a purchase "from the designated seller"
followed by an "immediate [sale] ... back to the seller. '40 7 Yet, the court
refused to disregard the interposition of the public market and treat the
transactions as repos - a decision that was not surprising in light of a limited
precedent for doing so. As long as there was no certainty that the seller and the
re-purchaser were the same party, the first loan characterization appears
difficult.
The second loan characterization is also problematic. No particular buyer
requested Compaq to advance funds on its behalf. Even if the Compaq court
looked "through" the market and concluded that the actual purchaser was
predetermined, it would be difficult to conclude that Compaq acted as a lender
because it never parted with $900 million - the presumed principal of the
deemed loan. Because of the manner in which the trades were executed and
the operation of the margin requirements, it only had to deposit a small faction
of the ADRs' price for a brief period. How could Compaq be viewed as
lending $900 million to anyone when the money never left the Compaq's
coffers? Thus, there are considerable difficulties with applying the reasoning
of Patton-Comtel line to the Compaq transaction.
408
Would Bradford be more helpful? It appears that an argument based on the
nonfungible when authorities would be much more damaging to Compaq's
position as an owner. At the time when Compaq acquired the ADRs, it
became unconditionally obligated to deliver them to a buyer. The ultimate
question of the nonfungible when authorities is whether the respective rights
and obligations of the parties have become fixed. On the facts of Compaq,
there seems to be little doubt that this was the case. If so, like Mr. Bradford,
Compaq lost tax ownership of the ADRs a moment after it acquired them and
certainly before the record date for the dividend. Who was then the owner of
the ADRs and the dividends? Their ultimate purchaser. The problem with the
fact that this purchaser may be different from the original seller that needs to
be addressed if the transaction is approached as a whether case, does not exist
in the when context. In fact, this ultimate purchaser may not be a single
taxpayer. Whoever this purchaser is, it, and not Compaq, owns the ADRs on
409the dividend record date. The Bradford conceptualization fits the Compaq
407 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added); see also, IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The
counterparty then sold the ADRs short (that is, sold borrowed property) to IES .... The
counterparty bought back the ADRs after the dividends accrued to IES.") (emphasis added).
408 The conceptual difficulties with recasting the Compaq transaction as a lending by
Compaq are closely related to those underlying Congress's reluctance to characterize buy-
and-sell-forward arrangements as loans in § 1258. See supra, note 380.
409 This conclusion may appear to produce an unpleasant surprise for the unsuspecting
purchaser(s) who acquires ADRs from a seller such as Compaq in open market transactions.
However, if these transactions are not prearranged, the purchaser(s) would be unaware of
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transaction almost seamlessly, and produces the exact result argued for by the
Service. After all, maybe it is more productive to let Bradford and Patton
approaches coexist and apply each type in the appropriate setting.
CONCLUSION
Having the benefit of the analytical framework proposed in this article, it is
worth taking another look at the existing tax ownership scholarship. It should
come as no surprise that the commentators' thoughts about ownership are
greatly affected by the type of transactions they consider. Those trying to
discern the unifying principles while focusing on real estate and equipment
transfers effected primarily through leases and sale-leasebacks argue that the
inquiry should be limited to economic benefits and burdens and offer detailed
tests. 4 10 Others, looking at transactions in stock and securities, conclude that
economics are all but irrelevant in determining an owner of a fungible asset.
4 1
'
While these differences underscore the unsettled state of the ownership
doctrine, they are not contrary to the approach proposed here. All of these
commentators are right and there is nothing inconsistent in their views, as long
as the views of each group are limited to the ownership inquiry in a specific
context.
A third group of commentators, however, suggests that a particular principle
or set of principles applies to ownership transfers in general. The analysis
offered by David Miller is not in conflict with this article's approach.
412
However, Miller ends up offering six rules of thumb that are fairly narrow and
are tailored to specific transactions. 413 Charles Kingson and Lee Sheppard
the seller's peculiar circumstances and would not include dividends in income. In reality,
arrangements such as the one in the Compaq case are inevitably executed with an assistance
of intermediaries recruited by the firns such as Twenty First. Both in Compaq and in IES
cases the same entities that sold the ADRs to the taxpayers ended up repurchasing the
securities from them, see supra, text accompanying note 407. Treating these intermediaries
as receiving dividend income (and paying a higher purchase price for the ADRs) may not be
particularly offensive to the notions of notice and fairness.
410 See, e.g., Faber, supra note 2, at 809 (suggesting that courts concentrate on economic
burdens that accompany particular deductions); Marsh, supra note 2, at 567 (proposing a
test focused on economic attributes of the asset being sold); Simonson, supra note 2, at 3
(offering a three-part test based entirely on economic characteristics).
411 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 794 (arguing that "[a]t least for gain/loss
realization issues, then, the only touchstone of who owns a security today is the legal and
practical freedom to dispose of that security"); Kevin Dolan & Carolyn DuPuy, Equity
Derivatives: Principles and Practice, 15 VA. TAX REv. 161, 173 (1995) (asserting that
economics is not dispositive in determining owners of publicly traded property); Surdell,
supra note 1, at 1534 (summarizing common law of tax ownership related to fungible assets
as focused on "dispositive power" rather than economic benefits and burdens).
412 See Miller, supra note 4.
413 Id. at 326.
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make an argument that is far less consistent with my analysis. 414 Having
considered the Compaq transaction in light of other ownership authorities, they
argue that Compaq did not own ADRs at any time because it could neither gain
nor lose from their price movements. In other words, "[w]hether the legal
owner of a capital asset should be considered the owner for tax purposes is a
more elaborate way of asking whether the legal owner is economically at
risk."415 Neither Sheppard nor Kingson acknowledge that there is at least a
question whether the Frank Lyon principles, or those enunciated in Provost,
should govern the ownership inquiry in a particular context.
Professor Shaviro recognizes this uncertainty, but sees no way to resolve it.
Considering whether a long counterparty in an equity swap (on a fungible
underlying equity) should be viewed as the owner of the underlying equity, he
asks whether the analogies based on short against the box authorities would
dispose of the issue and concludes that the answer is essentially a matter of
prediction. A court might reject this approach, suggests Shaviro,
on the ground that the tax treatment of fungible securities has no overall
unifying logic, and thus.. . the tax treatment of an equity swap need not
be intellectually consistent with the tax treatment of a nonowner's long
position or a short against the box. The court might decide that
precedents involving similarly structured transactions (for example,
tangible property leases accompanied by put and call options between the
lessor and lessee) were more germane than precedents involving different
fact patterns but similarly fungible assets (such as a short against the
box).416
This article attempts to resolve the uncertainty identified by Professor
Shaviro. I argue that there is a unifying principle in the law of tax ownership,
there are reasons why the ownership analysis of an equity swap should not be
analogized to leases of tangible property, and these reasons rest on much more
than any specific line of authorities dealing with any particular transaction.
In sum, the law of tax ownership is vast, remarkably fragmented, and
thoroughly confused. I argue that there is a substantial support for subdividing
tax ownership authorities into four categories. Furthermore, I identify the tests
relevant for each of the categories - the tests that are not expressly articulated
by many of the authorities, but are largely followed nonetheless. This
approach, I believe, clarifies the law of tax ownership by reconciling
seemingly contradictory decisions, identifying critical issues, and focusing on
relevant inquiries. On a more practical level, this approach helps to locate the
appropriate precedents and to distinguish the irrelevant ones. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the suggested framework should provide useful
guidance for resolving future difficult tax ownership questions which, if my
414 See Lee A. Sheppard, Should Riskless Profit Equal Economic Substance?, 94 TAX
NOTES 153 (2002); Kingson, supra note 1.
415 Sheppard, supra note 414, at 160.
416 Shaviro, supra note 3, at 679.
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experience is any indication, are certain to arise.
At the same time, one should fully recognize the limitations of this article.
Recognizing the four categories and placing a particular transaction in the
correct one by no means completes the tax ownership inquiry. Even if one
accepts the tests proposed here for each of the four groups, it is clear that
transactions within each of them are, and are likely to continue to be, full of
subtle distinctions that will call for a nuanced analysis. Thus, using the
contextual approach developed here would only help to make the first rough
cut. As the discussion has demonstrated, however, making this first step can
substantially advance the analysis.
No doubt, the proposed division is not the only "right" way to analyze
ownership issues. Tax ownership authorities present scholars with such rich
and diverse material that it should be expected, not just possible, that other
conceptual approaches will be developed in the future. They will arrive not a
minute too soon. For the moment, the goal of this article would be more than
fulfilled if contextual analysis of tax ownership is used as a helpful tool in
answering difficult ownership questions.
